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1. 
I N T R 0 D U C T I 0. N • 
Since World War II a special interest has been generated in 
incomes policies in industrial countries as a result of persistent 
inflation •. During the War nations were obliged to give close and 
continual attention to the control of wages and prices in view of the 
acute scarcity of manpower and other resources and the urgent need 
to secure an extremely rapid mobilisation of all available resources 
for the over-riding purpose of winning the war. It rarely, if ever, 
occurred to economists at the time, that inflation would still remain a 
serious problem after countries had adjusted their economies. to peace-
time conditions and after the immediate "pent-up" demand existing at 
the. end of hostilities had been satisfied o 
Even before the end of the War, economists were thinking of 
ways in which the anticipated depression could be reduced. Most, 
if not all, of them seemed to consider that full employment, as lt has 
now come to be accepted in industrialized countries, was up.likely. 
Lord Beveridge himself was not optimistic that unemployment could 
(l) 
be brought below about 3 per cent of the labour force. 
As the war era .receded and the world moved into the second 
half of. the century, inflation remained a major problem in most Western 
countries and the wide-spread economic stagnation which economists had 
feared, failed to re-appear. Instead rising prices and -wages, accom-
panied by a high level of employment. relative to pre-war conditions 
persisted, despite warnings by economists that the high level of economic 
activity would not last. 
Accordingly/ ••••••.• 





Accordingly it was to be expected .that governments,. anxious to 
avoid the dangers stemming from continually rising prices - particularly 
in view of balance payments crises - would look for some method for 
controlling incomes so that inflation could be stopped or at least contained 
within an acceptable, although o~en not clear!y specified~ -limit. Incomes 
policies have ·thus been conceived and applied under various economic 
and social conditions in an attempt to help preserve economic stability. 
This . stability was btended to include fostering economic growth, en-
suring an equitable or "socially just" distribution of income and a 
healthy balance of payments. 
By 1970, however, a considerable measure of disenchantment 
towards incomes policies is discernable among many employers, trade 
unionists and politiqians 1.n western nations in view of the lack of success 
of these policies, especially in the longer term 9 to contain inflation with 
( 2) 
any great degree of success. The purpose of this thesis i.s to attempt 
to survey and analyse incomes policies in Western countries which have 
instituted them and to try to explain t;he economic problems that confront 
economies which apply them with the prime object of checking inflation. 
It is, moreover, i.mportant. to c.onsidet' whet her the disappointing re-
sults flowed from policies which were basically inappropriate· for the 
economies .:for which they were designed, or whether they were due to 
a lack of determination by the authorities to carry them out, ·in view of 
public hostm.ty towards this kind of go1ernment intervention. 
Incomes/. ; •••• 
(2) The Editor in the Preface to the article by F .W. PAISH entitled 
·"Rise and Fall of Incomes Policy", remarks that. "the economic 
discussion of 1 incomes policy 1 has now changed from its merits, 
which are seen to be few, and its demerits, which. seem more 
obvious, to the reasons for its failure (in Britian) and the extent 
to whi.ch statistics record its unhappy history". 
HOBART PAPER No. 47, June, 1969. 
3. 
Incomes policies can, of course, be taken to include many types 
of direct and indirect government controls and methods of distributing 
the national product. It is intended, however, to limit the survey to 
a consideration of their specific objective of controlling inflation, as 
distinct from . their objectives ~ such as reducing the disparity. in incomes 
within a community or the social welfare aspects of pensions and un-
employment. We shall, therefore~ be dealing in the main with incomes 
policies in the narrower sense "of the relationship between changes in 
•••.• •real income and changes in. the aggregate of money incomes 
taking place in the economy at the same ti&(J,.. 
The isolation of one specific goal of an incomes policy is a 
difficult operation. Policies, even if developed primarily to counter in-
flation, do include other issues as well and it is impossible to ignore 
them as they inevitably intrude. into the formulation and application of 
any particular policy. Moreover, they may serve to modify, retard 
or assist the attempt to secure a greater degree of control over the 
causes of inflation. 
R .C. Tress is surely correct in pointing out that this connection 
between the narrower and the wider meanings must not be forgotten. 
For example, he reminds us that the National Incomes Commision 
established in 1962 was instructed to have regard to ••••• "the 
desirability of keeping the rate .of increase of the aggregate of monetary 
( 4) 
incomes within the long-term rate of increase of national production". 
Tress observes that "clearly this undertaking is a pursuit distinct from 
·that/ ••••••. 
( 3) R .C. TRESS "Incomes Policy in the United Kingdom 11 • A paper 
from "The Distribution of National Income" edited by J. MARCHAL 
and B. DUCROS. · 
(4) Cmnd. 1994 H.M.s.o. 1963, pp ii - iii 
4. 
that of trying to formulate a policy for dividing up the national product. 
11 Yet it is ·important", he continues "to recognise ·the connections between 
·the two, as an appreciation of some of the difficulties in formulating 
an. incomes .policy in the current (narrower) .•••• sense - and of some 
(5) 
of the obstacles to its application - stems from them 11 • It will be seen 
when we study the British and Dutch incomes. policies how the wider 
meaning of the term may influence the application of the policy and may 
m.ake its successful implementation much more difficult. 
The political process is intended to give the electorate ·in democratic 
societies the opportunity, at regular intervals, for expressing its approval 
of the economic and social policies of the government. The attitudes and 
conditions within a society and the decisiora of the government of the day 
will therefore, together determine to what extent an incomes policy as 
. distinct from other policies will be the instrument used to promote the 
economic and social development of the country. Indeed, it will be 
emphasised· later that without. the co-operation of the community as a 
whole, an incomes policy providing for direct government intervention 
in t.he fixing of prices and wages is almost unworkable even for a 
relatively short period, Some of the objectives of the community will, 
no. doubt, conflict and will need to be reconciled or "traded off" against 
one another. A more equal distribution of income between individuals 
may, for example, entail a relatively slower rate of growth. 
Incomes/ •••• 
(5) R.C .• TRESS op ·cit. p. 682. 
5. 
Incomes policies, irrespective of the relative importance attached to 
. the various ends they pursue 1 have always been applied in conjunction 
with other policy in~truments. such as the conventional fiscal and monetary 
measures with which we are more familiar. . Even if an incomes policy 
were to have only the single specific job of controlling inflation, · it would 
still require to be applied in association with other instruments such as . 
taxation and credit controls. We must remember that the relationships 
. between those variables. significant in causing inflation may shift over time. 
Indeed the ·more sophisticated and complex econometric studies( 6 )now being 
attempted may well indicate that the "navigation instruments" government 
departments have been using are not only. inaccurate but are funda-
mentally wrong. 
( 6) The article by DR. J. BRAY in "The Economis.t", 30th May 1970 
is important for its challenge to what Dr. Bray refers to as the 
"conventional wisdom". He suggests that the model by GODLEY 
and SHEPHERD on which the British Treasury appears to place 
considerable reliance for its economic .forecasts may be basically 
unsound. 
- - - - 0 0 0 .- - - ·-
Chapter 1 / ..•• 
6. 
C H .A P, T ,E R I. 
It was indicated. in the· introduction that an. incomes policy could 
be, variously defined according to [what sense the .term :was to. be used. 
In the present contE1,?Ct a useful definition may, perhaps j) be "the effort 
to acquire a degree of direct collective control over the ·level and 
·structure of the remuneration of labour and capital and over the dis-
(1) 
tribution of .the national income to households and enterprises". The 
authors of ·this .definition observe that the use of the words "direct ••• 
control" distinguishes .incomes policies from other instruments of economic 
management such as monetary and budgetary policies, prevention of 
competition, foreign trade controls, growth. policies and many other in~ 
struments which affect the level of national income and .its distribution. 
They also add that the term 11 collectiven ratiler. ·than "government" 
control has been adopted because in Western countries even where the 
State has certain compulsory power, it must . "influence primary incomes 
mainly by guidance and persuasion of management, workers and their 
representative organisations • • • • • • • • • • it is the policies adopted by 
.these collective organisations which· must be the instruments of incomes 
policy". 
Although the definition is wide it succeeds in eliminating many other 
policies which would have to be included Jf the concept were defined in 
. its broadest sense. Nevertheless it must. be conceded that it does ·leave 
a measure . of ambiguity as to .the precise nature of the government us role 
·in/ ••••• 
(1) This definition is taken from ''INCOMES IN POST-WAR EUROPE. 
A STUDY IN POLICIES, GROWTH AND DISTRIBUTION .. 
U. N. E • C • E (1967) Ch. 1, p. 2. 
; 
?-... 
in any system, namely, whether the State both has, and, . in addition, 
uses specific legislative powers to prevent. increases in particular ·incomes 
·from rising above a certain defined -level. The Report by. the Organi-
sation for European Economic Cq-operation, ."The Problem of Rising 
(2) 
Prices", when referring to 'W'age policies is unequivocal in. its assertion 
. that . "vague exhortation 11 by the government, informal understanding un-
.. checked by special powers, arbitration machinery where . there . is no 
. instruction nas to the average wage increase appropriate to the economy", 
government intervention. in cases of disputes designed to encourage or 
. facilitat~ settlement and centralised wage negotiation by and of. ttiielf, are 
·not strictly wage policies. They. insist that the Government must have 
a "reasonably pr.ecise view . . . . . . . . of the average increase in wages 
that. is appropriate to :the economic situation and consistent with . stability 
of.. the price Jevel 11 • A-lthough ,these conditions would appear to I'ule · 
out any. type oLvoluntaryiincomes. -policy some attention will be given 
. to. voluntary policies :in. order to establish why .. legislative powers are 
·normally a prerequisite for effective incomes pol ides. ' 
The means which a government has .to make a particular· policy 
.... 1 
effec.tive . is, indeed, an essential part of any policy designed to control 
the rate of inflation. It f s necessary to bear in mind that no matter 
how precise or detailed the policy may be, the methods by which Jt is 
to be applied will be of fundamental importance for its success. 
A/ ..... 
(2) "THE PROBLEM OF RISING PR.ICES·". O.E.E .. C . .,(l96l)p.58 
8. 
A piously enunciated objective 9 no matter how .clearly spelled outj) is not 
worth consideration as a policy if. the sectors of the community to whom 
it. is addressed do· not intend .to observe it and know the government has 
( 3) 
·no power to make .them do. so. Indeed 9 Jossleyn Hennessy has argued 
.•forcefully that an incomes policy. to. control inflation can only be attempted 
if the gover??-ment sets up an authority to. decide periodically 
" (a) by what total sum incomes can be allowed to .rise 
without c.ausi.ng inflation~ 
( b) how it is to. be allocated among thousands of categories 
of skills. in the nation us worklri.g population; 
(c) how employees can be compelled-to. accept as Ufair.u"·i 
the shares allocated to them 11 • 
It would . seem clear~ although· this .does admittedly anticipate the 
later discussion in Chapter III on ·guidelines and guideposts~ that. there 
should be some element of compulsion within .the framework of the policy 
for it· to be properly regarded as an· incomes policy, although statutor.y 
powers may be held in reserve~ and rarely :i if ever ll emplqyed. 
It is, in addition :i necessary to . distinguish between a wage pqlicy 
including salaries ·- and an incomes p_olicy. Strfotly,:i a wage policy 
is concerned-• only with cePtain types of incomes :1 namely :i that share of 
the national product going either to ·labour· as . a whole . or to certain 
categories of labour such as unionised labour j) .the lowest paid. sections 
of labour or labour in specific• industries -or ·carrying out particular 
types -of work • Pt>operly, an incomes policy is a wider concept 
. including non-wage incom·es such as :rents, interei:;t and profits. The 
economic aspects -of controlling non-wage -incomes j) .·however~ involve 
problems/ ••• 
(3) "INCOMES POLICY IN EURO.PE''· Part II of 1 Poliqy for 
Incomes" Hobart paper No. 29. J:nstitute of Economic Affair§. 
9. 
problems not associated with wages such as the rewards for risk-
taking by entrepreneurs. 
Having attempted to describe what the concepts of "incomes policy" 
and "wage policy" include and the difficulty of providing a really satis-
factory definition, it is now necessary to approach a definition of in-
flation. Definitions of inflation are, of course, legion. Some econo-
mists define inflation as the increase in money incomes "out-stripping. 
( 4) 
the sustainable growth of output".' This. definition is, perhaps, in-
sufficient as it does not clearly establish that all money incomes need 
not necessarily be spent or, . indeed, even be received by the factors 
of production earning them. It may be preferable to add the word 
"disposable" to indicate that the "gross" money income may not be 
available to satisfy demand, in so far as the State itself siphons off 
in. taxes, a proportion of all incomes above a certain minimum level. 
On the other hand, the distinction may be misleading as the government 
can and often does, immediately pump back into the economy all the 
income taken in taxes, thereby m.erely re-distributing income from one 
group to another either in t,he form of investment and government 
spending or simply through transfer payments. Nevertheless until it 
re-appears again as disposable income it does not increase or lead to 
inflation except in so far as people anticipate its return and spend .in 
anticipation. Furthermore, not all disposable income. is spent by those 
earning it, and the portion saved may not be invested if "investment" 
is used in the sense that it involves further real expenditure. It may 
be more ·accurate to regard inflation as the excess of intended or 
planned spending over the "sustainable growth of output". This would 
emphasise I· .. 
(4) F .W. PAISH. "Policy· for Incomes?" Hobart Paper: No. 29 p. 13 
(1964) 
10. 
emphasise that the intention of the recipients of income is of particular 
relevance . - namely the relationship between total planned spending and 
. total planned output. The more familiar and somewhat more popular 
description of inflation as the persistent general rise in prices may tend 
to obscure the aspect of excess mohetary demand that lies behind it. 
Inflation may .. be initiated and .perpetuated .. in different ways. It is 
of crucial impor~ance for the authorities to appreciate the nature of the 
relationship as the U\struments for dealing with inflation will depend upon 
what are regarded as the principal reasons causing the excess monetary 
demand leading to the rise in prices. Even the above definition of 
inflation leaves something to be desired because it tends to disregard 
the inflation usually referred to as "cost:-push 11 rather than "demand-pull", 
and, moreover, it does not distinguish between money incomes and the 
money supply, all of which will require examination. 
The •·'raison d'etre 1 of an . incomes policy in the narrower sense 
in which we have defined it, is to ensure the full-employment of the 
resources of a country without at the same time enduring an unaccept-
ably high rate of inflation. It is this conflict between a high rate of 
growth being sought with a high Jevel of employment but at the cost of 
a high rate of inflation that has been at the heart of many of the so-
called ·"stop-go" policies since Wot-ld War II. The supporters of 
incomes policies have generally argued, often cogently, that full em-
ployment and a high rate of economic growth are possible without in-
flation only if the government. is able and has the will to prevent the 
rate of increase in incomes from outstripping output, so that the excess 
demand for labour will not result in employers bidding up wages and 
therefore raising prices .in a continuing wage-price spiral. Without 
such government intervention the exponents of this argument claim that 
the only effective alternative to inflation . is to reduce demand by 
monetary/ ....... . 
11. 
monetary and fiscal means and to have part of the country is resources un-
utilised. They contend that in the real world a hiargin of spare capaci_ty 
is necessary to avoid inflation but that an incomes policy can reduce this 
margin. substantially. Similarly they argue that an incomes policy would 
prevent the monopoly power ·of both unions and employers. in key indus-
tries from raising prices and wages and causing rising unemployment. in 
other sectors of the economy 7 as well as underutilisation of labour 
resources in their own sector. 
In the real world it is generally far from easy to_ determine in any 
given set of economic conditions to what extent the inflation is of one -kind 
·or the other. A rise in prices may at first sight appear to. be purely 
a ·11 cost-push 11 inflation sustained by the demands of unionised labour. 
This conclusion may be misleading as the demands may reflect the 
unions 1 claim for wage increases lagging behind a general rise in the 
price of commodities:.this ri.se being the result of excess demand created 
by increased government spending ll by an increased money supply or by 
a reduction in taxes. 
(5) 
Indeed. as H .A. Turner and H. Zoeteweij have pointed out» · 
merely because wages appear to. have risen before prices»· does. not 
necessarily indicate that the -inflation ·is of the "cost-push" variety, as 
"it might also be. the case that the wage . increase was a delayed adjust-
ment to a much .earlier price increase-". The di:ffic·ulty of deciding 
whether ·inflation is caused by union power or by excess demand at an 
earlier stage 7 is: undoubtedly .ever-present. "The difficulty".. Turner 
and Zoeteweij add 7 11is ... to distinguish between ·the. two cases . in practice 7 
this is. all the greater ·because they are liable to be combined. in different 
proportions .. in different situations". F. W. Pai sh 7 however 7 
has/ ••••••.•• 
( 5) "Prices,. Wages. and Incomes Policies· in Industrialised Market 
Economics" H .A. TURNER AND H. ZOETEWEIJ. Internation-
al Labour Officell Studies and Reports. New Series 7 No.70 p .. 78· 
12. 
has contended that although inflati:m may be sustained and perpetuate~ 
" by labour pressing for increased wages whether because of its monoply 
power or ·because there . is excess demand for labour, a generai rise 
in prices in unlikely to be initiated by "cost-push 11 inflation because em-
ployers will know that if they raise prices there will be a reduction .in 
demand and if they were previously maximising 'Jrofits, their profits 
will how decline. In these circumete.ncef' they will try to resist 
union .demandf' but if they cannot O.o so, their '.)Utput and sales will be 
·lower and . this in . itself will lead to unemployment and so w.ill tend to 
discourage inflationary trends. Paish argues that .firms will only 
raise their prices and maintain their level of production if they are 
satisfied that the higher prices can ·be passed on .to the consumer with-
out a loss of sales. Firms -must be confident that there will be an .in-
crease in aggregate incomes in the economy to justify the same· level 
of production at higher· prices. This would suggest .. that firms antici-
pate inflation .otherwise they w.ould behave in a different manner. Paish 
.therefore claims .that "cost inflation has become the way in which .in-
( 6) 
flations are perpetuated rather than . initiated~'. 
" i 
In ,the . following chapter -We shall be studying in some detail the 
empirical work on. inflation which has been carried out in recent years 
irt so ,far as it has a bearing on the possible advantages of incomes 
policies. over other measures, for curbing inflation. It might, perhaps, 
be appropriate before doing so to point out the significance of the . money 
supplyin an inflationary situation. Economists have often stressed that for 
an inflation .to be prolonged it is necessary for the supply of money to 
be increased. It· is not sufficient merely for money incomes themselves 
to/ ..... . 
(6) F.W. PAISH "Policy for Income~" op. cit. p. 15 
to increase.. How~ver, if at an early stage :in the.inflationary spiral 
there are large idle cash balances sugge,stiqg low ra.tes of interest, . it 
may .be a lengthy period before the constant supply of money ·is able to 
exert a significant influence on the rate of inflation. An . increase in the 
velocity of circulation of money can .enable prices to continue ·rising to 
a le:vel unacceptable to .t;he authorities 1ong before rising rates- -of interest 
have succeeded in drawing out all idle balances. The whole question of . 
the quantity of money and its relation. to the ri'Se' ·in. the price ·level is a 
complex one ·in a modern economy. In particular, many substitutes 
for ·money have been developed and these substitute$ together with the 
activities of. banks, credit organisati~hs and other .Jiri~cial interme-
diaries play an .important part in sustaining the excess dem.and for goods 
and services, despite a relatively constant volume of money. Where 
the quantity of cash can be controlled directly by the monetary authorities 
the volume of money and the volume of money substitutes can . also be 
controlled as they are themselves dependant upon a cash .base. 
Nevertheles~, the manner ·in which the supply of money affects ·the 
expenditure patterns ·in the ·economy of. a modern state ·is intricate and 
often far from clear. It- is worth noting, however, that H .A .• Turner 
and H. Zoeteweij have defined inflation .not in terms .of an·. increase ·in 
money incomes, but as "an increase in .the supply of money in .relation 
( 7) 
.to that of comm6dities 11 • The relevance of the money supply to , the 
British . problems of inflation will be considered -later. 
( 7) Op cit. p. 28 
- - - - 0 0 0 - - ~ -
• 
14. 
C EA PT ER II. 
We observed in. the previous chapter that it was usually difficult 
to decide firstly what was the relative strength and importance of all 
. the factors causing an .. inflation and secondly whether there was .enough 
evidence ·to : justify the conclusion . t..llat a reduction. in . the level of aggregate 
demand would,only be sufficient. to reduce the rate of. inflation .if un-
acceptable levels of unemployment were to occur. We also •implied that 
. the stronger the element. bf • 11 cost-push," inflation caused by the monoply 
power of unions and assisted by the price .. l' fixing behaviour of parti-
cular industries, the more appealing the institution of an incomes policy 
might become. These ·.issues require further examination and will be 
discussed . in more detail in this Chapter. 
The "demand-pull" and 11 cost-push 11 models that economists have 
· constructed vary from relatively simple illustrations representing extreme 
positions on either side to cincreasin~ complex and abstract models which 
endeavour to ,trace the ·interaction and •interdependance of both causes 
(1) 
of inflation . The authors of "The Problem of Rising Prices" have 
described, succinctly, the ·pure "demand-pull" version when . they state 
. that . "pressure is put on. prodp.ctive resources as more and more goods 
are demanded, capacity, is strained, a general labour shortage devek~p~, 
and prices and wages are bid up by buyers and employers competing 
for scarce supplies". ·."Cost-push:" inflation .. on. the other hand ... is not 
caused directly by excess demanO. but it is result of the exercise of 
monoply power within•. industry either by unions alone or by unions 
assisted by firms which .because of their importance ,in . the economy 
and as a result of their.· methods of. price ·determination. en~ble unions 
.to/ ..... . 
(1) Op cit. p. 33.. They define excess dem.a.nd as "a volume. of 
aggregate monetary demand which cannot be met at existing . prices 
without exerting undue pressure on· productive resources. " 
15. 
to secure higher wages than would prevail under· more competitive 
conditions. If union ..leaders are relatively more concerned with pushing 
up wages that with ensuring a high level of employment either for their 
members or for other sectors of the labour force, a "cost-push-" spiral 
of increased wages causing _-increased prices, which cause .further wage 
claims can be sustained with increasing unemployment. The Government 
must eventually either impose a. price and wage "freeze" or increase 
expenditure, reduce taxes, and loosen credit contr9ls. to enable other 
areas of the economy to counter the rising ·prices a,nd -increased. level of 
unemployment which such . monopolistic behaviour in key sectors may 
bring about. In addition, the · governme:q.t may be able ·to ·legislate with 
some success against certain types of monopolistic behaviour. This 
action may be rather unlikely in some countries both .because of the ' 
manner in which highly capital-intensive industries have developed and 
also ·because of the attitude of organised labour. 
{ 2) 
F. Machlup has pointed out that. "opinion ·is divided on whether 
consumer prices .in recent years have increased chiefly because industry 
has invested too much and government has spent .tJo much {relative .to 
the nation,' s thrift) or because big business has raised material prices 
and/ or ·labour has raised wage rates too high {relative to the nation's 
. increase ·in. productivity) ". Machlup considers the contention. of 
economists such as F. W. Paish, who argue that. "cost-push" inflation 
. is, on the whole, unlikely. to 'initiate a general rise in. the price level 
unless inflation' is already anticipated by employers who expect an· in~ 
crease ·in the money supply to .follow. He concedes that whether ·the 
government/ ..• 
( 2) F. MACHL UP.: ·"Review of Economics and Statistics". 
Vol. 42: (1962 
pp 125 - 13'9. 
16. 
government will permit an increase -in the money supply to _ensure that 
_the -output at higher prices ;is- taken up, is an important question of fact. 
The spiral of increasing wages and prices by employers _and unions _de-
pends. to no small extent on the .expectations they have as to what wUl 
happen -to the money supply. Machlup rightly observes that eabh set 
of real world circumstances will have to be .examined-in the light of the 
-expectations on both sides of industry as- to what. the monetar.y poliqy of 
the government will be. This :is of material significance -because-- if : · -
industry is persuaded that. it will not be ubailed out" by the monetary 
authorities agreeing to an e:xpansion of the money supply so that aggregate 
demand will not be reduced, -both employers _and unions will be much 
less confident about raising wages_ and .prices. The relevance of the 
(3) 
monetary policy of the government. is_ stressed by Paish when he reminds 
us .that "each rise in money. incomes will require _the -holding of more 
money to finance consumption, while_ each rise -in_ prices of physical 
assets, and .the .. titles- to their ·ownership, will require additional money 
- to be held- for ·financing investment. If the -total quantity of money is not 
rising", he concludes, uor rising only as. fast as .real output, money will 
have to be withdrawn from idle. balances-". As we saw.:in .the previous 
chapter when touching _on .the money supply, this will cause an ·increase 
. in the velocity of circulation and the -rise in· interest rates . should eventu-
( 4} 
ally "choke off 11 excess demand. R-.J. E3 .. all would appear .to_ agree 
with :this view and he -remarks :that a "self-perpetuating ·inflation requires 
a suitably expansionary monetary_ policy". 
In/ ••••• 
(3). F-.W. PAISH - op cit. pp. 14-15 
( 4) R .J. BALL. "Inflation and the Theor.y of Money·". 
17. 
In . order to establish. the soundness of any hypothesis it is 
necessary to look .for empirical evidence of how . individuals and groups 
react. We. need to know how employers, unions, non-organised labour, 
and the owners of capital will behave in particular ec:momic circum-
, 
stances. We also need to know how .the government its7lf will react 
and whether its behaviour will be correctly"' anticipated. In cases of 
monopoly "do ·labour unions and monopolistic ,firms -largely disregard the 
( 5) 
state of the market.in settling prices and wages" asks C.L,. Schultz. 
"Are prices marked up as costs rise with .little r.egard for demand 
conditions'? Does. a rise ·in the cost of living lead to an· equivalent 
wage increase in periods of unemployment? 11 Furthermore are unions 
motivated .to demand higher wages in firms making above average 
-profits? Does increased productivity in an industry result only' in a 
higher rate of profit or does it reflect. itself in higher wages and lower 
prices? Are highly capital intensive ,firms more susceptible .to demands 
for wage . increases than other firms? These issues are extremely 
cotnplicated and Schultz suggests that there are few people who would 
take an extreme position .on these questions. He thinks, rather, that 
there ·is a whole spectrum of opinion. If prices and "Y'7ages over a 
substantial portion of the economy· in·. industrialised countries are, 
· inde~d, administered in th~ sense that the commonly accepted market 
forces of supply and de'mand are at least partially ignored· in .. the short-
run and even in the longer-run where the latter may cover a. period 
of five years or more, then :the argument that. "demand-pull" must be 
the initial cause of. inflation would ~eem to lose a good deal of. its force. 
This/ ..•.••. 
(5) C~L. SCHUL'I'Z "Recent Inflation.in the United States", 1959. 
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This, of course, is an issue for empirical investigation and the results 
so far obtained are often conflicting. 
Some economists such as Machlup.distinguish between different types 
of "demand-pull" and "cost-push" inflation which does, no doubt, assist 
in illustrating that the more "simpliste" explanations are inadequate to 
explain satisfactorily a persistent inflation in the real world. Machlup 
uses the terms "autonomous", "induced" and "supportive" demand 
·\ inflation to describe three separate expansions of demand. Autonomous 
expansion would refer to those which are "not linked to previous or 
to expected cost increases" while induced expansions are the direct 
consequences of a cost increase and might occur where firms borrow 
from the ·banking sector in order to pay for an increase in wages. 
Similarly people who receive higher wages may "increase instalment 
purchases and induce an expansion of consumer credit". Supportive 
expansions of demand would· include ·instances where the authorities 
permit an expansion of credit or the money supply ·in order to avoid 
unemployment. This latter expansion would be the type mentioned 
earlier and possibly anticipated by firms. 
Just as Machlup distinguishes three forms of demand inflation so 
also does he isolate three types of cost inflation, namely, "aggressive 11 , 
"defensive" and "responsive" cost inflation. The first type would ·occur 
where unions decide to claim higher real wages because profits are 
rising or where wages are seen to be rising elsewhere in the economy. 
Defensive cost inflation would include the reaction of unions to increases 
in the cost of living index. Responsive cost inflation would refer to . 
increases gained by labour which they would have achieved even without 
monopoly power, namely,increases flowing from the demand for labour 




This breakdown of inflation .into its more detailed forms helps to 
single out the sort of relationships between groups or sectors in an 
. economy that economists advising, a. government should be searching 
fo:r when building up the structure of the incomes. policy they hope to 
institute., It. is the lack of clarity in determining causal relationships 
that makes attempts to control inflation .. in a complex· economy so difficult. 
Even when these relationships are clearly identifiable there remains the 
problem not only of creating the ·instrun:ents for guiding and .directing 
. 
them, but also ,the problem of timing any action so .that. the instruments 
used do not. take effect on a changed economic condition for which· they 
are no. :longer appropriate. Successive administrations in the United 
States, . for example, have been. increasingly criticised. for using weapons 
which take so .long to . be effective, that. they act on an economy that 
requires quite a different type of treatment. 
So far in this Chapter we have dealt in a rather cursory manner 
with some of the complex ·issues .lying behind ·inflations and . therefore 
with some of the factors which may influence governments in making 
their decisions as to whether or not to ,institute a prices and. incomes 
policy. It would be appropriate at this juncture to refer fairly briefly 
to some of the better known empirical. investigations on. inflation. As 
indicated alread,y, the results are· incenclusive. H owevei', at the very 
least, they will serve to highlight the .dilemma facing ,.policy makers in 
government when contemplating direct. intervention 1 in. the wage and 
price determination process. in mixed. industrialised states as in Western 
·Europe and North America. 
One/ ...... . 
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One of the earliest. investigations and, perhaps, still one of the 
( 6) 
most celebrated, was that by Professor A, W, Phillips. This :parti-
,, 
cular empirical study was conducted,. in, an attempt to ·identify a relatioIJ.-
ship -in . the . United Kingdom between the rate of change of money wage 
·rates and -the level of unemployment. The· results appeared to suggest 
that there was a non-linear relationship between these two variables. 
It seemed to indicate that over a period of approximately one hundred 
years the changes in the institutional environment did not significantly 
affect this relationship. Thus the conclusion .derived from the 
statistical_ tests was that the -increasein unionism, the evolution. in . the 
social climate and ih social attitudes, the changing behaviour of industry 
regarding price determination, the increases in productivity or the \ 
changes in the rate of profit, were not sufficiently material over a long 
period to affect the relative closene;Ss of the relationship between ·.the 
. ·level of unemployment and . the rate of change of wage rates. If the 
institutional environment was not an, important-factor ·in. the rate of~ 
change of wage rates, then this would seem to suggest that the 
government could Q.etermine fairly easily what. level of· unemployment 
was consistent with. price stability. After taking into account the 
increase in productivity in industry the Government ·in the United 
Kingdom could calculate the increase in the rate of change of wage 
rates that woula not cause inflation. Accordingly, by' means of fiscal 
and monetary policies, price stability could be se_cured ; wTthout dir~ct 
iilterventi.on _in:-the .price and--~a.-ge determination mechanisms. 
(6) A.W. PPILLIPS; 
There/; ... 
"The relationship between unemplo:Yment 
and .the rate of change of, money wage 
rates in the United Kingdom, -1861 - 1957" 
Economica Vol. 25 ( 1958). 
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There was, of course, the. implied condition that the level of unemploy-
ment required for maintaining price stability would need. to . be politically 
acceptable. Subject to this condition the rate of inflation would be 
determined by the level of unemployment that the country was prepared 
to tolerate. From this ~tudy he concluded that . "ignoring years in 
which ·.import prices rise rapidly enough to initiate a wage-price spiral, 
which seems to occur very rarely except as a result of war, and 
assuming an increase· in productivity of 2 per cent per year, . it seems 
from the relation fitted to the data that if aggregate demand were kept 
at a value which would maintain a stable level of product prices the 
associati:td level of unemploym~mt would be a little under 2~ per cent. 
If as ,is sometimes recommended, demand would be kept at a value 
which would maintain stable· wage rates the associated level of unemploy-
ment would be about 5~ per centn. Phillips has been criticised, 
however, on a number of grounds. Firstly, his critics argue that as 
his investigation referred to wage rates and not to actual earnings it is 
of little value because it is wage drift which is one of the principal 
causes of. inflation. Wage drift would not be reflected in wage rates o 
Secondly, they contend that. there is no necessarily clear-cut or 
·logical connection .. between .. the two variables chosen. It has been 
suggested. that they may change· in the manner they do because they 
are both affected by some third variable, which remains unidentified. 
In addition it has been argued that. the curves described by Phillips 
may in .recent years have been. changing. These c'.Jntentions merit 
discussion because if they are correct they weaken or refute the con-
clusions drawn from the curves and will thereby influence government 
policy decisions based upon these conclusions. 
It I~ .. " . 0 • 
22. 
It will be recalled that the Phillips Curve is negatively sloped 
and non-linear. It intersects the horizontal axis at a level of 
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The dependant variable is, of course, the rate of change of wage rates. 
Some economists following on Phillips 1 work have preferred to substi-
tute th.e rate of change of prices for the rate of change of wages. 
This is quite acceptable if there· is some relatively simple relationship 
postulated· between th,e rate of change in prices and wages. Lipsey, 
·-. 
for example, uses this relationship. 
The reason the curve intersects the horizontal axis at a positive· 
level of unemployment is that there is_ normally some "frictional 11 and 
"structural" unemployment in the economy. Frictional unemployment 
may be .defined as unemployment caused by the lack of. perfect mobility 
of labour and implies a period. of unemplqyment between terminating 
employment and commencing employment. with another firm. Structural 
unemployment "is that unemployment which .is thought to. be associated 
with/ ....... . 
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( 7) 
with the structure of aggregate demand rather than with its level 11 • 
This structural unemployment may be expected to determine the precise 
location of . the curve but not. its shape and slope. If structural 
unemployment remains constant then frictional unemployment determines 
( 8) 
.the shape and slope of the curve, 
Lipsey has argued .that "given that people change jobs for wh.at-
ever reason, and that a finite .time is taken. to change, zero excess 
demand must be accompanied by some . positive amount of frictional 
unemployment. From this -it follows", continues Lipsey, "that when . 
. the wage rate is stable, there will be some quantity of ti.nernployment 
....... the exact quantity being determined by the amount of movement 
and the time taken to move ........ . The larger is the excess 
demand the easier it will be to. find jobs, and the .. less will be the 
.time between jobs. Thus, unless there is a completely offsetting 
increase' in numbers of persons moving between jobs an. increase in 
(9) 
excess demand will cause ___ q. reduction. in 1 u. 1 (unemployment' 11 • 
(10) 
Corry and Laidler have argued, however, that. if .the. increase 
·in the number of people moving .to. better jobs (as a result. of in-
creasing ,tightness. in the labour market) completely offsets or more 
than offsets the decrease .. in the period of unemployment between j?bs, 
the/ ...... :'.. 
(7) This definition·is by BERNARD CORRY AND DAVID LAIDLER 
in their article "The Phillips· Curve: A Theoretical Explanation 11 • 
Economica, May, 1967, p. 193. 
(8) This statement must be qualified iii so far as PHIL~IPS ,did--in-
clude. in his. model the -influence of changes in .the consumer price 
··index. 
( 9) R. G. LIPSEY: "The Relation between Unemployment and· the 
Rate of Change of Money Wage Rates in the United Kingdom, 
'! 1862-1957. A Further Analysis". 
1 ( 10) Op cit. pp. 189-197. Economica Vol. XXVll. (1960) . 
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the Phillips Curve above the horizontal axis would either be vertical 
or positively sloped. They conclude that only if the curve is 
negatively sloped would it "lead to . the all=important implications of 
the existence of a trade-off between the policy goals of high employment 
and . price stability". Therefore the relationship between the rate of 
change of wage rates and unemployment resulting in a negative s}ope 
depends upon "very special assumptions which do not seem to be, 
. ' 
grounded upon any empirical analysis of this phenomenon 11 • N eV'.-er-
theless Corry and Laidler concede that the relationship appears to 
be statistically significant and accordingly requires explanation. They 
suggest that. there is no reason why "the level of structural unemploy~ 
ment (assumed. to_ be constant) should remain constant over time". 
Moreover, they add that. there is no reason why "the . level of 
frictional unemployment should depend solely on the excess demand for 
labour; it could well depend upon . . . . . . the quality of information 
about job, vacancies or their geographical distribution, which might 
vary over time". Furthermore, they suggest that "probably our 
ability to fit statistically negatively-sloped relationships to historical · 
data shows no more than that there is no strong relationship between 
the. level of unemployment and the rate of change of wages, and that 
a continuous negatively-sloped curve -is hence a good approximation 
of the underlying economic process". 
If the above contentions by Corry and Laidler are sound the 
l 
policy decisions of government to reduce -inflation by· increasing_ the 
i 
level of unemployment may be relatively unsuccessful. Thus -fiscal 
and monetary policies may succeed' in reducing aggregate _demand and 




inflation. Therefore different policies, such as an . incomes policy, 
have sometimes. been suggested as more appropriate economic measures. 
Lipsey has .replied to. the criticism that the Phillips qurve refers 
to wage rates and not to earnings. He assiert$ that "although 1 a 
' \ 
.priori 1 reasoning can suggest many reasons why rates and earnings 
might not move together, they . do . in fact stay, over any · 1c;mg period 
,. 
of .time, remarkably close together, so. that any theory that explains 
( 11) 
one will go· a .. long way to explaining _the other 11 • 
( 12) 
Phelps , before developing a dynamic m.acro-economic. model, 
criticised what he refers to as the "statistical approach 11 of Phillips 
and ·Lipsey. He contends that if the statistical .optimum level of un-
employment . •'il 1 depicted. in . the diagram below, results in .inflation, 
"it is reasonable to suppose that the participants in . the 'product and 
labour markets will learn to expect inflation (and . th.e concomitant 
money wage trend) and that, as a consequence of their rational 
anticipatory behaviour the Phillips Curve wm gradually shift upward 
On a -uniform displacement} , by the full am.aunt of the newly expected 
and .previously actual rate of inflation 11 • Furth.er displacements may 
follow which .ma,y lead to ,either hyperinflation or to a steady-state 
inflation .''where the actual rate of. inflation '.is :equal to ~the expected 
rate of inflation 11 • The .. latter situation might occur when the authori-
ties .take action to·~ increase the level of unemployment as well as 
accepting an increase in . inflation. 
(11) R_.G. LIPSEY. (1962) "Can 'There be a Valid Theory of Wages" 
Adv. Sci. 
(12) EDMUND S. PHELPS "Phillips Curves, Expectations of Infla-
.tion and Optimal Unemployment Over 
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u*in the diagram is the equilibrium unemployment ratio, 
where. the . expected rate of inflation equals the actual rate 
·of inflation so the. the expected rate of inflation remains 
unchanged. Il, I2, I3 and I4 represent indifference curves. 
If a country has come to expect inflation after a period of rising 
prices, it may be reasonable to conclude that the curve will move up-
wards. Indeed, as we shall see when we. study the ·recent experience 
of the United Kingdom it is possible. that this is what has ~occurred. 
Although Phelps has .developed a dynamic model which also 
(13) 
includes an 11 exp;ectations hypothesis" it has been asserted by 
(14) 
F. Brechling that this hypothesis implies that "wage increases 
should be comparatively mild in upswings {because expected wage 
increases are low) and comparatively high in downswings {but this) 
important implication of the expectations hypothesis. is not supported 
b.Y most of the available. empirical evidence". This hypothesis suggests 
clockw:ise/ ••• 
(13) Op cit. pp 254-281. and in "The New Microeconomics of Inflations 
and Employment Theory". The American Economic .Review~ 
Papers and Proceedings. Mp.y 1969 pp 148-160. 
{ 14) American Economic Review.. Pape rs and Proceedings, 
May 1969, pp 161-167. 
I 
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clockwise loops around the Phillips Curve whereas Erechling contends 
that most evidence in the United Kingsom and the United States points 
to anti-clockwise loops. N,evertheless, the prediction of the upward 
shift of the curve has received considerable support from Milton 
Friedm.an and the "Chicago School" of monetary economics on the 
grounds that inflation wi\l\>e. anticipated. 
The debate about the significance of the Phillips Curve may, 
(15) 
perhaps, be summed up in the words of Otto Eckstein who observed 
that"the dispute over the existence of the Phillips Curve . . . . is a 
·limited one - a .disagreement about the variables that matter besides 
employment, and a subsidiary question about the value of the coefficient 
on consumer prices (included in Phillips 1 own. model), the time 
profile of the effect, and the nature of the expectations process". 
In fairness to Phillips, moreover, it must be stressed that he conceded 
that his conclusions suggesting ,the stability of the curve, were 
"tentative" and rerri.arked that "much more detailed research .into ,the 
relations between unei:nploymertt, wage rates, prices and productivity" 
was needed. 
(16) 
R..G ... Lipsey using .the same approach as Phillips but paying 
rather more attention .to changes in the cost of living than .did Phillips 
found only a weak relationship between wage rates and changes in cost 
of living before the first World War but the relationship was significantly 
stronger after the War. In addition his study indicated that unemployment 
was/ ..... . 
( 15) , American Economic Review. Papers and Proceedings, 
May 1969, pp J61-167. 
(16) R.G. LISPEY. op. cit. Economica Vol XXVll (1960) 
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was. also a much stronger influence on wage rates in. the nineteenth 
century than . the twentieth century but the opposite tendency held in 
respect of price changes. 
:tt is important, to co_mpare the studies . by Phillips an.d by Lipsey 
with· those economists who. include in their investigations the . influence 
07) 
of trade· unionism.. The work of Dicks~Mireaux and Dow , is of 
.. par-ticular interest in .. this connection . Their studies showed .the 
. importance of. demand .for labour ·in the inflationary economy but they 
also_ considered the possible . influence of "cost-push "factors such as 
the change in retail prices and what. they termed "trade union push-
fulness". They arrived ~t the conclusion that wage rates responded 
by about 0. 5% to a change in prices of about. 1%, but that wages re-
sponded by about 3!% to a change in unemployment of around 1%. 
The -influence of "trade union pushfulness" was seen in the comparison 
between rate of ch~ge of wages. in periods when unions tended .to 
excercise restraint as . in the period .from 1948 .to .1950 and 1 in periods 
where this restraint was not apparent. The study concluded that 
' .1 
the pushfulness of unions could affect the rate of change with a range 
of almost 5% . 
. \. 
Accordingly the average "trade union. pushfulness 11 :~ 
coilld cause wage rates to .. ~hcrease by 2 - 2~% a year' even where 
<>;.~~~-: 
there was no .excess demand'cfor labour and where the general leve~ : 
of prices was stable • The significance of this study as comp~red 
. with ·those of Lipsey· and Phillips. is that it places emphasis on . the 
institutional factor of trades unionism. 
Subsequent/ .••. 
(17) L.A. DICKS-MIREAUX and J.C.R. DOW. "The beterminents 
of Wage Inflation: United Kingdom 1946 - 1956 11 • 
Journal of Rcyal Statistical Society~ Series A (General) 
. 1959, part 2. 
:· 
Subsequent, to. the Dicks-Mireaux and Dow .investigation, Dicks-
(18) 
Mireaux in a further study for the United Kingdom from 1946 to .l.95§ 
concluded that productivity did not app~ar to be a significant factor·· in 
explaining wage movements. 
(19) 
The work carried out by Klein and Ball offers a somewhat more 
subjective approach in its treatment of the pushfulness of unions. 
Furthermore, productivity and . profits were not a significant influence 
either on wage rates·or·on mark-up prices, subject,.·however, to certain 
conditions applying ·in what they term ''pace-setting:· industries 11 • They 
suggest in. their model "the hypothesis that changes in wage rates are 
influenced . by changes. in the cost of living, by the dem.and for labour 
and by the political climate 11 • Work carried out by two Swedish 
(20) 
economists; in .1956 also suggests that the influence of "excess prqfits" 
and productivity in Sweden were not significant. factors. in determining 
wage rates. 
Kaldor, on the other hand, has claimed that Phillips is·:· incorrect 
~ in attributing to the level of unemployment or to . the rate of. change of 
unemplC?yment, .the.principal cause of the rate of change of ·wages. 
He has argued that "the rise in money wages depe~ds on .the ba.rgaining 
strength of labour;. and . bargaining ·strength, · in turn, ' is ciosely related 
to ,the prosperity of industry, which determines both the eagerness of 
( 21) 
. unions and the willingness and ability of employers . to grant. them'·'. 
Although/ .... 
(18) L.A. DICKS-MIREAUX "The Inter-relationship between Cost 
and Price Changes 1946-1959": Oxford· Economic Papers 
October, 1961. 
(19) L ~ R. K_LEIN AND R .. J. BALL: "Some econometrics of the 
.determination of. p~ices and wages'' Economic J:rnrnal Vo. 69 (1959) 
(20) BENT HANSEN AND G. REHN: .. "On wage drift, a problem of 
' money wage dynamics" in Economic Essays in Honour of Erik 
Lindahl. 
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Although the profitability of industries appears to be a significant 
factor in wage increases in. the United States, an empirical study by 
( 22) 
----"R;.G. ·Lipsey and M.D. Steuer suggested that the .·.influence of profits 
-·. 
on wage rates .. : in. the United Kingdom was small. 
( 23) 
The study of A.G. Hines)l however, .. draws the conclusion .that 
. far ·greater importance should be attached to unionisation in the rate of 
wage change than was given in previous ehnpirical work we. have con:-
side red. If. his. investigation accurately reflects· real world conditions 
it would seem .clear ·that the importance of. the institutional environment 
should not be under~estimated in Great Britian. It would , in addition , 
sugge.st. that incomes policies may provide an appropriate answer when 
rapid changes in wage •rates lead. to inflation. Indeed Hines contends 
that "cost-push" factors are the main determinants of wage increases. 
He shows how a 1 per cent rise in retail prices.:is. associated with a 
O. 7 per cent increase in wages. Moreover he also produces evidence 
.that over the period which he examined, a 1 per rise in the degree of 
u:nionisation appears. to result in a 2~ per cent rise in wage rates. His 
study also indicates that over tii;ne wages rates show an increasingly 
greater response .to changes. in unionisation~ When comparing earnings 
rather than wage ·rates with . unionisation there is a similar close re-
. ~ 
· lationship .• The considerable significance of the unionisation .. factor was 
~- . "" 
revealed• in a recent study by· Lipsey and Parkin appraising the British 
incomes policy. This study will be discussed. in a. later chapter 9 
evaluating the British experience. 
Empirical/ •••••. 
( 21) N. ~ALDOR~ 11Economic Growth and:the Problems of Inflation 
Farr.:II'' _Economilca, November, 1959. 
( 22) R.G. LIFSEY and M.D. S'I:EUER: 11 The Relation. between 
Profits and Wage Rates" •. Econotnica, Mq.y 1961. 
( 23) A.G. HINES: "Trade Unions .and Wage Inflation in. the United 
Kingdom 1893-1961 11 • Review of. Economics and. Statistics .• 
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Empirical work carried out in .the United States, however, 
appears on the whole to show a closer relationship between profits 
and wage rates or earnings than has been noticeable in the United 
Kingdom. Two interesting studies were those by Eckstein and 
The former found that there was "only 
weak evidence that unionisation affects the long run level of wages". 
Nevertheless they also find that wages in "a group of heavy industries, 
which we call the key group, move virtually identically because of the 
economic, political and interdependance among the companies and the 
unions in these industries". Moreover they add that "wages in the 
key group are explained by the profit rates and the unemployment 
rates in the group. Wages in some other industries outside this 
groups are largely determined by spill-over effects of the key group 
wages and economic ·variable applicable to the industry". Eckstein 
and Wilson consider that both political as well as economic factors play 
a part in wage determination and contend that the importance of 
political factors "is implicit in the hypothesis of the key group and the 
wage round ..... (as) . . . . political relationships among unions are ••. 
close within this group". Specifically they found that a 1 per cent 
change in the rate of. profit and a similar percentage change in the 
level of unemployment were associated with a change in earnings 
of approximately 0. 6 to 0. 7 per cent a year. They did not find 
any correlation between profits and unemployment. In the study by 
Phattia approximately 80 per cent of the change in earnings was attri-
buted. to th.e rate of profit. In an earlier study he had shown that 
/unemployment ..... 
( 24) OTTO ECKSTEIN and THOMAS A. WILSON: "The Deter-
mination of Money Wages in American Industry". Quarterly Journal 
of Economics. August 1962. 
(25) R.J.BHATTIA: "Profits and the Rate of Change in Money 
Earnings in the United States, 1935-1959" Economica Aug.1962. 
unemployment did not explain more than about a quarter of the change 
in wages. As far as the United States was concerned he considered 
the term "profit-push 11 more appropriate than "wage·~push". Other 
studies by Perry, by Klein and Podkin and by Schultze and Tyron 
have introduced a combination of different variables to explain wage · 
changes. Although it is not possible .to draw any firm and precise 
conclusions from .all the empirical work carried out, it would seem -
.that the rates of profit and rate of price increases are relatively m.ere 
significant in the United States . than . in the United Kingdom. Finally 
it is worth observing that following in the wake of Phillips and Dicks-
Mireaux and Dow in the United Kingdom , econ?mists in the United 
States have tried to establish what the level of unemployment would . be 
in order to achieve .. price stability. Indications are that. it would be 
higher than . in the United Kingdom; possibly around 5 to 6 per cent. 
as opposed to Phillips 1 estim.ate of 2~ per cent, but as would .be ex-
pected . the results are not conclusive although actual experience in the 
United States in the first half of the 1960s would not seem to provide 
strong evidence against such a conclusion. We have been reminded 
(26) 
recently however, by B. ,T, McCormick that "in one memorable in-
vestigation by Bodkin it was discovered that wage stability in the 
United States could be obtained if 17 per cent of the lapour for·ce was 
unemployed,. Such a. findingn, he adds, "suggests that economics. 
has .returned . to its nineteenth century role as . 1 the dismal science 1 • 
Before/ ..•. 
(26) B,J, MCCORMICK: "Wa~es": Penguin Modern Economics· 
1969. p. 154. 
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Before concluding this admittedly brief and somewhat sketchy -· 
survey of some of the. empirical work that has been carried out 
during the past fifteen years,. it would be appropriate to consider 
the model developed by Godley 
(27) 
plained in· 1964 and which was 
I 
and Shepherd which they first e.x-
( 28) 
slightly modified. in· 1968. We indi-
cated .in .the introduction that. the British Treasury appears to place 
considerable reliance on this model for ·its .economic forecasts, and 
as we shall be dealing ·in some detail with _the incomes policy in that 
country, th.e relationship between unemployment and output a~ .des-
cribed- by the model:merits examination. We shall s.ee that the model 
appears . to support the contentions by Professor F. W. P aish that a 
·.level of unemployment of about 2~. per cent is. required to· maintain 
price stability . in. the United Kingdom~ Moreover, the compulsory 
incomes .policy initiated duri:ri'g.·the Labour Governmen~' s Admin.istration 
.does -not appear to· have reduced_ this .percentage. P aish therefore 
concludes . that the policy failed. A .more detailed consideration of 
Professor Paish 1 s arguments will be attempted .. in a later chapter 
after :the development of the British: incomes. policy has .. been described,. 
(28) 
Shepherd asserts. that "essentially the m.odel consists .of relation-
ships whereby the . level of em.ployment and unemployment can. be pre-
• < • 
CA"-
..;_ dieted .. if. certain . pre-det~rm~d variable:S are . known_. The most. important 
_ .•.•••. is .the volume of total output (gross. product), • How ever, the 
. availability of labour is also .. important and the 1 supply of labour 1 and 
. the/ .... 
( 27) W .A.H. GODLEY and J. R. SHEPHERD: "Long-term Growth 
and Short-term Policy''. National Institute Economic Review 
No. 29, August, 1964. 
( 28) J .R. SHEPHERD: "Productive Potential and the Dem.and for 
Labour" Economic Trends No. 178. August 1968. 
pp XXV - XXVll. 
? 
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the level of normal working hours are essential pre-determined 
variables 11 • Shepherd defines .the 'supply of labour 1 as "a measure 
of the number of individuals who are able and Willing to work". 
This is. not the same as the statistical series for working population 
which consist of employed plus registered unempoyed because the 
working population ''is known to be affected by the state. of dem.and for · 
labour as well as. by the supply. The labour supply is therefore 
defined as the -level of employment. that would occur concurrently 
with a .given· level of unemployment". This implies that when certain 
employees loose their jobs they will not seek .employment. Some 
housewives, . for example, may only accept employment when there 
is a strong demand .. for their services in. industry and will therefore 
not register as unemployed if their services are terminated. Shepherd 
concedes that the labour supply as defined cannot be "directly measured 7 
but changes can be estimated by the use of the observed relationship 
between employment and unemployment". Be asserts .that it can. be 
shown statistically that "cyclical fluctuations in employment are sub-
stantially greater than the corresponding fluctuation in unemployment 
. • • • • • • • • • The (very approximate) estimates· derived. from the 
equations suggest that with a low level of unemployment (say 300 
thousand) an· increase of one thousand in unemployment. is associated 
with a reduction of about 2~ thousand in employment in relation to the 
labour supply. With a higher level of unemployment (say 500. thousand) 
this figure iS· about. l~ thousand". The employment - unemployment 
relationship as described accordingly "postulates. that with employment 




The model intri:Jduces the concept of productive potential which 
.. is defined as "the output associated with a . given intensity of labour 
utilisation" • Changes ·.in the labour supply, however, affect the 
productive potential because . they will affect. output. "Given the re-
~ 
lationship between employment and unemployment", Shepherd states 
that "at the margin, an· increase of 1 per cent in output gives rise to 
a .fall of about 1/5 per cent in unemployment when unemployment is 
1 
already low ( 300 . thousand) , but to a larger fall of about /3 per cent 
when unemployment is somewhat higher ( 500 thousand)". 
(29) 
Paish uses this .relationship between unemployment and output 
. to_ illustrate his contention .that a. margin of spare capacity is ·required 
. to avoid inflation. He observes that "if we interpret an. increase of 
l per cent in output as .the equivalent. to a .. fall of 1 per cent, in .. the 
margin of unused potential anq, assume a ratio: of 1 to i;: at. intermediate 
. levels of unemployment we cctn fconstruct • • • • . • a rough scale. between 
variOus· percentage margins of unused potential and the equivalent 
percentages of unemployment". Paish then combines . this scale with 
a relationship. between. levels of unemployment and percentage increases 
·in. income from employment and is thus able to show that with a margin 
of spare capacity of about 6 per cent the annual increase in· incom·es 
from employment (after allowing for time. lags) wtll be about 4 per cent. 
If productive potential. is growing at the rate of 4, per cent.-the equiva-
·lent level of unemployment will be about Zi per cent. Paish therefore 
concludes that "so long as. the growth of productive potential is m.a~-
tained at its present rate, this seems. to. be .the lowest level of unemploy-
ment which ·is,· in the long .run, compatable with an absence of inflationu. 
He/ •....• 
(29) F.W. PAISH: "The Rise and Fall of Incom.es Policy" Institute 
of Economic Affairs. Hobart Paper. No. 47. pp 40.-4!. 
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He remarks that 1958 and 1967 were the only years in which . the rate 
of increase in· income from emplbyment slowed down to . equality with 
the rate of growth. of productive potential and during these years 
.uneroployment was about 2~ per cent. The experience .. in the United 
Kingdom from 1968 to -1970 -provides evidence, however, that. the re-
latively stable relationship pe.tween the level of unemployment and the 
rate of change in wa~$ .. ob_$e.rv.:e0. by Phillips and Paish as w:ell as 
~other ·economists, may be changing. We have touched on this aspect 
already but will need to return. to -it at a later stage • P aish in 
particular,. has-·v1ew.s upon this change which require consideration. 
The discussion in this. chapter has, perhaps., ~een sufficient 
. to .highlight the wide range of conclusions drawn from the -investigations 
' conducted and the relative. importance attached to. the various factors 
in the wage and price mechanism. From the conflict of evidence 
that has been forthcoming it. is surely clear that a government should 
.. be extremely careful when .it adopts polieies which over-ride -the 
market mechanism by the imposition of direct controls on wages, profits 
and prices. 
In . the following chapter we propose : to consider the .. type of 
problems :with which the authoritites havihg the responsibility of 
formulating incomes policies will be confronted. In particular 9 we 
shall look at some of the mechanisms which may be built into an 
·incomes policy model to control increases in incomes without at the 
same. time causing serious distortions which would greatly detract 
from the advantages. than an_ incomes policy might have to offer. 
Although/ •••• 
Although the economic conditions. in a country may seem to .justify 
:direct. intervention by the State, the criteria used. to decide .. increases 
. in .. different. types . of incomes as well as. th,e administrative . mechanism 
for applying whatever criteria are agreed upon, must be worked out 
with .great care. If they are not, . the country may find that. -the cure 
is worse .. than . the disease. In subsequent chapters a survey of the 
incomes .policies in the United Kingdom and the Netherlands will be 
attempted with a view .to assessing what success th~y have had in 
.. controlling .the rate -of inflation. 
- ·- - - o·o.o - -- -
C HAP TE R III 
·We ass.erted earlier when defining~incomes. poli.cies that they should 
.. : include some mandatory provision "to ensure that their conditions are 
complied with • Notwithstanding this assertion, with which we have 
.. no . reason .to find fault 9 ; it. is .. intended. to . begin . this chapter · oy looking 
at policies, generally referred to as "guide posts", 11 guide=lines 11 or 
II guiding· lights II. S.uch policies may, but usually do. not~·. include 
legislative power to make the guide-lines .effective, Indeed, where 
guides are stated only in- general term.s it is, as we shall se.e :1 very 
difficult to give them effective legislative backing. A discussion on 
guide-'-lines .should help~to appreciate why compulsion. is usually an 
essential requisite of an incomes policy. 
It. is also necessary to preface any discussion on the problems 
of formulating and applying an. incomes policy by again emphasising 
.that the specific economic conditions existing at a particular .time in 
a .couritry are of fundamental importance . in deciding. the . type of 
economic mechanism.s to. be. built into .the policy. We cannot but 
agree with R .. J. Ball that "details of any particular policy cannot 
possibly be discussed without reference , to a set of spedfic institu= 
~ tional conditions.". We shall, of cours~, · later be dealing specifically 
with :.the ~xperiences of Holland and .the L.Jnited Kingdom~ Moreover, 
certain circumstances .:existing in Scandanavian countries will be 
studied. Before analysing the application of a specific policy in the 
real world, some general consideration of the practical. issues . likely 
to be .encountered is~ not without relevance. 
The. / •••• 
( 1) R_. J. BALL: "Inflation and ,the Theory of Money". p. 300. 
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The "guiding Jight" policy for incomes. is usually seen simply as 
an exhortation or ·expression l:>Y- the. government. to .. independant decision-
making units, groups or sectors as to what. increases . in wages, or in 
other ·incomes are considered l:>Y the administration . to. be compatable 
with ·price stability. In the United States, for example, government 
. bodies and. the President himself, have from .. time to .time made ex-
hortations . both to specific industries as well as. to . the general public 
and. the business community to. avoid inflationary wage and price-- in-
creases. It is doubtful whether such "moral suasion" has .had any 
very material effect. They appear ·to be regarded· more as pious 
.hopes .:expressed to show official concern. rather than requests intended 
to ·influence . decision-makers . in industry. In 1964, President Johnson 
·in his "Economic Report of the President" said -
11 I shall keep a close watch on price and wage 
. developments, with the aid of an early warning 
s_ystem which is being set. up in the appropriate 
agencies. I shall not hesitate to .draw public 
attention .to major actions by either business or 
·labor that flout the public interest~ in non-
inflationary price and wage standards 11 • 
Notably absent was any real threat to. impose compulsory restraint 
except through anti-trust legislation or unlawful price-,fixing . method~, 
or threats to release stock-piles. 
Earlier/ •••. 
( 2) "ECONOMIC REPbRT OF THE PRESIDENT'': 
1964 p. 11 
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Earlier,· in 1962, the Council of Economic Advisers in .the 
United States,· formulated what was referred to. as a ·11 guidel"'"post" 
for wage adjustment. In its Report .the Council stated. thaL:the 
-"general guide for·non-inflationary wage behaviour·is.that the rate 
-of. increase .in wage rates (including fringe benefits). in each industry 
be equal to the trend rate of overall productivity increase". The 
Report continue.ct by saying .that the -"general acceptance. of this guide 
would maintain stability of labor cost per ·unit of out-put for :the economy 
as a whole .- -though not, of course, for individual industries"-. In 
April. 1962 the steel industry negotiated a wage contract which 
(3) 
. J. K. Galbraith observed was 11generally consistent with .these standards". 
The steel companies then. announced an. increas:e ,in steel prices. 
However, Galbraith states that 11 strong government pressure, strongly 
adverse public and business opinion and some historic Presidential 
invective brough a recision of the increases. Thereafter, for several 
year sit'• he asserts' .11the wage guide-posts' aS they Caffie to be Called II 
.and ·the counterpart pric-e behaviour were a reasonably accepted 
.feature of government policy. Wage negotiations were closely consis-} 
tent with the guidelines. Prices of manufactured goods were stable" •. 
Notwithstanding Galbraith 1 s remarks it is not clear to what extent 
the pressure by the government as distinct from business and public 
opinion was influencial in . the recision of the prices. .Moreover, it 
does not hecessarily follow that the stability of prices and .the terms 
. of subsequent wage agreements were a result of the guide.,.lines set 
out/ •••• 
(3) J.K. GALBRAITH: "The New Industrial State". p. 257. 
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out by the· Kennedy Administration. There may be no strong causal 
relationship. However, "jawboning" as this type of government 
pressure came to be called was thought to have had some effect on 
price and wage increases. It is difficult to establish the extent of 
its influence on industry. The Republican Administration which 
succeeded .President Johnson, did not continue "jawboning" but 
President Nixon n s "inflation alerts" may, in practice,.· prove. to. be 
of a somewhat similar character. 
The establishment of some form of "guide" is, accordingly, 
intended normally to provide a target figure for 11 the .. increase ·in 
( 4) 
aggregate money income to ·be . permitted in a . given year.". This 
increase would naturally depend on the increase in agglr'egate 
productivity of the economy so that there would be no rise in the 
general price . level. The authorities may hope--tbat industry will 
pay some attention to the guide-lines. if they are accompanied qy 
threats of· i ncreased taxation or . the more severe use of monetary 
weapons. The government may endeavour to set an example in its 
reaction to wage claims. in the public sector as it is a large employer 
of labour. Such an example was provided py. the ·"pay pause-" in 
the United Kingdom which was .enunciated .in July ·1961 and which pre-
ceded the "Guiding Light" of the -following year when a. maximum 
increase in wages of 2 to 2~ per cent was set as a target. This 
percentage was .the official forecast of what the ·increase in producti-
vity would be · in· 1962. It was remarked by one .econon\i5Jt that .the 
actual/ ••• 
(4) R.J. BALL: op cit. p. 293 
( 5) JOHN B. WOOD: "Labour Management and Economic Growth", 
· 1967. 
actual increase in productivity turned out to_ be zero but wages_ and 
salaries had by then risen by 4. 2 per cent". Despite official 
Prime Ministerial condemnation of certain large wage, increases at 
the time, the Treasury itself granted an increase for administrative 
civil servants substantially above -the target figure and the . same 
-economist adds dryly that the Guiding Light "was thereby firmly put 
out". 
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Probably -the most. damaging criticism of policies included under 
the - "Guiding Light" variety is that they do not answer the crucial 
question of how wages and other incomes are -to -be adjusted in various 
industries, or even different plants, which have different productivities. 
It has been pointed out by the critics of government attempts to control 
aggregate incomes .in .this manner 9 that no_ solution· is provided for the 
unavoidable problem that .if all incomes are .-to rise by the same -per-
centage~ those -in efficient firms will grow at a slower rate -than 
productivity while -those in· inefficient_ firms will grow at a faster rate 
than productivity. Quite apart from the dissatisfaction .this is likely 
to cause -in efficient .. firms, : there also needs .to. be some effective 
- method of dispersing the gains in .fast growing industries over ·the 
whole of -the -_economy. This might. be done .through lowering prices 
-or ·even by the taxation of "excessive" profits _if some profit norm can 
be determined. But. this whole issue is often ignored by the supporters 
of guide-posts that are concerned only with aggregates. This 
criticism would seem to .highlight a major defect and requires a satis-
factory answer- before general guidelines, as we have described them, 
are likely to have any significant effect- in restraining increases in -in-
comes. At the- most, 0 they may provide some guidance ... to. official 
arbitrators/ ••• 
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arbitrators considering disputes over claims for higher wages. In short, 
a clearly defined policy is needed. for relative incomes, not merely for 
·total incomes. As we shall see when examining. the Dutch experience a 
. policy for relative incomes requires a vast ·wealth of detailed. information 
to calculate how each wage should be fixed and 1 moreover,· how such a 
policy, if mandatory, can be adequately ''policed", so . that it will not 
be undermined by wage drift 1 "black wages" or other inducements. 
As government exhortations combined with voluntary targets. did not 
seem to have a moderating effect on wage and price· increases they had 
. to be transformed,. in the United Kingdom,· into policies permitting direct 
government. intervention. This occurred .. in 1966 as. an, immediate· re-
suit of the economic crisis in .that. year. At a later ·period .they were, 
as we shall see, largely relaxed. 
When a government has decided. that direct intervention in wage and 
price determination is necessary, whether as . a short-term or long-term 
policy it is immediately faced. with a host of issues which. need an answer. 
We propose, therefore, to look at the most important of these· issues in 
the remaining part of this chapter. 
·as distinct from non-wage incomes. 
Firstly, we shall consider wages 
Initially, the State must decide whether. the existing wage structure, 
as it stands at a particular time, should, by and ·large ·be preserved. 
It must endeavour to determine whether the ·rates and the differentials 
as they_ have been established in .the ·labour m.arket, no matter ·how 
imperfect, are· beneficial not detrimental to ·the ·economic ·.goals :the 
government has set itself. For example, .if a unicm has :through .its 
monopoly power,· however, exercised, succeeded.in acquiring wage 
increases/ ••••• 
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increases far in excess of those that would prevail if cori9.itions in the 
labour market were· more competitive, should such• increases be allowed 
to ·stand? Moreover, is it a practical proposition to try and establish 
what rates would be .in. a competitive market for labour? How .. ·indeed 
would this be done except ~y legislating against all restrictive practices 
on both sides of industry and .prohibiting J'closed shop" conditions. Is . 
such a .drastic legislative change reaHy feasible even if it were -economi-
cally desirable? The social climate and attitudes of labour leaders and 
union members would be crucial. Unions would not willingly see a 
diminution of their bargaining power unless employers were .. similarly 




control by the State. Thus it is .. hardly .a feasible political policy 
to attempt .to· make competitive conditions· ·prevail in respect of .the supply 
of labour if .the employers, in· key industries in particular, are per-
mitted to· retain· their monopsony power,s. 
If· the existing wage structure is not inherently undesirable econo-
mically and if the .differentials in particular skills are considered to be 
justifiable in ·terms -of job .evaluation techniques, then an· incomes policy 
starts ·from a .. firmer platform politically. In Holland, the. wage dffferen-
.tials :established between. skilled, _semi-skilled and unskUled_ labour were 
roughly what existed .before the incomes policy was introduced after .·the ,. 
Second World War. If the State approves .of the . e.xisting differ·entials, 
is. it.-then to attempt. to .. ignore subsequent pressure· for(further) increases 
in the differentials ·resulting from the market demand for the services .of 
labour? If certain ·in.dustries are . expanding faster ·than others . and 
wish to. attract labour should .they be denied. the right to pay higher wages 
_:for:/•.• •.•• 
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for similar work? If they are .denied .this right how is ·labour to. be 
allocated to. where .labour is· most needed- in the national interest and 
most in/ demand? Furthermore j unless :th~ State undertakes :the 
direction of labour l:>Y some form of compulsion, as in wartime, how 
:much longer can inefficient. industries or firm.,s survive simply because 
.they do_ not. have .to .:face competition from efficient firms -offering relatively 
higher wages? Thus the notion of "social. justice" or "social equity" 
inherent . in the concept of "solidarity" 1 namely 9 the rate. for the~ job 
which is unaffected by market conditions~ may not easily be· maintained 
in the face· of a growing demand for labour of a particular ·kip,d in 
specific industries which are prepared to. pay higher rates. If. the 
concept of.· 11 solidarity·" is not retained what criteria, . then, · is :to ·be 
substituted? Is .the "status quo" to remain? It h.as been suggested 
often enough qy economists .. that wages should be -increased proportionally 
to·, increases~ in productivity. If this is so .then either ·this. is ~done on 
an aggregate basis for the economy as. a whole, and we have s·een how 
unsuitable this policy. is when considering the guiding :light approach, 
or it- is to. be carried out on the basis of productiv~ty in .. specific 'indus-
tries .or even in specific plants. Whichever approach : is adopted .it- is 
necessary to ;formulate an accurate measure of productivity and .of labour 
productivity, namely, output per worker, in particular. Turner ~.d 
( 6) 
Zoeteweij . note 11that .. there are many concepts of labour productiv~ty for 
the economy as a whole. Qn. the output side one · may consider gross 
or net physical output per ·man-hour, one may· include or ·exclude pro-
duction for purely militar.y purposes_. on .. the input side." ' . they continue~ 
"labour ma,y be measured in .terms .of unweighted·. man-hour~ (which .take 
no/ •••.• 
(6) H .A. TURNER and H. ZOETEWEIJ: op cit. p. 115 
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no account of differences in quality or skill), or in terms -of weighted 
man.;..hours (that. is j allowing_ for differences -in individual earnings 
taken as. an indicator of differences -in skill).". Th~y rightly point out 
that the two methods. give quite different results and cite examples. from 
the United States. and France to - illustr·ate this. point. Moreover they 
contend -that "it is because a -weighted labour input. index ••••• tends to 
rise faster than an unweighted one that a productivity index using weights 
.rises.Jess than an unweighted one. But .this." j. they claim j His appropriate 
.for an index used. for a productivlty criterion of wage policy because 
while -structural shifts . in manpower will normally result .. in a rise .. in the 
total output. index, there is no corresponding scope ;for wage increases,. 
the shift of labour to better paying industries or , occupations .its.elf. having 
already resulted in a rise in_ the wage level. So r:aising wage rates 
. in . the same proportion as _a national productivity ind.ex calculated with 
unweighted labour 'input would -tend. to lead ,to; increases :in_· labour costs..". 
If aggregate. labour productivity is forecast. to rise -·by say 3~ per 
. :: . ' 
cent and wages and salaries are also permitted to ri.Se by a similar 
percentage the. next question; as. touched on earlier' . is . to . decide" how, :the . 
. total increase --in wages~. is _to.-be -spread over vari0us !~ectors and ... f.rl-~-
dustries · grow·ing at differing . rates of productiv\ty. Even assuming -that 
productivity can be accurately measured and this . is .pa:rticularly difficult 
. in certain categories of work such .. as .te~ching ~ the meO.ical profession 
and sections of -the civil service such. as. the p0lice and .the -armed 
forces, reliance would have .to. be placed, at. least.-to. some e.xtent, 
on job evaluation studies_. In order to . encourage . innovation,. l?Y the 
removal of restrictive practices_ and other obstacles -to growth, workers 
(and/ ••• 
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( an.d indeed. the owners of capital as well) should surely be . permitted 
to enjoy some of the fruits of their· increased productivity and not 
merely to share equally with other sectors which have shown less 
growth ·in productivity or no growth at all. Ma!ly economists, however, 
would claim that .. it would be wrong for ·each sector or industry to .re-
tain for itself the whole fruits of productivity increase, especially as 
the- imperfection in the market for labour· services and in the market 
for the· commoditites .. they produce would distort the wage structure 
unjustifiably. if aggregate wage increases were determined. by the State. 
They argue that such a practice would be more -inequitable than any 
situation prevailing under free collective bargaining despite. the fact that 
organised labour in free. collective bargaining may ~xercise. its monopoly 
power at the expense ·of unorganised labour. It would seem that 
some compromise would need to be achieved both to . encourage the 
increase of productivity, to. attr"act labour-to where .it- is needed? and at 
the same .time to ensure .that not all the advantages were re,tained ]?y 
.the. sector· achieving productivity gains. Accordingly, as. intimated 
earlier when discussing guide-posts, a measure of price control might 
· be an appropriate answer ·if combined with some acceptable formula 
for sharing out productivity increases_ to other groups. not so. fortunately 
placed to enjoy productivity gains. Thus the concept of social justice 
inevitably intrudes. into. the policy criteria in the form of an equitable 
minimum wage based on minimum living standards or a wage. that is 
regarded as. socially acceptable for a certain _type· of job~• But just 
as .the economy may wish to attract labout' to certain sectors so .too 
. it may wish to attract private capital. Therefore the determination 
of the returns to .the owners of capital must be taken into account if 
growth is to. be promoted by the direct intervention of the state. The 
institution/ •••• 
institution of a non-wage incomes p0licy_ to prevent inflation must not be 
allowed to, inhibit. economic growth (particularly. in the crucial export 
sectors)·' by discouraging private capital investment and entrepreneur-
ship. 
It has .been pointed out by P,. Stree\i/i and other economists in 
the United Kingdom 9 that if increases - in· incomes are related only to 
productivity increases in industries achieving them (so that if a. sector 
achieves no_ growth of productiv~ty no increase is justified) this in itself 
does not mean price stability m the economy, Workers _getting wage 
-increases will spend some of their wage increases on products -from 
industries w:her'e there liave been no productivity gains. There will 
therefore be -a rise! in demand for labour in the latter sectors~~ If wage 
increases are not permitted in these sectors they may fail to attract 
. labour~ and unless there. is price control~ prices of their goods will 
rise as . there will be a shortage • If wages and prices in the static 
·industries. rise~ .the aggregate price . level will also. rise. Thus. once 
again Jt is probably necessary to determine the aggregate permissible 
-increase .. in incomes and then determine how -this• is.· to_- be shared . out 
. between various claimant~. As prices. are often sticky downwards 
in the shor.t ... term at least~ price reductions while desirable .in an 
efficient industry may be ·difficult to achi.eve in practice. A -further 
complication is .that productivity besides being difficult to measure may 
be subject to substantial .fluctuations. Indeed~ there may be an absolute 
decline' in productivity in some. sectors~ but .it- is highly unlikely that 
unions in such a sector would countenance an;y reduction· in money wages 
as a / ••• ~ .. 
( 7)P. STREETEN ~ "Wages, Prices and Productiv\ty". Kyklos 
Vol 15 ( 1962) ·pp 723 - 731 
as. a result, even .if the measure of productivity were output per head. 
The designers of an incomes policy for wages will be confronted 
immediately with the .practical issues of determining whether wage changes 
are really instrumental in attracting labour from one. sector to another. 
If they are instrumental how much weight should be attached .to them? 
.In the last fifteen. years ~rk carried out on labour mobility has suggested 
. that wage differentials ·to attract workers ... from one -industry to. another 
or ·from one. firm to another are much less significant. than was 
:previously thought to. be .the case.. The so-called -· 11 job..-vacancy11 hypo-
. thesis .~has :receive.d a good deal of attention in· recent years .~in ·.this 
.connection. Professor P. de.Wolff stated in .the O~E.C:.D• R:eport.:' 
( 8) 
··ore 'tliages an.d labour.· mobility. that •!the most. important .. finding of the 
Expert Group 1 s :report is :that. in. the -labour ·markets and periods' studied, 
large short-term changes. in relative -earnings do not seem to .have. been 
necessary. to~bring_ about substantial changes :in the pattern of emplqyment". 
Although the findings. showed that "in a number of countries .. :there has 
been a· tendency, when industries are. studied . in .·fairly aggregative 
groupings,· for wages .to rise .faster ·in· branches which were in.c·reasfng 
their share of the labour force •••••• this should not generally be . in- · 
terpreted as a . causal relationship 11 • The. study "clarifies the wa.y in 
which .expanding industries. have .in fact. generally been able.•to· .. increase 
numbers. as .required .through the attractive.,force of, new .job . vacancies 
.. opening up. w1thin ·the framework of the .existing wage .. structureu. 
The/ ••••• 
(8) "WAGES AND LABOUR MOBILITY''· O.E.C.D. 1965 p .. 9: 
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The Report, however, does not suggest that changes in. wages_ are 
never necessary to. bring about a re-allocation of labour, and indeed, 
suggests some specific instances where. such changes may be required, 
such as attracting labour to remote areas where the· existing supplies 
of labour are insufficient. Another example cited is ·the case of teachers 
and nurses and similar occupations which require relatively long training 
periods. so that,. in .the. short term, at any rate, supply is not resp on-
,, 
sive to. changes _in demand. The Report furthermore admits that the 
neveryday knowledge of employers sometimes raising wages to. attract 
or retain labour", .. suggests that labour is sensitive to wage changes and 
could even be said to be so sensitive that a very small change in wages 
leads to a large movement of laboµr. On the whole, however, they 
have been led to b.elieve that "with some important exceptions, it is 
the Wage-insensitive explanation that applies •••• (as) • • • • • • 0 • 
(i) the observed changes in the allocation of labour 
are often brought about by mecha:p.isms other than 
changes in the wage structure, and 
(ii) the observed changes in the wage structure are often 
brought about by forces other than. those that allocate 
labour". 
(9) 
Earlier W. B. Reddaway also produced empirical studies suggesting that 
. the "job vacancyH hypothesis was a more satisfactory explanation of 
labour movements than. wage changes. His view is, he admits, "tentative 
and he adds that "the most one can conclude is that it is probably. nol: 
worth while· to undertake a difficult campaign to induce wage negotiators 
to./ •••• 
(9) W.B. REDDAWAY: "Wage Flexibility and the Distribution of 
Labour". LLoyds Bank Review. (1959). 
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to . change . their practices, when the redistribution seems to. be . obtain-
able without such a campaign, largely via .the (socially more acceptable) 
. ro~~e of varying job opportunities". 
If. these studies are .. basically correct. in their ·conclusions. th~y do 
certainly make the imposition and admmistration of a government wage 
(lo) 
. -policy a lot easier, because as McCormick .·remarks it means ''that an 
·incomes .policy need not. concern itself tNUh .the allocative aspect of 
wages 11 • In addition, . it might be more worth while for a government 
. to concentrate on encouraging labour mobility through providing efficient 
information -services about, jobs~ through ·better educational and re-
training schemes where necessary~ and. furthermore·· QY helping to 
counteract t..h.e ignorance, inertia and .the unnecessary restrictions on 
entry. into: jobs. 
It is appropriate at this juncture ... to concern ourselves with non-
wage incomes. Quite apart from whether· a strict. control over non-wage 
incomes is .'.economically desirable, Jt. is unlikely that a statutor.y' incomes 
policy would ever ·gain acceptance. by labour unless .the. policy. included. 
non-wage incomes:• Non-wage. incomes .can~ apart from higher 'I'a.tes 
of tax, · be subject. to control in the. form of interest rate ceilings~ dividend 
limitations, rent control, or price . control. Although .the nfreezing 11 
of dividend payments and rents, for example·' ma,y. be .. regarded politica.lly 
as a "quid pro quo" .to _:the· unions .:in return for restriction·s on. their 
·bargaining power,· controls .over non;...wage,incomes .present a number 
of serious _:economic problems as . .::distinct from .so.cia:l aspects.. 
Firstly/ ••• 
( 10) B .J .. McCORMICK~ "Wage~-". Penguin Modern Economics. p. 36 ° 
He also points out, however~ that .the job vacancy hypothesis .. is 
. inconclusive. as .it. failed -to specify whether employers -.in an industry 
would wish to retain .the. labqur which was offered. new jobs in 
other industries_. 
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Firstly, there is. the difficulty of deciding upon economically sound 
( 11) 
· criteria for limiting increases in profits, prices and rents. P aish 
discards any proposal for the direct limitation of profits. "To tr.y to 
peg profit margins" he contends ."would mean that every firm would be 
working on a cost-plus basis and would. lose all incentive . to keep down 
(12) 
costsu. But what after all, are profits? R .c .. Tress has .pointed 
out that the National Incomes c,ommission established by :the Conservative 
Administration on 1962 addressed itself to. this problem and. defined profits 
as -being 11 the contingent reward for the capital invested in a business, 
for the risks -that have been accepted. in earning_ the . pro fits and ... for the 
skill and enterprise with which the affairs of the. business have been 
conducted". Moreover, the Commission explained .. that "profits are a 
II 
contingent receipt not a contractual one", and that they arise :from a 
collection of causes. for which a unit of reference is difficult to .find" 
and furthermore, that "profits vary between one ,firm and another to a 
· notably greater extent .than do .the other categories of earnings in 
industr.y11 • The criteria .for deciding. on rates of profit are .therefore 
far less easily established than salaries. and wagei:;. If innovation and 
enterprise are to be encouraged then the opportunity to earn .high 
rates of profit if greater risks are undertaken must. be acceptedo Tress 
suggests that -there are three components making up "the notion of 
profits as_ an incentive to ·enterprise. and innovation". The first com-:-
ponent is .the abnormally high rate per unit of output obtainable for a 
relatively short period through seizing an opportunity . Secondly there 
. is .. the "rate of profit per unit of output that comes -to -be established as 
normal/ ••• 
(11) F .W. PAISH: "Policy for Incomes"? op cit. p. 20 
(12) R.C. TRESS: op cit. p. 694. 
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normal within a particular. line of production". Finally .there ,is the 
··"volume of sales in any period which .in the determination of aggregate 
net receipts, is. the multiple G>f the rate of profit, whether in the first or 
·the second of .the above ·two .definitions". 
Altl:1ough -the first definition of profits should not be disregarded, 
Tress suggests that . .the second definition probably "provides .the main 
source of profit earning and -that therein the origin of the rate of profit 
per unit of output (though not of sales and therefore of aggregate·profit} 
: is much more the product of convention". If this is . so and it is . by no 
means conclusive, . the norm, whatever it may be for a particular industry 
or :line of production, could be maintained by the State ·intervening not 
. to control profits, but rather by controlling prices. However it must 
surely be conceded that·, except as a relatively short--term expedient, 
such action may cause distortions in, the economy where capital is privat-
ely owned and. is used where .it can obtain the· best available return. The 
problem of rent control in countries where ·it has been imposed has· re-
sulted,· not. infrequently,· in private capital no :longer being supplied for 
residential housing in the quantity which . is . needed to . satisfy the demand 
for housing. Entrepreneurs c0ncern .themselves with future expectations. 
They will not: lightly commit capital to, say, new res.idential buildings 
which, while not presently rent-controlled may find them subject to 
control before long. There· is. indeed no ,easy answer ·to ,the problems 
arising from the control of ··non-wage incomes. The 'establishment of 
profit norms. in ,the real world would seem fo ·be a hazardous task as 
it involves .the ·valuing of capital,· .itself an. exceedingly difficult undertaking 
as peoples 1 expectations of the future are forever changing. While direct 
control of prices and profits may be. a short-term necessity,· it· is doubt-
ful if it is a desirable long-term objective except. through .the more 




of profits. such as -distributed profits or ·"excessive-" profits .• Paish has, 
however, provided som·e cogent reasons. against_ taxing "extra" profits 
at a higher rate or of distinguishing between _distributable profits and 
retained: profits:. in·. fiscal poli~y .. In the .. fi~st instance .. he ·points out 
-that a .. high rate. of profits .:tax does not affect "the . inefficient firm .which· is 
: only ju.st managing :to. stay in· business,. while. it increases .. the difficulty 
of efficient firms in obtaining the .. finance th~y need for ·expansion". 
Moreover ·it also reduces -the~ incentive ,to . keep . down .costs. as indicated 
earlier.. On the o~er hand taxing distributed. profits at a higher rate 
.·.than retained profits means .. that-the fast growing efficient firm will be 
unable or w111 find. increased difficulty in. obtaining ,finance.: in. the ·open 
market-to_ augment its. own r~tained profits.. Slow:-growtng _firms. who. 
do: not- really need .. ~ost of. the profits .-they make will be less. inclin.ed 
. to . distribute . dividends .• Thus ~the. net result- may well. be to .discourage 
initiative,. efficiency and innovation and preserve a relatively und:ynamic 
economy. Price control is probably a preferable way. to. control non-
,'>( wage in.comes . that:\ the direct. intervention ·.in the :fixing of profit rates. 
Indeed, price supervision or price controls· of some kind,, have -e.X.isted 
in mixed economies ~for relatively long period-a ·:in. peacetime conditions. 
The discussion of .the control of ~on..;.wage .incomes .:ei.ther ·directly 
or 0 through -the. control of prices .has. so far ·te:qded to .imply that although 
price. control . is .politically feasible -it is .:economically both unnecessar.y and 
under sir able. ~re there no. sound economic grounds :for ·controlling 
prices as. a means of controlling inflation? B.y itself price control 
maY,: ·merely ·••suppress" ·inflation or encourage -black markets, but if 
used in conjunction with other economic m·easures :has it some economic 
.justification?/ ••• 




justification?. rn.· periods of national crisis··such as during a war 1 
. Jl4) . 
it has .been pointed out by Phelps Brown . tha_t· "Governments .commonly 
find .th.at. the process of the market place will not unaided. achieve 
.. 
. the sudden and massive transfers of resources .tp new uses that -the 
._.,. 
switch from .a peace .to_ a war economy demands~·· .other ·means must 
also'. be used ••••••••• Higher rents could not have .the sar'ne .. :.effect 
on long•run supply· as in a free market~ .since ,the Government ·will. 
. . ' . . ~ . 
. ·~.-
not allow :the necessary movement of factors .. into_;·the building mdµstry. 
. . . . 
They would". asserts Phelps Brown 1 'II simply increase .the. incon:i~s. of 
landlords 1 and reduce the real incomes of those . people .who have· .inoved 
· into :the area because directed .. to. do so". This argument j · however j 
·is not applicable .to. normal peacetime conditions. 
The O~E.C.D. Report entitled "Policies.for Pricei?, Profits and 
(15) 
other Non-Wage Incomes" . suggests that a .case .for controlling non-wage 
. incomes may be made. if. the. behaviour of profits and other· non-wage 
· incomes is ::"an .important cause of rising prices~ . either in isolation or 
in supporting and reinforcing a rise in wages ••••••• The authoritites · 
. ·in many c-ountri~s feel that .the most appropriate complement. to a wages 
policy is an active price policy". 
( 16) 
The Report refers to. the. authors of 
"The Problem of Rising Prices" who held. th.at non-wage .incomes can 
be an· independant cause of cost inflation. They cons.ider that this may 
occur j even though producers may tend to use .their m_arket power 
primarily at times when demand. is .rising or costs are . .increasfug. 
( 14) E. H. PHELPS BROWN: "A Course in Applied Economicsu. 
p. 227 
(15) 0 .E .C .D. (1964) pp 15..:22 
(16) ·Op .cit. 
56. 
How ever, they qualify their statement by adding that, , '~in our judgment, 
the problem of inflation from ~dministered prices w.oulq by minor .if a 
situation were reached in which average wage .. increases were confinecL~. 
to .the limit allowed by the 8;verage. increase in productivity ai:id excess 
.demand· pressure were .avoided;" o 
The . c_ondltions existing . in .important areas of .the private sector in 
. . 
Western economies. tend to ma'.ke . effective price -competition dj.fficult to 
achieve; This tendency may be increasing. The tentative ·conclusions 
. . 
reached by the 0 .E .C :•D ... Report in. 1964 seem ..to represent a .fair 
• < 1 • • 
assessme.nt of the situation • While adrpitting that a degre_e .. of compe-
. tition -.is a. commori feature of such. economies the.y observe that "there 
are many sectors where prices. are, in. some sense ; 0 administered i • 
The ".existence. of administered pricesJ• they continue, "is at least a. 
potential cause . of cost inflation. It would seem more particularly in 
sheltered .industries :that whereas cost. increases :tend to_. be passed on 
immediately and fully fn higher prices, cost reductions are ofteJ:l only passed 
on incompletely or after some delay. This may well be a significant 
'&l\.cl. ~'"'-'es part of the process by which costs,.,.are .. levered .up under conditions 
" of cost inflation ... However, as w.e pointed out. in Chapter II, even 
·if prices are administered and a wage-price. spiral develops,. ·.it still 
' 
requires an expansionary monetary policy to sustain . it. 
The reasons . why a government may prefer an active price policy 
to other ·indirect measures . su'Ch as . fiscal and . monetary instruments, are 
partly political, partly administrative and partly economiC • · Firstly , it 
. is .probably easier for .the general public ;to under::;tand a policy directly 
related to. prices. Secondly, . it is easier for the authorities .. to ascertain 
what .is .happening to prices than it is for them to discern rapidly the 
trend/ •••. 
trend of profits :in specific industries or sectors.. Thirdly :i as. the 
O.E.C .• D. Report asserts, 11framing policy in terms of prices rather 
than profits seems to get round many of the difficulties that arise from 
the fact. that profits are a residual j and hence fluctuate quite sharply 
with the level of activity and sales:". Nevertheless, policing a compre= 
hensive price policy may raise major ·difficulties. In addition, a large 
measure of market intervention by the authorities may~ as already 
suggested, prove to. be economically harmful by causing. undesirable 
distortions in the -economy. 
In view of the nature of modern mixed economies some degree 
-of price control may be -justified on economic grounds .~to. help reduce 
inflation, but as intimated earlier, it is a weapon to. be used with great 
. caution. Preferably it should be accepted only as. a short•term measure • 
If price control is held to be unavoidable, it must, of course, be 
sensitively and . imaginatively handled. There is always a considerable 
·risk that the controls will be clumsily applied if the controllers have 
. little ·sympathy. for or understanding of business policy and entrepre= 
neurial ·, motivation. Where possible, alternative measures should· be 
adopted. For example, subsidising particular members of. the commu~ 
nity seriously affected by the removal of price control may offer a 
.,, . '·: , . .,; ,.·· . ,. . . . ' ... ~ .... 
sounder economic solution to the problem,especially in the case of rents.for 
residential housing. 
(17) 
It is worth noting ·that Paish has contended if prices were .fixed 
at levels which . would provide .. norm.al profits at an agreed level of 
wages .for a reasonably efficient firm, .this would frustrate the. whole 
purpose of the ·operation· of an incomes policy which is. to maintain. a 
high/ •••• 
(17) F.W. PAISH: "Policy for Incomes?-" op cit. p. 20 
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high level of employment With price stability. " 1Unemployment'' )l ' he 
observes~ ·''can be· kept abnormally lowj) only by keeping the demand 
for labour abnormally high~ and the demand .for labour can be -kept 
abnormally high only b_y keeping the -emplqyment of labour apnorm,ally 
profitable. If profits are held down to ·the same .level as would prevail 
in a competitive market~ the demand for ·labour ·~·till be correspondingly 
restrained and unemployment will not fall". 
We have considered so far in this chapter the various possible 
crite!'.ia to. be built into the framework of the incomes policy and thE?Y 
have provided a number of intractable problem~. Something must now 
. ·be said .. of the sort of administrative mechanisms ~that are needed in 
order to make the criteria .. effective. How are .demands for wage 
increases :to be processed? What will be the machinery for wage ne-
gotiation? If prices are .to. be controlled 1 what machinery. is necessary 
for considering price -increases? wm the organisations ' set up : ~y the 
State be tripartite in that the State will act in co-operation with:both 
sides: of industry? Will some type of "early-warning system'' for price 
and wage .increases be instituted? If so~ wm .it apply to all prices 
and an· wages~ and if only to certain prices and wages.to which Will 
. ' . . 
. the "early warning system'' apply? 
The instituti.onal framework :for ·collective :bargaining :may be· an 
integral part of an· incomes _.policy in so. far as.:it may serve to centra-
. lize wage· negotiation .between both sides of. industry and to -ensure not 
only that. the agreements are facilitatedj) but also that. they are more 
likely to:be enforced. This is not inevitable. as. wage drift may be 
more like'ly to. develop at plant level as a result of central negotiation. 
Where/ •.•• · 
,, .... ,. 
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Where there is alre<?-dY in: existence a relatively centralised .$.ystem of 
wage negotiation .it may be much ea~ier for the State to ,intervene in 
the. bargaining ·process or to3orm a .. third party to . .the di.scussion~.: 
Even. -.if the State does not take part. in .. the· actual negotiations? either 
as . .an intere.sted party or as. a . mediator or an arbitrator j. cent.ral 
negotiation .may proceed subject to_the .proviso that any agreement 
may. be. subject to review and approval py a State- institution wblch 
may or may not include at least some representatives from ·industry. 
In the Scandinavian countries .there is. a high degree. of central nego-
tiation as-compared with the United Kingdom. However, the Scandi .... 
na vian countries do :.-not~. unlike . the Nether lands. and until recently~ the 
United Kingdom-,. have a. comprehensive .. system of price .. aild wage 
. controls, although Norway still retains a greater c_ontrol over prices 
than does. Sweden and Denmark. Price and wage !'freezes'·' have 
. been imposed .in Denmark and France. but a properly worke~.d out 
.. iricom·es policy as. defined,:,. in an earlier chapter· has not formed part: of 
this. control in either country. The "freeze" ·was :looked upon as only 
a. short term .measure to deal with a cri.sis . situation created largely as 
a result of a deteriorating ·balance .. of payment~ •• 
In the Netherlands, partly by reason of its. own social and politi.cal 
development and . institutional structure·~ , i••it has .. in general been possible 
to achieve a high degree· of concerted action among ·b\;>th .. the employers 
' • • J 
(18) 
and the trade union . federations!'. 
: Where/ ...... .. 




Where collective bargaining is __ unsuccessful in arriving at an agree-· 
ment there may be legislative provisions for -mediation or arbitration. 
--Arbitration· ma,y be -employed -to decide how much of the proposed in-
crease in wages-is -justified., if there is a dispute -as .to_ the extent of L-he 
increase in iproductivlty. This may apply where 1 - for ·example ll. legisla-
. tion provides_ specifically· for arbitration in cases where_. permissible 
- norms _ are . e.xceeded o Alternatively 1 legislation may simply offer a 
useful means of ending industrial disputes w-ithout making any attempt 
to .relate increases -to any government incomes policy. - Arbitration 
has been used extensively in Australia and New Zealand for a Jong 
_{19) 
time. Turner and Zoeteweij point OU~ how:ever j that although the 
formal purpose- of the s:ystem of arbitrati.on in Australia is "to avoid 
industrial unrest and to :dispense -justice :1 the awards are made with 
explicit reference to_: the country 1 s -economic and _ social conditions" e 
They observe -that 11the indicators used _for assessing these conditions 
.include 1 for -example, data-relating to employment;> investment, produc~ 
:tion and foreign tr aden • In New Zealand the Court" of Arbitration 
11 may make general wage orders qy which J;he rate of remuneration 
fix-ed~-in all awards and industrial agreements .in operation may be 
changed_ • • • • • • • These orders affect wages throughout the -economy 
and must be based on a number of national economic and social indi-
caters .that are specified in the (relevant) act 11 • 
I_t is_:therefor~ essential to pay atte_nti.on n_ot only. to ;the criterja 
for changes -in prices and incom·es but al.so tq _the mechanisms ·required 
to_ administer the criteria _selected. If the government of the -day . is 
_accepted as _;genuinely having ~the interest of the community at- be.art 
rather/ •• .,.,, 
(19) TURNER AND 20ETEWEIJ: op cit pp .108-109 
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rather than of being biased in favour of a par0ticular sector or ,group~ 
the ·community are much more . .li.kely not to resent the government~ giving it-
self powers of direct intervention. The climate of political sentiment 
and of trust is. of the .. greatest importance .. if a compulsory incomes 
·i: . ..:::; I 
.policy is ~to be -established either as a long=term ·or ·even as a short~ 
term policy for contr'olling inflation . 
. = = ~ ~ oOo = ··- = = 
C HAP TE R IV~ 
Direct intervention by the statetnlt\tcontrol of prices and wages is 
not peculiar to the Twentieth Century. In Roman Times, for ·example, 
Diocletian endeavoured, seemingly without a great deal of success,, to 
restrict the increase. in ;the prices of certain goqds. So, did Charle-
magne. In .a . much. -later period, m England, as. a result of the Black 
Death and the shortage .. of labour, ari .·· ,b_rdinance in 1349 and the 
Statute of L.abourers :in 1351 attempted to reimpose ''pre-plague wage 
rates" throughout the cowitr.y. Between 1351 and 1377 "about 9000 
cases. of breach of -the. prices and incomes. policy were heard . • • • and 
(1) 
discontentment was widespread". This attempt at an:·incomes :·policy 
. in Medieval. times was widoutedly one . of the causes of the Peasant 
Revolt in 1381, and did not survive this -lµ.surrection. 
Wage .and price controls were_ invoked in Spain ·.in :.the SiXteenth 
Century to ,curb ::inflation but if they succeeded .in. achieving anything, 
-·it was.~probably onlytpreinforce.the other ·economic·factors:in°'the 
Iberian Peninsula which started .the economic decline lasting unti.l the 
· middle · ef the Twentieth Century. However.-, it i~, perhaps,. rather 
·more. appropriate .thai\: an ·examination of the "evolution-" of an· incomes 
-
.policy. -in· the United·· Kµigdom should start from 1939 W.lth ··the outbreak 
of ·the Second World War. 
The British Government. in J939 was .:fuµy aware that a major war 
would create -very serious inflationary. trends ·in ... the cowitry. · The 
Govern~ent had· been ·giving a lot of attention at. the time as .:to what 
~ . 
controls_ sould be ·imposed. on wages and prices :if and. when War broke 
.-out./ ••.• 
(1) JOHN" B'.~ woop. op cit. p .. 159. 
out. :tn particular? J.t was also highly concerned as to .how. labour 
could be directed to those industries and jobs that were of prim·e 
importaAce -to _the war effort. 
At the outbreak of war in Beptember 9 there was a Conservative 
.administration in power 1 which did not have -the support of the labour 
unions. They were ·deeply suspicious of it •. This : lack of trust and 
confidence ·did not provide a helpful background against whi.ch the ex-
tremely urgent a..11d . important issues .had to_ be decided. Although late 
in 1939 tand at-the heginning of 1940 _the Government urged both sides 
of industry not to press :for higher wages or to_ raise prices j .it did 
not,· initially 9 have very specific proposals .to make q~spite ·the setting 
up of a National Joint ~dvisor.y Council composed .of ·emplqyers and 
unions as w1ell as members of the Government. 
( 2) 
In November 1939 9 Keynes published his proposals -on how .the 
.. 
problem of inflation might be dealt with. The Government as well as 
Keynes appreciated that. the very rapid and extensive increase . in 
Government expend,iture would greatly increase, incomes: in · mariy sec-
tors of the. economy. If there were insufficient consumer goods 
available -to satisfy the· increased demand flowing from the rise in wages 9 
prices would rise - at a fast rate. As the Wa:r proceeded in .the early 
months of 1940 and. the military situation grew more critical it was 
realised that drastic steps would have to, be taken without further 
procrastination. Initially the Government 9 as. a temporary measure, 
decided to .forestall price increases l:>Y providing food subsidies .in order 
to:. keep 0the cost of living down 9 . but this :in· itself was not a solution as 
. it I . -... , . ,,;_ 
.(2) J.M.• KEXNES·: "The Times". 14th and 15th Novernber,·1939 ..• He 
- observed, that 11 •• •those who.se first thoughts run to ·rationing and 
anti-profiteering 'have·· not begun to .discern. the. real nature of the 
problem -- namely that the aggregate purchasing power is_ increasing 
faster than the available. supply of gooqs". 
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it. did not provide any answer to ·the rapid. rise of incomes.. By itself 
it w0.uld. serve only to aggravate the problem. 
Keynes's-famouspamphlet 11 How to Pay for the War.11 was.an 
acute analysis of the , inflationary problem and contained a profound 
' 
understanding of the -economic issues at stake.. His solution 9 although 
·in some respecti;; ~ perhaps 9 . too_ sophisticated to_ expect to win acceptance 
in. full by either ·the private. sector or by the Government~ was never-
theless a. basis. on which the system ·of controls 9 subsidies, savings 
and taxation could be built. While approving of the provision of sub.-
sidies, he suggested .that. incomes could be- held in check ·qy the in,sti~ 
tution of a ~yE;tem ·not only of :encouraging voluntary saving .but also of 
. . I 
compulsory saving by what was, in ·fact 9 a·deferred incom~ s9heme~ 
. not unlike a loan levy which post-war budgetary policies in some 
I 
countries -have incorporated .. ~ At the same tim-e ~ Keynes sought to 
promote. ·the acceptance . of his_ scheme :Qy .the ·.unions~ who. were 
. unequivocally hostile 'to any g<?vernment. intervention in the collective 
' 
bargaining system~ l::>Y ensuring that .there would be a higher :n1ational 
min.imum wage and .that price controls and rationing would ensure .that 
-there were. sufficient essential consum-er goods for all income levels .• 
This. would . m-ean ·that .the standard of living would not- be unfairly dis-
torted in: favour of :higher income groups in. the econom_y. 
The unjons ,. how.ever 9 . w·ere still unenthusiastic about tbese pro-
posals and the more conservative members of the civil service 9 especi~ 
,. 
ally the Treasury, were not prepared to. accept some of Keynes·· more 
•iradical 11 suggestions such as a "post-war·" cq.pitaL l'evy. Ho"illfever 1 the 
I 
. deferred income scheme w~s :"converted into q. system of post-war 
(3) 
credits ·based on the amount of in.come ta,x paid". 
The / ..... 
(3) B-.C. RO~ERrrS: ''National Wages Policy in.War and Peace". 
p. 29. 
The resignation of Mr. Chamberlain a.pd the appointment of 
Mr. Churchill as Prime Minister in 1940, ·the .deteriorating military 
·position, and the- inclusion in.· the Cabinet of prominent members. of the 
Labour Party, such as Mr. Ernest Bevin 7 a. former union leader :.i re-
sulted in · further actfon being taken. A National Arbitration Tribunal 
was .. set up .to.-decide .disputes .between labour and employers which were 
not settled by negotiation. Its decisions were·· legally binding. In 
addition,: an · . qrder in. Council gave the Government power to prohibit 
strikes and lockouts. It is, however, essential to .. bear in. mind that 
direct State interventi.on ·in the determination. of ·wages was applicable 
c only where there was a dispute not susceptable to. settlement. b;y the 
parties ~themselves_. This~ intervention was required to· prevent possible 
serious industrial unrest aI1d disturbance causing damaging delays in 
production~ •. The Government appears, at first, to have m.ade some 
indirect attempt to. steer the .. decisions ·of .the National Arbitrati.ori Tribu-
nal along ~the road it wanted but the Trades Union Congress soon made 
it clear that .it would not tolerate or submit to any su~h government in-
fluence or direction of the 'J;'ribunal. Indeed, the. <aovernment. did. not 
try to .. follow, .through wlth. any otfier direct. intervention· ih the. control 
of wages ~in view of the attitude-taken by organised .. labour. As .a re-
sult of labour·' s stance and .. the decision ·by the .G'cwernment not ·to. pur-
sue direct intervention . further, .it. is, perhaps,. somewhat. surprfsing 
that inflation, though· serious, was not as. great as. might 11 in these 
(4) 
circumstances, have ·been expected. B .• C_;• Roberts • observed.· that 
''the policy of stablisation based on subsidies and price---controls was 
.continued. and, in conjunction with rationing, high Jevels. of taxation a.Ild 
-the willingness of employers, . unions . and general public • to: behave with 
restraint/~- •••• 
(4) B.C_.ROBERTS-~ op.cit. p. 32. 
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restraint and responsibility, the Government managed to keep the' 
economy remarkably steady·11 • The public realisation of the national 
emergency and the -very real feeling. of patriotism ·and need for self..;. 
sacrifice were without doubt significant contributory reasons why the 
somewhat- unscientific and. makeshift policies were as successful as .they 
proved to· be. Indeed, when the -immediate post-war period in ·the 
Netherlands .is. examined later, it will be seen .that public acceptance 
of the need for restraint and co-operation was partly instrumental. in 
making the . Dutch incomes policy a 'iM:>rkable and valuable .instrument: in 
promoting economic ·recovery in the latter half of the 1940_ 1 s, and the 
early years of the following decade. 
Despite ·the economic weapons used. to prevent price and wage 
(5) 
·increases these did, nevertheless, occur as .the table below ~illustrates. 
Wage Rates .Earnings . Retail Prices • 
1938 Oct 100 .100 JOO 
,..__,.. 
.1940 July 110 130 119 
· 1942 July 124 143 130 
1945 July 143 180 -148 
Besides -high rates of taxation, there was at. the. same ·time a 
very considerable amount of voluntary saving. In 1938 and 1939. the 
annual sum of small pe:vsonal savings was £57 million and £;-103 milli.on 
respectively, while in 1944 and 1945 the annual sum had risen to £716 
million arid £676 million. 
As far as .:the .direction of labour into :the. most important industries 
r . 
was .concerned, War industries. did. tend. to offer relatively higher .wages 
and earnings w;ere. naturally higher in view of the overtime worked. 
The/ ..... ,. 
( 5). Source: "LONDON AND CAMBRIDGE ECONOMIC BULLETIN" 
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The Government. did .have· power .. to compel p·eopI-e to. go -to. specific 
·industries but pl:'cSbably this aspect in itself was· not a major factor in .. the 
allocation of· labour, although .. these ·powers .for .:the · directi&n of• labour 
were very wide • Patriotism, as. alreaCl.y indicateq., was an added 
. factor ·encouraging ·labour to move •to where :it was. most needed. Signi-
ficantly, there was also . a narrowing· of wage differentials as craftsmen 1 s 
wages .did not rise aLthe same rate a.s other wages. The reasons 
:for this narrowing ~f differentials during the War may· be attributed :.to a 
variety of factors .such as :the change :in the type of goods made,· the 
methods of production and .the; strength of the ·"general" unions as 
distinct. from the craft unions. 
By the :time· the war ·ended, although. prices and wages· had risen 
very steeply, the· battery of economic· instruments used. to control them 
had not been ineffective and .the average annual increase. in .the ·retail 
price •index of about· 7. per cent was, · in the circumstances . and" in view 
of. the ·relatively. limited· intervention by the State -. in. the : determination of 
wages , s.uprisingly. ·1ow,. 
In .194:>, atthe end of the hostilities, a quite . different. set of problems· 
arose. There was now. the· need to adjust . .the economy to .peacetime 
conditions. Relations between. the· new .Labour Government and .. the 
. ( 6) 
·unions were relatively amicable. Allan Flanders. notes.that. 1 ~the ·Gov-ern-
ment, ·for its part, anxiously s·ought their collaboration. at -every. turn both 
in developing .its new economic and welfare policies and .in tr.ying :to mas,... 
· ter the countr.y:u s acute difficulties of transition an.d readjustment. Apart 
from union representation on .. innumerable· committees and councils~. trad-e 
union leaders· had access to .Labour Ministers with -whom they could talk 
.. " 
'b'n .terms -of easy• familiarity. 
inflation .the Trades Union 
Realising the· continuing .danger ·of 
. CJ:,ngre s s/ • • ••. 
(6) ALLAN FLANDERS: "Trade Unions" 7th (revised) Edo 196$ pol66 
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Congress accepted a continuation of the war-time regulations which 
provided for price controls, rationing, arbitration and the prohibition 
of strikes and lockouts. Nevertheless the element of self-sacrifice, 
as the country was no longer at war, and the willingness to accept 
severe austerity measures, were much less compelling. Some steps 
were taken in 1947 by the Government, whereby the Control of Engage-
ments Order in that year provided that people must seek employment 
through the labour exchanges and could be directed to essential jobs 
but this measure, accompanied by Government exhortation, discussion 
within industry and between government and industry was not success-
ful in securing any really effective control of wage rises. 
In February 1948, as a result ·of a steadily deteriorating economic 
position the Government issued the famous White Paper on "Personal 
(7) 
Incomes, Costs and Prices".' This was a major statement of policy 
(8) 
Which was described in 1951 by one economist as "the one outstanding 
.example of an attempt by. the State to influence wages policy" in the 
United Kingdom. The statement enunciated the principle that "there 
should be no further increase in the level of personal incomes without 
( 9) 
at least a corresponding increase in the volume of production". 
Despite this statement the Government in the White Paper agreed 
not to control directly the incomes of individuals except through fiscal 
measures. In an effort, however, to persuade industry to adopt 
greater restraint, the Government warned employers that it would not 
necessarily take into account wage increases in permitting increases in 
the prices of those goods still subject to price control. In addition 
the/ ••••• 
( 7) Cmnd 7321 H .M.S. 0. 1948 
(8) C .W. GUILLEBAND: "Wage Determination and Wage Policy" p. 20 
(9) Cmnd 7321 op cit. 
the White Paper accepted that BIJ.ncreases in wages and salaries would 
be justified from a national poi'.nt of view •• o • o where it is essential in 
the -national interest to man up a particular under=manned industry and 
it is clear that only an increase in wages wm attract the necessary 
labouru. 
Notwithstanding the control of prices whfoh had been car.0 ried over 
from the war=time regulations 9 the unions objected that. there was no 
direct control of profits. or of dividends. a.Tld that those who received 
(lo) 
incomes ~in ·this form were favoured at. the -~xpense of the wage -earner. 
However, the Trades .Union Congress finally accepted. the. basic principles 
set out in the White Paper. The critical state -of the econ0my was 
probably a major reasot\ for ·its acceptance of this statement of Govern= 
ment policy. During the ensuing period of nearly two years and .des-
pite the lack of compulsory controls over wage determination a remark= 
able degree of restraint was observed. To a lirn ited extent the rate 
of inflation was checked but wages rates and earning? continued to rise 
and consumer demand naturally increased~ although the high 'level of 
taxation did help to modify this demand. Unfortunately the monetary 
policy of the L_abour Government did not assist in encouraging a reduc""' 
tion in· the· rate· of increase in. money incomes as the money supply was 
not sufficiently restricted s interest rates remained relatively low and 
furthermore .the Government did not reduce its own borrowing and 
expenditure. The devaluation of the pound sterling in · 1949 and the 
rise in import prices resulting from this action together with the rise 
in import prices of some primary commodities caused by the Korean War~ 
made substantial price rises .in Great Britain unavoidable" The Tunions 
were/." •• , 
(10} This.objection could be-·met~ in part~ by taxing "unearned income" 
at a higher rate than· 11 earned income". 
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were 1pecoming more and more hostile towards. wage restraint and it 
became clear that the wage policy enunciated in .the White Paper in 1948 
was collapsing. In 1951 wages per unit of output as well as dividends 
. increased considerably. The type of voluntary wage policy pursued by 
the post-war Government was capable -of success only in so far as-it 
could pursuade both sides of industry to. accept the restraint which .the 
Government maintained was essential for economic recovery. As the 
cost of living rose, partly through circumstances which were beyond 
.the control of the Government)} such as the K.orean War 9 and partly 
through the relatively unskillful management of the monetary policy, 
it was not difficult for economists. to predict that the voluntary policy 
would fail, as indeed it did, by 1950. The Government was not pre·- · · 
pared to adopt a· really deflationary policy through the- exercise of 
combined fiscal and monetary policies, sufficiently harsh to. ensure 
that .there was an appreciable reduction in the rate. of inflation. Nor 
was the Government prepared to impose wage controlsj consequently 
serious .. inflation continued in the ab sense of the vitally needed voluntary 
co-operation by both employers . and employees. Looking back at this 
period from a distance of twenty years :i it is, perhaps, hardly suprising 
that British· industry was unable to. recover the lead it had once held 
am.ong __ -the European· economies and .that the British rate. of economic 
growth has ·been so .. disappointing in comparison with many of .its 
European competitors. 
Despite the change of Government. in the. elec:tions in 1951, the Con~ 
servative Party, which gained power and held it until Qctober 1964 
proved to. be no more able to control inflation or -the rate .. of increase 
in wages .than the Labour administration it- had. succeeded. Although 
the price and wage stabilisation policies of the Labour Government had, 
in the/ •••• 
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in the . end, failed, it had enjoyed during most of its period of office a 
degree of trust from the unions that was .denied .the Conservatives for 
much of the.following period. 
The new administration intended to rely on fiscal and monetary 
policies to secure stabilisation rather than on the war-time price controls 
- which were already being dismantled· - or on wage controls or even 
compulsory arbitration. . Notwithstanding the good intentions of the 
Government and despite a clear understanding of the implications of 
secular inflation' especially its adverse .. effects -on the balance -of pq.yments' 
the Administration did not follow :through its policies with. sufficient per-
sistence and energy. The result was _:that there. followed. a long period 
during which .the economy experienced the "stop-gou policy of boom., 
disinflation, mild recession· and subsequent re-inflation. It was punctua"-
ted by the· increasingly familiar balance of payments -problems which made 
the disinflationary measures. necessary but without achieving any long-term 
:stabilisation. Rather there were a few fairly" short-lived periods when 
. the rate of inflation declined. The Government m.ade a serious . attempt 
., 
to break out of the -11 stop-go11 cycle· in 1963 and 1964 with a policy that 
!," 
became. known as the -·"Maudling Experiment", but the General Election 
in October 1964 and the measures taken soon after by the new Adminis-
tration made it impossible to. decide whether ·the "experiment" would have 
been successful. 
In the later :years ·of the Conservative Administration, from about 
1956 the Government did tr.y to evolve . some . coherent and acceptable 
policy in regard to wage increases. The attempts were .to.· have: little 
or no ·effect, except possibly in the very ,short-term. Meanwhile -or-
ganised labour became· increasingly hostile .towards the Conservatives 
which made an effective wage policy much more difficult .. to apply even 
. if it had been unequivocally stated. Mr. Selwyn Lloyd/ .• 
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Mr. Selwyn Lloyd, while Chancellor of the Exchequer, in 1961 
enunciated a "pay pause" in the public sector where the Government 
had some control over wages. in its capacity as. an employer of labour. 
It urged the private sector to follow its example but, as indicated earlier, 
this attempt was a failure as the private sector would hot accept the 
Government• s .exhortations to observe greater restraint. 
In .the previous ~de.cade, in March 1956, to which period we - must 
briefly return, a White Paper entitled, "Economic Implications of Full 
( 11) 
Employment" was published , but notwithstanding _the spelling out of what 
.these implications were it had no. effect whatever on :the. behaviour of 
industry. A Council of Prices, Productivity and Incomes was set 
(12) 
up .. in 1957 and was composed of "three wise m~mn. 
reference were: "to keep under review changes in prices, productivity 
....... and _the level of incomes • • • • • and to report thereon· from time 
(I 
to time. It was intended to. be an authorative and impartial body but 
was boycotted by the Trades Union Congress which refused_ to give 
evidence before it. The Council issued four Reports and .then dis-
appeared from the scene. The Government had antagonised the ·u:ni.ons 
by the appointment of the c'ourcil. It was now. less likely than ever 
that voluntary restraint would_. be accepted by organised. labour •.. The 
next move by the Government was to try and establish a "Guiding Light" 
(13) 
with the publication of a White Riper in 1962. This. policy set out a 
norm of 2 .to 2~ per cent as a maximum for wage increases and$ as 
indicated earlier by the observation of Wood, was a· conspicuous. failure. 
The/ •••• 
(11) Gmnd 972~ 1956 
(12) The first were LORD COHEN, SIR HAROLD HEWETT and 
SIR DENNIS ROBERTSON. 
(13) "INCOMES POLICY: THE NEXT STEP". (Cmnd 1622) 
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The Government did, however, succeed in getting the . co-operation 
of organised labour, subject to reservations, for the establishment of 
the National Economic Development Council. Employer organisations 
also agreed to representation on this body so that. both sides of industry 
as well as the Government were represented. It first met in March, 
1962 and its intention was, broadly speaking, to .examine economic as-
pects .of the private and public sector in order "to increase the rate of 
sound growth". However, it had no power to compel anyone to 
carry out its -recommendations. Although it was and, no _doubt, still 
(14) 
is, ~ useful forum for the discussion of economic issues and problems 
. by the three interested parties it has "no _teeth". In addition , what 
have come to be called "Little Neddies", have been established for 
specific industries in order to encourage discussion and examination 
of problems in particular sectors of the economy. 
The Gonserv:ative Government 1 s -final attempt at fostering some 
kind of effective policy for incomes or, at least wages, was the estab-
lishment of the National Incomes Commission in November 1962 o This 
body, however, was largely, if not entirely, ineffective as organised 
. labour refused adamantly to have anything to .do with: it. In February 
1963 the Commission announced that it intended to revive the norms con-
tained in the "Guiding Light" policy. However, the announ.cement was 
( 15) 
soon superceded by the Government because as _Wood. points out "only 
six weeks later the Chancellor of the Exchequer unhelpfully put forward 
a different target of 3 _to 3!% on-· the assumption that the economy would 
grow/.o•• 
(14) "The Economist" in its·issue dated May 23,-1970 (p.64) thought 
that "the Ned organisation • • . . is not much more than a talking 
shop, but it is still a place where government and both sides of 
industry can meet for discussion, without necessarily taking sides 
and there are all too few of these 11 • 
(15) JOHN B. WOOD: op. cit. p.160. 
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grow l:>Y 4%. Once again" 9 adds Wood 9 "salaries and wages rose 
·more and -output less .than expected". Indeed 9 when . the General 
Election· in October ·1964 returned .the Labour Party to power ,fue 
incoming administration was no. better equipped to ,institute an effective 
incomes policy than its predecessor had. been more than twelve years 
earlier. The same problems -remained unsolved~ namely~ how .to 
achieve a more rapid rate .of economic growth 9 a high level of employ= 
ment, a satisfactory state in ·its balance of paym·ents together with a 
less economically damaging. rate of inflation. 
In the· next Chapter we shall consider the -events that led up .to 
. the first direct - and for a short period, effective - intervention ·by 
the Government. in· the determination of incomes .·in peacetime conditio:i;l.s 
·in order to secure some control over the rate· of inflation. 
- · - · - - oO.o · - - - · -
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CHAPTER V. 
Although· the National Incomes Commission had no authority to. take . 
. effective action· in the determination of any types of incomes, and al-
·though the Government had taken. no. such. power,. the Commission. 8 s 
reports were, nevertheless, of some value -in so. far as. they examined 
wage bargains in retrospect and commented upon wage policy. Such 
comment was. often sound. Significantly, the Corntiiission expressed 
the view .that an exceptional increase in wages was .not justified solely on 
the grounds that it was difficult to obtain sufficient labour.··for a particular 
·job; "the ·manpower needs of an·· industr.y had themselves .-to. be 1 excep-
tionai 1 to.justify exceptional treatment". The Commission.as . attitude 
appeared .. to. show some sympalll:y for the views :expressed by 
W .B,. Reddaway and other ·economists, already mentioned, whose -in-
vestigations .had .. led them to .doubt whether ·direct attempts to change 
relatively long-sta.Ilding wage differentials to encourage the . movement 
of labour had been particularly successful in achieving their 'purpose ... 
The institutional background in any country and particularly the United 
Kingdom, seemed to. indicate-that. it was .very difficult to. achieve, let 
alone. maintain, significant changes -in ~ifferentials .. except in exceptlonal 
circumstances - unless .:thes·e changes were already in· process 9 in which 
case -the action ~y the State m.ight be able .to :retard .them ·or hasten them 
(1) 
to a very limited extent. B .C. Roberts· is. surely right when he ob~ 
. serves.-that "the- narrowing.-of: differentials :betw·een .. the wages -of skilled 
and unskilled workers, between manual and· clerical workers, and be-
tween men and women workers, as well as the levelling up of wages of 
one industr.y compared. with. another, is not a course of development that 
is confined . to . countries ~that have pursued national wage polici'es. 
a .feature/ ••• 
(1) B.C. ROBERTS,. op cit 85-87 
It is 
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a· feature of ind us.trial and social progress almost ever.ywhere 11 • 
Nevertheless -the narrowing of differentials may proceed at different 
rates _in different sectors or industries or categories of jobs~ depending 
on a variety of factors o Roberts 9 however 9 remarks. that "there 
would· seem to_ be ··limits 9 which are set l?Y economic and social circum"."' 
stances, to _the -extent. to which it is possible to,force wage structures 
. into a particular mould •• o • • • It is admitted by trade tin.ion supporters 
that the. slowing down qf the narrowing trend-9 and in certain cases jts 
. reversal, · is :due to . economic fac.tors :;iand:in some degree, to a change in 
trade union and _employer policyj ·brought about l?Y a .growing resistance 
on the part of the higher paid wage and salary workers :to .further 
levelling" • · 
'The National Incomes Commission disappeared with.· the. advent 
of the Labour Government_ to power in 1964. Nevertheless the estab-
lishmE[mt of the Commission, .its Reports and especially the attitudes 
adopted .towards . .it- both -i:;iy the Government. instituting it 9 and .qy both 
sides of industry are important and enlightening in tracing:1 however 
briefly, . the development of incomes _policies -in Britain·. in relation. to 
their · attempt. to control inflation. 
In 0.ctober 9 -l964, when the Labour Party was returned_to:power 9 
.it was .immediately confronted with a major ,economic crisis caused by 
the critical situation of. the -country 1 s. balance. of payments. However 9 
the Parliamentary m.ajority of the Government was .:very small, and this 
may w·en have been, at. least partly, the reason for ·its ·failure to _:take 
more effective economic action at an earlier stage. The Governm·ent 
. did consider the possibility of devaluation but decided against. this. measure. 
Moreover it is clear -that the Government was fully aware, not· only of 
the/ ••••• 
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the ·economic situation but also· of the. lack of confidence -felt by authorities 
·in ether ·countries of -the new 'Governmmt 1 s abiUty to·. cope . successfully 
with the crisis. As the Goverrtment relied to a great. extent on .the 
suppoi::'t of the unions, it was naturally most reluctant. to: interfere 
. directly in the wage determination process;. JY!eanwhile money.·tncomes 
continued .. to rise at a~fast rate and unemployment remained at a:low 
level -of about 1 ~ 5 per cent. Moreover unfilled vacancies .rose 'from 
313,200 in 1964 to.354,000.in·l965 indicating as-C .. W. Guillebaud ob-
served "indisputable· ~ymptoms of an over-loaded economy wlth over-
( 2} 
full employment" • In addition the large deficit persisted-: .. in the ·balance 
of payments. 
Shortly after taking over the administration of the country g ·the 
Labour Government. did succeed 9 howeYer~ in Decemmber.·'1964, in 
· obtaining ·the. signatures -of both. sides. of industr.y to a "Declaration of 
Intent"· in which -the Government and bqth the employers 1 . organisations 
. and the Trades Union Congress .declared that. they "must take urgent 
and- vigorous action to increase productivity~ keep money incomes in line 
with ·real output and maintain a stable price level otherwise. the level of 
empl_oyment would. be -lower and the rate . of growth slower". The 
Declaration was .unexceptionable but it seemed to optimists at the time 
to .. heral:l some· new, but unspecified 1 era of co-operation. The Decla-
ration, indeed, did not appear to. have any material effect. in. slowing up 
the"rate ·of increase ·in prices. and wages or upon the actual behaviour 
or attitudes· of industry in. general, despite agreement with the G-0verntnent 
. to '.the · setting up . of suitable c machinery to review the price- movements and 
increases in. money Wages. It was. hardly surprising. The Declaration 
did not legally commit anybody to_ anything. 
The/ ••• 
(2} c_ .• w. GUILLEBAUD: op cit.; p. 34. 
.. ' . 
~· 
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The "machinery" mentioned.· in the previous paragraph included 
the establishment of the National Board for Prices and Incomes in Apr:il 
1965. This was constituted by Royal Warrant. Its scope: and manner 
(3) 
of operation were set out in two White Papers, in February and April 
of that year. The influence of the -Board on prices (3lld incomes in the 
first. year of its operation was probably minimal as it had no power to 
compel anyone to act in. accordance with its views or recommendations. 
Industry could and did ignore it .• Indeed its relatively rapid establish-
ment in 1965 was probably made possible only because it had been 
given 11 no. teeth". There was, therefore, no really cogep.t reason 
why industry should be opposed to its formation which. flow;ed from the 
somewhat pious hopes behind. the "Declaration. of Intent" signed at the 
j 
end of the previous year_. 
As prices and wages moved inexorably upwards during the latter 
half of 1965 and no restraint was observable in industrial negotiations, 
the Government decided to introduce what was termed an "Early Warning 
<· (4) 
System" requiring notification of wage and price increases. :But once 
again there was no provision compelling the defermEmt of proposed in-
creases until after the Prices . and Incomes Board had considered the 
issues involved, so this type of· 11 early warning" did not make the 
government's voluntary incomes policy any more effective. The ·policy 
·was still to be voluntary and industry in general did not appear to be 
any more willing in practice to take heed of it although the White Paper 
stated that 11the parties will be expected to suspend further action until 
the Board has reported 11 • Even while the provisions of the White Paper 
were still before Parliament the economic crisis which occurred in July 
1966 made/ ••• 
( 3) 11 Machinery of &ices and Incomes Policy" - C mnd 2577 
"Prices and Incomes Policy" C mnd 2639 
( 4) "Prices and Incomes Policy: An 1 Early Warning System 1 11 
Cmnd 2808 
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1966 made drastic action by the Government unavoidable. Voluntary 
policies were now recognised to be quite inadequate to cope with the 
situation and crisis of confidence in the British economy which came to 
a head in the middle of the year. 
The central problem of the type of incomes policy which had been 
evolved up to the middle of 1966 was not that it failed to recognise the 
importance of the relationships between prices, wages and output in the 
existing inflationary situation. The trouble was that there was no 
readiness on either side of industry to take the type of voluntary action 
through co-operation which would· render the policy at least to some extent 
effective. The White Paper i~< April, 1965, referred, sensibly enough 
to trends in national productivity and remarked that "the figure for the 
growth of the economy between 1964 and 1970 which .is being assumed 
in the preparation of the Government plan for economic development is 
25 per cent!1 giving 11 an annual average rate of growth of rather less 
that 4 per cent". After making various assumptions the White Paper 
spoke of "an average annual rate of growth per head in the nineteen 
fifties (which) averaged about 2 per cent a year". In addition, the 
White Paper set out the crita-ia, in admittedly fairly general terms, 
which would, it felt, justify price and income increases and which would 
control inflation and encourage growth. But it was unsuccessful in its 
attempt to obtain an effective response from independant decision-making 
bodies. The voluntary system of restraint in the first half of the decade 
beginning in. 1960 had been proved beyond a doubt to have been a failure 
in the United Kingdom in peacetime conditions prevailing at that time 
irrespective of the seriousness of the economic situation. The 
exhortations/ •••• 
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The exhortations that appeared to have had some beneficial effect in the 
immediate post-war pe:r:-iod between 1945 and 1950 and especially in 1948 
and 1949, did not seem to have any significant success in the succeeding 
decades. In the circumstances, the economic crisis of 1966 was, 
perhaps, . inevitable, and .. the mandatory powers that .the Government was 
then ·obliged to take over prices and incomes,· probably unavoidable. 
The abandonment of the policy of voluntary restraint was .followed 
by a "standstill" period of six months~ which was itself to be succeeded 
by a similar period of "severe restraint". The policy of the Govern-
( 5) 
ment was set out in a White Paper in July. The "standstill 11 meant what 
it implied. Prices and incomes would not be increased· for six months. 
Legislation was introduced immediately to give effect to this decision 
and the Prices and Incomes Act became law .in ·the following month. 
The Government made no secret of the urgency of the policy and the 
need for immediate action. The Act was in four Parts.. The first 
part. established the Prices and Incomes Board ·as a permanent statu-
tory body - no .longer deriving its existence . from the Royal Warrant -
and the Minister of Economic Affairs , · then Mr. George Br own 9 was 
empowered to refer to· it proposed increases in prices, wages and 
·dividends. I Part II was intended to .give legal effect to :.the ·"Early 
Warning System 11 which had been before Parliament when the crisis 
came. , Any w·age agreement or any proposed claim was to . be referred 
to the Minister within seven days to decide whether or not to refer· it to 
.the Prices and Incomes Board. If he decided to do so the award was 
not to. be implemented until after .the Board had considered the claim and 
had reported on it. Any. implementation of an agreement prior to .the 
decision of the Board would render the parties concerned . liable to 
prosecution. This section of the Act, · however, did not prevent increases 
either/ •• 
( 5) Cmnd 3073 (July 1966). 
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either in prices or ·in awards after the Board had reported even if the 
Board did not consider the. increase justified. Accordingly~ Part II 
was a delaying procedure and not an indefinite prohibition on increases 
in prices 9 wages and dividends o Moreover 9 Part II required an 
Order in Council to bring it into operation .and this Order would have 
a duration of twelve months only. It could 9 however 9 be renewed. 
Part III of the Act is not really matePial to the· present discussion of 
the development of the United Kingdom us incomes policy o Part IV 9 
·however, empowered. the Minister to make Orders whi.::;h prohibited 
. in.er.eases in prices and wages and in the distribution of company 
profits. An infringement of an Order rendered the party liable to 
prosecution. 
The Government. in trying to make the Act less unpalatable to the 
public in general and organised labour in. particular attempted> to obta.in 
the co-operation of indus.tr.y so ,that the :'•standstill" would at least be' made 
'to appear as if it were ·voluntarily. obse-rved. · This . so-called 
· 
11 voh:mtary 11 co ~operation would then. make the Government us direct in"".''. 
/ 
cursion into wage and price determination appear to be less mandatory 
that~· in fact,, it was. However 9 on a few occasions -the powers""-pro-
vided . for in the fourth part qf the Act had to . be . invoked 9 · in .. particular 
in November 1966. It is, therefore 9 ·inaccurate to claim that the incomes 
policy was voluntary because the Government did not in practice often 
have to use its powers. These powers did exist and were seen. to 
be used when necessary. Such a. policy is no ,longer· "voluntary" o 
During :the "standstill" period prices. did 9 of course 9 rise. This 
was both .permissi\;>le and -- indeed ·unavoidable where ,the cG>st of imported 
raw materials and components increased or where ·increased.· taxation 
(6) 
II 
or· "changes in supply due to seasonal or other reasons made price 
increases/ •••• 
·. ( 6) Cmnd. 3150 ( N overmber 1966,) and Cmnd. 3073 op cit. 
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increases virtually uncontrollable. For example, electricity charges 
were raised during the "standstill" period. Nevertheless ,the six month 
compulsory ".standstill" did, undoubtedly, significantly affect prices 
? and wages in that inflation was virtually brought to a halt. rhe 
Government had been at pains to emphasise that .it 1 s intention. was that 
both the "standstill" and the ensuing period of "severe restraint" were 
to be essentially short-term measures. 
In November 1966, the Government published a further ,White Paper 
dealing with the period of "severe restraint". There was to be a norm 
which was stated to be zero. This norm however, was subject to 
exceptions in the case of certain workers. in the lowest paid categories 
of jobs. Exceptions were also to be permitted in the sphere of agree-
ments where there was improved productivity. This exception in the 
case of an improvement in productivity was intended to promote in-
creased industrial efficiency so that there was. to ·be an incentive for 
managem~nt and· workers to work out agreements which would result 
in. a more efficient use of the resources of the country. The famous 
remarks of the celebrated American management consultant Mr. W.W • 
. . 
Allen in 1964 had received great publicity at the time and· had not been 
for.gotten. 
In March 1964, Mr. Allen had published an article in the British 
( 7) 
newspaper, "The Sunday Times"~ and had asked the question "Is 
Britain a half-time country, getting half-pay for half-work under half= 
hearted management?" Mr. Allen claimed that "for every person 
required to produce a ton of steel in America, three were required in 
Britain. By a similar method of comparison, the ratio: in aluminium 
is one to two point five. In the maintenance ·engineering activities of 
the / ••••• 
( 7) "The Sunday Times" - 1st March, 1964 
83. 
the two chemical industries, the ratio is about one to four 11 • Mr Allen 
claimed that in each of these ex.amples the technologies employed by the 
industries of each country . were at approximately the same levels. 
Mr. Allen, moreover·, claimed that " in shipbuilding ... " ships could 
be constructed with about 40 per cent fewer men.if labour were empk)yed 
efficiently • This could be achieved • • • • • simply by removing the more 
. irrational and non-logical forms of demarcation practised by labour and 
management alike 11 • 
Mr. Allen had earlier pioneered the famous Fawley productivity 
agreements in Esso 1 s British plants. His reputation accordingly gave 
his remarks very considerable weight. The Government, rightly, 
did not want productivity and its relationship to increased wages to be 
lightly disregarded. A genuine increase in productivity should, in the 
opinion of the Government, not go entirely unrewarded. 
As the period of "severe restraint" drew· a close a great deal 
of debate took place as to what policy should succeed it. Both the 
Trades Union Congress and the Confederation of British Industries 
wanted to see an end to direct government intervention but realised 
that this. was unlikely to be forthcoming unless they provided. their own 
effective alternative to Government intervention. 
(8) 
The White Paper in March 1967 prefaced its proposals with .the 
hope that an effective voluntary incomes policy could be instituted. The 
criteria. for wage increases.· included: -
(a) increased productivity with the proviso that. the public 
should also receive a benefit in. lower prices: 
(b) the need to ensure a distribution of manpower where 
pay changes were required to obtain such a distribution: 
( c) the/ •••• 
(8) "Prices and Incomes Policy after 30th June 1967 11 (Cmnd 3235) 
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(c) the maintenance of~"a reasonable standard of living" 
and applied to the lowest paid workers: 
( d} instances where "pay of a certain group of workers 
had fallen seriously out of line with.the level of remune-
ration for similar work and needs in the national interest 
to be improved". 
These criteria were, in fact, those that had been laid down in the 
White Paper two years ea~lier, in April, -1965, when the system was 
intended to be a purely voluntary one. The criteria for price ·increases 
and reductions were also those contained in the same -White Paper. 
The Government noted that its 11 call for a standstill on company distri-
butions during the twelve months of standstill and severe restraint ·has 
been given full support by industry and commerce 11 • The Government 
added that although the restraint :"'7ould end in July 1967 "companies 
should exercise moderaUon in distribution during the· following year con-
sistently with the principles of this White Paper • • • • • • The Government 
will stand ready also .to refer to the National Board for Prices and 
Incomes ••.•• cases where the growth of profits and dividends is 
based on excessive market power". 
The White paper also .expressed the -hope' that wage negotiators 
~ 
"would not seek to make good increases forgone as a -result of the 
standstill and severe restraint". This hope was not to be realised. 
' Although Part IV of the Act of 1966 lapsed ·the Government de= 
cided to retain its delaying powers pro-yided for in Part II so as to .be 
able to refer, when it thought necessary, price and wage increases to 
the Board. This period of delay wou~d not exceed seven months -
including on_e month in order to decide whether to refer the increase to 
the Prices and Incomes Board and a period of three months for the 
Board/ •••• 
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Board to. investigate the matter .and make its recommendations. Its 
recommendations did not, however 9 ·have the force of the law but the 
Government could delay the ·increase for a further three months if it wished o 
Despite ·the goods intentions of the Confederation of Briti~h Industri= 
es and the Trades Union Congress and their -awareness that if .the volun= 
. tary system. again failed to work, direct Government controls might be 
reimposed,. the per0 iod following .the "severe restraint" saw a· resumption 
of rapidly rising prices and wages which to a· large extent proceeded to 
undo the success of the· previous year us policy to reduce ·the rate of 
inflation. In .the twelve months from July, 1967 and July 1968 aggregate 
·incomes rose by approximately 7 per cent as compare.cl with about 2 
per cent in .the· previous year making an average of 4~ per cent over 
the two years. The mandatory control over wage ·increases in 1966 
and the ·first half of 1967 did not succeed in having a lasting effect. 
What then was the principal difference between the phase after July 
1967 as compared with the· period up to July 1966? The Prices and 
(9) 
Incomes Board in its Second General Report stated that "the outstan<l= 
ing difference between . the older criteria and the · newer . is that under the 
newer criteria .the norm is nil whereas under ,fue older criteria 
·exceptions· from a standard wage increase or 1 norm 1 of 3=3~ per cent 
could be allowed." 
We indicated that the hopes of the Government were not realised by 
the new policy but its predecessor did, nevertheless, have certain short= 
term effects which were not insignificant. In .the previous year from July 
196.6 to .July 1967 the Board calculated that although , "total industrial 
production fell •••••••• by about. l per cent. • • • • . • industrial 
production expressed in terms of output per person rose about 2~ 
per cent". The Board added that 0 the . difference between . the ·fall 
in total industrial production and· the increase· in output per man was 
due/ ••.• 
(9) "Second General Report 11 : July 1966 to August 1967 Report No. 40 
.p. 2. Cmnd. 3394. 
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due to an increase in unemployment from under 300 9 000 ·in June ll 1966 9 
to roughly 500 ~ 000· in June 1967 o o o o The increase of about 2 per 
cent in· average earnings as against the increase in output per head of 
2~ per cent meantll "continued the Boardfu Report 9 "stability in unit 
labour. costs through .the entire twelve months 9 and in factll a fall up ·to 
.the fitst quarter of 1967. This stabUUy compares w..ith the· increase. in 
unit labour costs· in manufacturing. industries of 6 ·per cent between 1964 
and .1965 •• 0 0 and with an average annual rise of 2~ per cent in such 
costs in the past 10 years" o Lastl~ and perhaps 9 to a large extent 
the central objective of the whole incomes policy was that from July 
· 1966 to May 1967 export prices in . the United Kingdom "rose ·by less 
(10) 
that 1 per cent''. 
The economy of the country was 9 however,, a long way from 
being -free from very serious dlificulties. As a result of escalatl\ng 
wages and .prices in the· latter half of 1967 i> persistent widespread lack 
of confidence in the ·econ.omic situation 9 a deterioration ofAhe balance of 
payment and yet another· sterling crisis 9 the Government finally devalued 
the pound by 14 •. 3. 0 per cent in November 1967. It was a step that 
many British and overseas. economists .thought long overdue. The 
pound~ many claimedi> had been unmistakably over=valued. 
The Government did not, take any immediate drastic steps to curb 
demand in the home market concluding that there was a measure of 
slack·· in the •economy which could absorb any. immediate switch from 
foreign to domestic goods o The budget ·in March 1968:1 was 9 as might 
have been expected extremely severe o There was~. however~ no. re= 
turn to. direct. intervention in the determination of wages and .prices 
except/ 0 0 0 0 
( 10) "Second General Report" op cit~ pp 4'75 
87. 
except that the Government extended in August 1968 ~ its .delaying powers 
from 7 months .to 12 months and .decided .that these powers would be 
effective until the , en_d of the following year. 
Prior' to ; the period of the -"freeze·" the -unions has ·tried to . deal 
with wage claims themselves. The Trades Union Congress attempted 
_towards the end of 1965 . to exercise greater control over organised 
labour by vetting claims· for increases through its Incomes Policy 
Committee. It continued this policy after the period of 11 severe restraint" 
terminated in July 1966. These efforts were to have little effect on the 
behaviour of the unions. This was mainly because when a claim was 
rejected by the Committee the union could ignore the decision. Although 
between May 1967 and May 1968 of the 441 claims considered only. 126 
were approved as .they stood this was not in. itself very meaningful. 
The Committee was dealing with claims and the settlement eventually 
reached by the Union and the ·employers might merely have ·established 
what the union had thought acceptable initially but had raised its . sights 
for purely tactial reasons when bargaining commenced. If the 
Committee rejected a claim as being .excessive its rejection would 
probably provide no more than an argument. for the employers u repre-
sentative at .. the negotiating table. 
Of rather· more significance were the criteria on which claims were 
to be approved. The Trades Union Congress considered that output 
could increase by 6 per cent productivity by 5 per cent and . employment 
by 1 per cent so :that wages c-ould .increase by 5 per cent without 
causing inflation. This was certainly a far more optimistic forecast 
and assessment than the Government. thought feasible at the time and the 
Government 1 s ·view was borne out by subsequent events. Thus not 
only did the Trades Union Congress not have -mandatory control over 
its/ •••• 
its members but even if it had~ its criteria were inappropriate for the 
·prevailing economic conditions. It was .therefore not surprising that a 
much stronger policy. for control over wage claims was necessary. 
( 11) 
The White Paper issued in April~ 1968 shortly after the Budget 
was announced re-introduced the criteria for increases in earnings of 
up .to 3! per cent which h~d prevailed in 1965 and the first half of 1966. 
The criteria were subject .this -time to two exceptions where the ceiling 
might be raised about this .figure~ namely, "where there is a marked 
contribution to· increased output per man hour 9 or a major revision in 
the pay structure". The Prices . and Incomes Board later remarked that 
,.....---
"this second exception would seem to be an outcome of some of our 
(12) 
individual reports". It was not unfair or immodest of .the Board to 
suggest that its reports had influenced Government policy. They had. 
They also had some influence on. the behaviour and the decisions within 
industr.y. 
The delaying powers .of the Government. in respect of wages and 
. prices could also be applied to dividend distributions. Rents were then 
and for a long .time previously subject to widespread control through 
separate legislation. Increases in .the incomes of self-employed .people 
could not,· of course~ really be effectively restrained by the incomes 
p0licies of the Government except through indirect methods of price 
. 
control or through fiscal measures. This had always been a problem 
but not sufficient to . defeat the effectiveness of a .. thorough.going · "freeze.11 
and ·"squeeze" as .had operated in Great Britain inl966 ai:t_d 1967. 
TheWhite Paper in April~ 1968s as.distinct from the one.issued a 
year ealier, accordingly permitted a maximum of 3~ per cent. increase· in 
earnings. Unfortunately it soon emerged in negotiations ;that the unions 
regarded/ ••• 
(11) "Productivity, Prices and Incomes Policy in. 1968 and 1969 '(Gmnd 3590) 
(12} "Third General Report" August 1967 to July 1968 Report Nq. 77 
( C mnd. . 3 715 ) 
regarded this percentage as a minimum rather than as a maximum and 
bargaining was generally conducted under this unwarranted assumption. 
The Government apparently had not anticipated that there would be strong 
pressure for· increases above the enunciated amount and found it very 
difficult in practise to take a strong line against organised labour despite 
the delaying powers which it had retained. The unpopularity of the 
Government at this time~ the growing number of strikes· and industrial 
stoppages which threatened to undo the short-term benefits of the de-
valuation of sterling in respect of exports~ made the Labour Government 
. less resolute in. ensuring .that the· level of wages did not rise above 
those criteria laid down in the prevailing . White Paper. The hostile 
political climate. in .. the country ri especially from among ·its own supporters 
within the union movement 1 was not conduciv·e to the Government adhering 
strictly to its own incomes policy. Perhaps .the most significant event 
which made the· unions, employers 9 and. indeed. the public in general~ 
regarded the Government 8 s lack of determination to implement .its own 
policy» as. a .signal. for ·them to disregard it too~ was .. the Government us 
11 capitulation 11 in July 1968 to the unions in one of the nationalised 
industries - British RaU. Despite the reasons given by the Government 
. for agreeing to .the Railway Board 1 s offer of 3 per cent "on account" 
which was "to be absorbed in payments .. linked with working changes still 
(13) 
to be settled by the target date of 2nd. September set by the parties"~ it 
was, in effect a "capitulation" to .the unions following a -"go=slow" strike 
in June and July of that year. The all..,important issue at stake was 
that .. the 3 per cent was. not seen to be given .for immdiate and definite 
increased productivity. When the private sector saw that the Govern-
ment. had itself failed to adhere to its own. policy, there was. little further 
incentive .for ;the private sector to observe restraint. And indeed this 1 in 
effect,· is what happened. If any one action can be singled out as. the 
main/ •••• 
(13) National Board for Prices and Incomes "Thi.rd General Report" 
Part II p • 23 • 
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main cause of the succeeding disintegration and collapse of the· incomes 
policy as envisaged by the Government early in 19-68 9 it was .its own be-
haviour when threatened by serious disruption . by labour ·in a nationalised 
industry. Had the Government held .. firm and declined aI1Y-'increase 
not patently justifiable in terms of its own criteria for increases 9 there 
would have been a much greater liklihood of the· inc0mes policy having 
been materially helpful to. the economy during the· following year and- a 
half. It might. in • any event have failed for other reasons 9 but its .fate 
was probably decided in July in Penzance where the railway negotiati0ns 
took place. The Government did not provide .. the exam pl e essential 
for the success .of the policy in a political and social climate extremely 
hostile to wage restrain.to 
It was stated in the Introduction that. it was important. to consider 
whether ·the lack of success of an incomes policy was a result of a lack 
of determination by a government in implementing the cr_iteria for· increases 
-in wages and other incomes. The negotiations at Penzance and .. the 
·"capitulation" must surely provide a forceful argument. for .those· who 
claim that the policy failed 9 at. least in part 9 ·because of· lack of resolution 
(14) 
by the Government. "The Economist" at the ctime ·remarked .. that 
"' 
"British Rail 1 s familiar surrender to the· railway uni-ens last weekend 
came after -two weeks .during which. th.is nationalised industry in. large 
deficit had intoned that. it would in no circumsmnces give an across=the= 
board wage increase to its workers until it got a .c.opper=bottomed (a 
Wilsonian adjective) productivity agreement; and during which ministerial 
spokesman had said that.the· Government would enforce :the ·incomes 
policy, but otherwise would not interfere. rt. is now apparent" continued 
"The Economist'' :1 "that both British Rail ·and ministers were· making 
.- promises/o o o o 
(14) "The Econo~ist". 13th JulyJ 1968 pp 14 --15. The words .in 
parenthesis appear in .the article. 
9L 
promises that they had not got the resolution to keep" o The journal 
·added in the same article that 11 last weekend thus spread the impression 
to the world that the Government does not believe its own incomes 
(15) 
policy (or, as far as"Mrso Castle and Mro Marsh are concerned~ 
apparently even understand what it is) o That was the wreck of 
" ·Penzance. 
Negotiations were continued during August at Windsor and an agree= 
ment. between B;ritish 1 Rail and the unions wa.s reached providing ·for. in= 
creased productivity in return for increased wages. The comments of 
(16) 
11 The ~Economist" are again~ worth noting a "The bad half oLthe egg" 
contended the journal 11 is that it is once again proposed that this increased 
productivity should be paid for before it is achieved" o The cost of the 
wage concessions was estimated at £13 million a. year and British Rail 
considered that the improvements in productivity should ·.bring an ultimate 
saving at an annual rate of £13 o 3 million. "The trouble is"~ observed 
11 the Economist". 11 that. the· increases are due to start on September 2ndo 
· The . u target date u for achieving t..he full annual rate of savlings is said to· 
be early in 1970 . Even on British Rail us own accounting the full 
saving after '1970 will be· only £0.3 million a. year more cthan .the present 
pay~out; ·it could take the railway up to 40 years to recoup the pre=pro= 
ductivity £13 million or so ,fuat may have been paid, out in the meanwhile •11 
It is not without interest to study Lhe summ.aries of the Reports by 
the :Prices and Incomes Boa.rd after July 1967 in respect of prices and 
wages in particular industries. Their report in November 1968 on 11 P ay 
and conditions in the Construction Industry ·other ;than Building and 
( 17) 
Engineering" observed that 11 in Government departments 9 ·however 9 
there/ o' 0 0 0 0 
05! MRS CASTLE and MR. MARSH were 9 respectively 1 the Minister 
of Employment and Productivity and the Minister of Transporto 
(16) "THE ECONOMIST". 17th August 9 1968 Po 520 
. {17) Report No. 93 (Cmnd 3838 = November 9 19680) 
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there had recently been an across~the=board pay increase of 3~ per 
cent for .all industrial employees· including the building workers o This 
. settlement did not seem to ·.us to •be related either to productivity or to 
the specific needs . and requirements of individual g~oups of workersu. 
In February,' 1969 .the Board reported on .the pay· in the London 
(18) 
Clearing Banks. It later remarked that the decision of the Federation 
of Bank Employers to .pay in full with refspective effect from 1st July ~. · 
1968 j the· increases contained. in. the agreement which had been referred 
to ,the Board, did .-"not meet the requirements of the Government 0 s 
incomes policy·11 • · It will be recalled .that the powers which the State 
had retained since July 1967 were of a delaying nature only so· that 
agreements could be given effect after· the expiry of the period of delay. 
In March 1969 cthe Boa.rd found itself unable to approve the increase 
permitted by the Department of Employment and Productivity• in September 
of the previous ~year in. respect of pay and conditions in the electrical 
09) 
contracting industry in Scotland. . Howiever ~ · it accepted .that. the . 3~ 
per cent average increase should be allowed to stand although a sub~ 
sequent agreement in December which the Boa.rd had been asked· to 
-examine and whose decision was unfavourable was not implemented. 
It is net 9 · perhaps~· unfair ·to suggest that the Government. tor= 
pedoed its own policy. through its lack of resolution 9 ·but it must be 
pointed out at the same ·time that som.e of the Board 0 s recommendations 
which. did not approve increases agreed upon were 9 · indeed 9 supported 
by the Government and. ·11 standstill" orders were· ma.de in. terms of the 
delaying powers. · In . some cases 9 such as ;that of .the Clearing Banks 9 
already/ ••• 
(18) Report No. 106 (Cmnd 3943 .= February 1969) 
(19) Report No. 108 ( Cmnd 3966 - March 1969) 
already mentioned,· industry indicated that the agreed rates would be 
paid upon the termination of the period of deferment notwithstanding the 
view of the Board. 
As 1969 drew to a close the e.s.calation in wages and to a far lesser 
extent in prices began to concern both the Government and 9 not least, 
the officials of the International Monetary Fund whose huge ·loans to 
. the United Kingdom would still require a very substantial improvement 
in the country us balance of payments and in particular in "visible" and 
. "invisible" earnings. The big· improvement, in the British balance of 
payments - especially in its increase ·in exports over imports in the 
closing months of 1969 had made the "wage explosion" appear less ;harm-
ful to the economy than would have been the case if there were still a 
(20) 
large deficit o As economists were pointing out the rise· in prices 
which had not yet been felt in the home or export market to any great 
extent was bound to. start eroding the advantages that still remained 
. from the devaluation o.f two .years earlier and .the monetary and fiscal 
policies pursued by the Government since then. Prices were merely 
lagging behind the rise in wages and as wage costs. rose, so,· in .time l) 
would prices. In the.early months of 1970,there was a.decline•in the 
monthly ·11 visible" trade .figures from February. Various reasons were 
given for this trend which in May resulted in a visible trade deficit of 
£31 million, .the largest deficit since the preceding July. This was 
followed by an even· larger ·deficit of £51 million in June. The slowing 
up of international trade generally and the decline in the United States 
economic position which showed absolute decreases. in gross .national 
product for the last quarter of 1969 and the first quarter of. 1970 were 
probably/ ••••• 
( 20) In 1968 and 1969 there were respectively deficits on visible trade of 
£643 million and Rl41 million. The surplus on invisibles rose from 
£324 million to £557 million. The current balance for the two years 
showed a deficit of £319 million in 1968 and a surplus of £416 million 
in 1969 •. 
<I>. 
were probably the principal reasons. The. increased imports necessary 
to re-build. the unduly. low level of stocks and the higher prices of some 
primary commodities also had adverse ·effects on the country 1 s trade 
·balance. 
The '."wage explosion" soon began to assume very serious propor-~ 
tions. It was realised even more strongly that. the achi.evements of the 
past years = whether or not due in part. to ,the ·incomes policy = would 
soon disappear as a result of rising prices if effective action were not 
. taken. The Government was well aware of the potential seriousness 
of the position but was equally aware that its unpopularity in the period 
from 1966 .to 1969 was in no small measure a result of its harsh. defla= 
tionary policies and its restraint on incomes. It had lost much of its 
traditional support. from organised labour not only as a result of its 
direct- interference- in wage negotiations~ but also .because of its attempt 
in 1969 to introduce legislation to. delay unofficial strikes and work stopp= 
ages.· in contravention of negotiated agreements. In January of that 
year the Government had outlined its relatively mild proposals ·for in= 
dustrial reform. These prop_osals 3 however~· had been received with 
(21) 
hostility by the unions. "The . Economist" claimed that the proposals 
"never grasped the nettles" but added that. "once a Labour government 
had written into ,the statute book the principle that certain legal action 
be taken. to delay breach of contract strikes, the way would probably 
be easier for :the next government to start enforcing the ordinary law 
of contract on trade unions =·in what nearly every industrial country 
would regard as a normal democratic way". In . the middle of 1969 
the Government abandoned its attempt. to place such .legislation on ·.the 
statute book in the face of great opposition from . the uni.ens and lack of 
agreement/ e • e •• 
(21) "THE ECONOMIST". 21st June~ 1969. 
agreement within the Cabinet itself. Accordingly 9 despite the remarks 
of the Chancellor of the Exchequer j) ·in the Budget Speech in April 1970 
, that "wages cannot for long· increase at the present rate" nothing was 
suggested or done to prevent this happening. It was generally realised 
·and accepted that nothing would be done untU. after -the General Election Q 
In local elections in 1970. there had been· a surprisingly and)l perhaps)) 
inexplicably? lar·ge swing to .the Labour Pa!'.ty and.,the opfilion ·polls 
.predicted a .Labour Party v·ictory if a General Election were to be 
held. The Government deoided. in May. to hold a General. Election 
. I , 
.the following month although there was no necessity to .dissolve Parliament 
until 1971 when .its five year term of office would expire. Whichever 
·party was returned to power 2 would clearly be faced with the .difficult 
problem of restraining the rise ·in wages and also in prices)) .the latter 
now making themselves felt- in the economy. But as in all .real world 
situations )l the ·issues were complex and .the relatively high level of un= 
employment ll although. partly regional and structural~ did to some ·extent 
suggest. "cost-push" inflation as beingj) at least)) a major cause of the 
rise in .the price ·level. 
The General Election on the 18th June· returned. the Conservative 
Party. to .power .. In their .Election Manifesto .the Conservatives had 
stated that the incomes. policy of the Labour Government would not be 
continued. Statements by ministers after the election indicated that. this 
undertaking would be honoured. In August)) Mr. Robert Carr? the 
Minister of Employment and Productivity told leaders of the Trades 
Union Congress that there would be "no freez~no norms j) no White Paper 
and no criteria" • He remarked that detailed statutory effopts to control 
wages )l as attempted by the previous Administration "fell flat on. their 
faces / ••••. 
faces . in practice·". He said that the Government intended to .leave the 
responsibility for the determination of wages where .the Government con= 
sidered it belonged, namely with . employers and unions o It is not yet 
clear what measures the new Admmistratt:on proposes to .take to reduce 
·the ·rate of inflation. 
In the next chapter we propo9e to consider monetary policy in 
general, and money supply in particular~ in relation to incomes policy. 
Thereafter, in Chapter VII~ we shall try. to evaluate the development 
of the British incomes policy and to make some assessment as to 
whether direct intervention by the State in· the mechanisms for deter= 
mining incomes and prices was materially successful in curtailing the 
·rate of inflation in Great Britain. 
- - - - oOo 
9'1. 
CHAPTER VI. 
It was stated in the Introduction that incomes policies have always 
been applied in conjunction with other poUcy instruments. It . is)} there~ 
fore, necessary. to examine the com:i;::ilementary policies .lln. the, United 
Kingdom to assess whether they were appropriate in the prevailing 
economic conditions or whether they served to impede or negate the 
objectives of ,the, incomes policy. In particular 1 the relative . importance 
attached to the supply of money. in the· formulation of monetary policy 
may be of considerable significance in. fostering .the success of an in= 
comes policy designed to reduce ·the rate of inflation. It. is intended 
in this Chapter -to .trace very briefly the monetary policies pursued by 
successive governments during the post=war years culminating in .the 
·enunciation of the concept of Domestic Credit Expansion in May.' 1969 
.by Mr. Roy Jenkins, .the Chancellor of the-Exchequer. 
After the ·.termination of the Second World War 1 -the Labour Govern= 
· ment ·under the Prime Minister 1 Mr. Attlee followed a policy 0f cheap 
·m0ney. Bank rate remained unchanged at 2 per cent until November 0 
1951. There was relatively little control over the supply of money. 
The Government endeavoured to . control aggregate demand and inflation~ 
mainly .through severe fiscal measures and a continuation of the· battery 
of war=time controls 9 including rationing and price control. E. V .Morgan 
commenting on monetary policy. during this period observed that. ''it was 
decided ••••• that borrowing should be cheap and easy for ·the Govern= 
· ment and for ·those whose ·projects .had government approval 1 while the 
(1) 
·expenditure of others was restricted by direct controls uu. 
Si.r/ •••• 
(l) E. VICTOR MORGAN. "Monetary Policy for Stable Growth" 
Hobart Paper no. 27 Third Edition p. 15. 
Sir Stafford Cripps, the Chancellor of .the Exchequer in 194 7, 
continued .the cheap money policy of his predecessor, Mr. Hugh Dalton. 
In 1947, for example, the ratio of money stock to Gross N aUonal 
Product was 0. 76 as compared with Q. 40 .. in 1961 and Q. 34 oy 1969. 
The economy was at, the time, almost "saturated" with money,· but it 
appears .that people· had not yet come to ,expect inflation to ,fue extent 
. that. they anticipated increases. in the price level during the·. following two 
decades. However, in view of the controls already mentioned, inflation 
was probably only :"suppressed" during the immediate post-war period. 
The increase in ,the money supply could not; ·as ·modern quantity theor-
ists .predict, cause a significant increase in output in view of the govern-
ment restrictions on·. industrial production • In 1951 when. the General 
Election returned the Conservatives .to power, relatively more attention 
was concentrated upon monetary policy. The wartime controls were 
being dismantled with the result that. the new Government had .to search 
for other instruments .to replace .them in ,fue management oLthe economy. 
Bank rate was raised to 2~ per cent in November 1951 and to .4 per 
cent in March ·1952. Although .in the early years of -the Administration 9 
Bank rate was used as an. instrument of monetary policy it was only 
after 1955 .that. this instrument was administered with considerable vigour. 
Open market operations by the authorities were also adopted, to influence 
the capacity of the banking sector to lend to the private sector. 
In 1957 ,the Government decided to appoint a Committee ·to ·examine 
the working of the monetary system. This Committee, commonly known 
as the Radcliffe Committee, reported in· 1959. The Committee listed 
the objectives of monetary policy as· a high and stable level of demandi1 
reasonable stability in the purchasing power of money, steady economic 
growth/ ••• 
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growth and improvement of the standard of· living, a margin in. the· 
balance of payments which would be sufficient to make some contribution 
to -the economic development of ,the outside world, and finally, to provide 
for a -11 strengthening of London vs international reserves0 • These ·objec= 
tiv~s, ·indeed, were similar to ·.th0se of .the Government itself ii although 
economic growth had not been specifically included by the latter. 
The Committee, although .it did not deny. that the supply of money 
was ,important, considered that. "the authorities •••••. have to regard 
.. the structure of. interest rates rather than•. the supply of money as -the 
centrepiece of the ·monetary mechanism. This .does not mean ii 11 • the 
Committee added, "thatthe supply of money; is unimportant, but that 
. .its control is incidental to cinterest rate policy". It is therefore unfair 
to suggest. that the Radcliffe Committee asserted that. "money. did not 
. II 
matter" but rather thatit considered that money did not matter very much". 
Throughout the Conservative Government 1 s period of office and, 
indeed, during mo~t of the succeeding Labour Government vs years. in 
power ll the basic monetary policies were not radically changed. Indeed 
the policies adopted by the authorities from 1964 to complement both 
, the fiscal and incomes polcies were not basically different from .those 
I 
-1 of the Conservative Government. Primarily, they consisted of more 
severe restrictions on bank lending, the imposition of special deposits 
by the banks with .the Bank of England and the maintenance of relatively 
higher rates -of interest. Control of -the supply of mone.y itself and the 
significance attached to .this control by economists of the so~called 
"Chicago School" such as Milton Friedman, and .the development of the 
-"new" Quantity Theory, received relatively,.little support from the 
Government/ •••• 
In so far as this policy of supporting gilt-edged securities is 
pursued it, is well nigh impossible to achieve a .tight control over ·the 
supply of money. Morgan would appear ·to have explained succinctly 
the result of this policy when he stated ,that 11the times when monetary 
control is most needed - when prices are rising .fast and the balance of 
payments is weak ·- are just the .times when the gilt.c.edged . market is 
likely to be depressed. If, · in these circumstances 11 , · he continues, 
11 the authorities feel obliged, not only. to refrain from selling stock, but 
also to make· substantial re-purchases in order to support the market, 
it is virtually impossible . to avoid additional recourse to the banking 
system (to meet the Government 1 s current financial requirements) 
(3) -
and control over the money stock must be relinquished". 
At this juncture it is appropriate to ask what are the main conten-
tions of economists favouring the "newu quantity .theory approach and 
whether ·they have .any empirical basis .for ·their conclusions .• Broadly,. 
the empirical work and views of Friedman on money supply may be 
, ( 4) 
surrimarised in the words .of Morgan who states ,that in the short-run 
"there is a very strong correlation between changes in the quantity of 
money and changes in the· demand for goods and. the rate of growth of 
re al output 11 • However, this correlation. disappears over longer periods 
and "is replaced by one between the quantity of money and .the price 
level. When the money stock grows .faster ·than real output~ prices .rise; 
when the· money stock grows more slowly than real output prices .fall; 
but there is no significant difference in the average rate of growth of 
real output between· long periods of rising prices and long periods of 
·II 
falling prices". The Chicago School" contend .that. the supply of money 
(3) E.V. MORGAN 
. . 
(4) E. V ., MORGAN 
op cit. p 35 
op cit. p 51 
should/ ••. 
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should be allowed. to grow at a fairly constant rate and that fluctuations 
. in. the quantity of money should be avoided. If the •lag between a change 
in the stock of money and jts effect on the economy is relatively long, 
the effect may influence real output in economic conditions which are 
quite different from those upon which the authorities wished . their actions 
( 5) 
to take effect. Friedman and Schwartz concluded from their empirical 
study that the troughs and. peaks in the cycles of economic activity 
lagged by 12 to lB months respectively behind previous troughs and 
peaks in the rate of growth of the money supply. However, it has 
been argued that the average lags concealed very considerable instability. 
Furthermore, the debate on .the influence of the money supply upon real 
output has revealed •that even if there is a strong causal relationship in 
this direction rather than a causal relationship from real output to the 
money supply, the precise "transmission mechanism." is by no mea...ns 
clear. Notwithstanding the apparent lag . identified by Friedman and 
Schwartz,· recent work in .the United States .has suggested .that. the 
time-lags associated with fiscal measures. imply that fiscal measures are 
not necessarily faster-acting .than monetary measures. The work of 
( 6) 
Andersen and Jordan is particularly interesting in this respect. In an 
article prepared by M.J. Artis and A .R. Nobay in the National 
Institute Economic Revie~~) an attempt Wa$. made to ."replicate with 
United Kingdom data .the kinds of test" employed by Andersen and Jordanq 
The results suggested that .fiscal measures were relatively quicker.=acting 
than monetary measures but the authors admit. that the results are very 
far ·from conclusive. 
A .A. Walters/ •• 
{ 5) M. FRIEDMAN and A .J. SCHWARTZ: "Money and Business 
Cycles". Review of Economics and Statistics. 1964. 
( 6) L .C. ANDERSEN and J .L. JORDAN~ "Federal Reserve Bank of 
St. Louis Review" November 1968and April 1969. 




A .A. Walters has examined the effect of changes in the money 
supply upon output from 1955 ,to 1968. He suggests that "there is some 
evidence that the downturn of real income at the end of 1955 was brought 
about primarily by the striking reduction in the quantity of money that 
occurred in the first quarter of the . year • o o ~·o e o o Prices, however:1 
continued, rising as rapidly as before until they levelled out during ·1958 11 • 
During the period from 1957to 1965 11 however:1· it is difficult to show .the 
relative importance of the effects of monetary and budgetary policies. 
Sometimes. they were in harmony and at other times they. appeared to be 
following diverging paths. Perhaps the most interesting. period for study 
was the period in 1967 and· 1968 when the· money supply was being ex-
( 9) 
panded but there was=.asevere fiscal policy in operation. Walters ob-
serves that from the second quarter of 1967 there was a rapid. increase in 
the quantity of money. "The increase over the year was of the order 
of• 10 per cent • • • • • • even in the second and third quarters of 1968 the 
money supply was still expanding at the rate of about 6 per cent per 
annum'·'. Yet despite the .udevaluation budget" in November 1967 and the 
extremely harsh budget the following March :1 .there was a consumer ·boom. 
Walters points out that "the consumer boom proceeded apace from the 
. autumn of 1967 on. Retail prices· increased from August 11 1967 to August 
19.68 at the rate of 5. 7 per cent and . industrial production increased by 
about 6 per cent. Retail sales soared". Walters suggests that. the 
evidence ·"is • • • • • • • consistent with the hypothesis that there is about 
a . six-month lag in the reaction of the economy to changes in the stock of 
money". However, he concedes that the rise in prices .from 1955 to 
1958 despite the reduction in the stock of money remains the most 
puzzling/ •••. 
( 8) A.A. WALTERS: "Money in Boom and Slump" Hobart Paper No.44 
Second Edition 1970 pp 45. 
( 9) A .A. WALTERS. op. cit. pp 48-49 
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puzzling feature of the period from 1950. This situation appears on the 
face of it to be inconsistent with . the predictions of the quantity theorists. 
Walters regards the most important lesson to ·be drawri from the 
1954-56 and 1967-68 periods is that "in the apparent conflict between 
monetary contraction (expansion) and budgetary stimulation (damping) 
·the resulting events were more consistent with a monetary theory. than 
with a budgetary model. It would be silly to conclude" he adds 1 11 that 
.the only thing that does matter is money. The evidence is neither 
sufficiently robust nor sufficiently extensive to suggest such a dogma. 
More subtle and sensitive interpretation may give more delicately-
balanced conclusions". 
In May, · 1969, the Chancellor :of the Exchequer. enunciated .the 
concept of Domestic Credit Expansion ( DCE) in his letter of intent 
to the International Monetary Fund. The n1etter of intent 1 stated. that 
11 it is the Government's policy to ensure that .the course quarter· by 
quarter of domestic credit expansion as a whole 9 and of the Central 
Government borrowing requirement within it 1 · is consistent with the 
intended result for ·the year as a whole and to take action as appro-
priate to .this end". The Chancellor 1 Mr. Jenkins lJ promised· to try 
to limit DCE to £400 million for the financial year ending March, 1970 • 
. ( 10) 
What is DCE? "The Economist" described it as "broadly ••••• the 
increase in the money supply excluding the effect of the ·balance of 
payments" •. Walters prefers to define it as the -"change in the money 
supply + deficit on balance of payments. For this purpose" 9 · he says s 
11 the balance of payments 1 deficit consists of the current account deficit 
plus net private capital inflow plus official lending overseas 11 • 
In considering/ •• 
(10) "THE ECONOMIST 11 28th June 1 1969 -pp 13..;.14 
(11) A.A. WALTERS. Op. cit. p. 56. 
In considering the statement by Mr. Jenkins to .limit DCE to £400 
million "The Economist" calculated that ''if Britain 1 s overseas accounts 
were in exact balance •••• (that) . financial year, then the new formula 
would allow money supply to ,increase by £400 million (i.e. by about 
2~ per cent) ; .if we really do get a balance of payments that leads to 
an. inflow of £300 million of foreign exchange, then .. the money supply 
should be allowed to increase ·by some £700 million {or nearly 4~ per 
cent) but if we again run a balance of payment deficit of £400 million,· 
then the permitted increase in the money supply wi.11 be nought". The 
journal admitted that "there are complications in this rough arithmetic 
· becau·se ·the concept of DCE includes some· illogical item.s ••••• but 
(12) 
that is the broad effect. 11 In August "The Economist" observed 
that. the permitted increase of 4! per cent (assuming an inflow of £300 
million) "fits in well wit.h fhe Milton Friedman formula .. for keeping in-
flation under control ( 1 allow the increase in. money supply to , be only 
about 1 per cent above the potential for real annual growth of output 
in the economy r) 11. 
Walters, however, considers that the operation of DCE, while 
having .the attractions of the type of discipline. imposed by .the automatic 
gold. standard system also entails many of its disadvantages. He con-
eludes that. "a stable DCE may be worse and perhaps much worse than 
a stable expansion of the money stock. But, by the same 
token. some· sort of stability in DCE, if extremes are av-0id-ed~ will 
provide a useful basic discipline on government behaviour; we must~' 
(13) 
he adds, "make do with .the second best". 
It is/ •••• 
(12) "THE ECONOMIST". 2nd August, 1969 pp 13-14 
(13) A.A. WALTERS. op cit. p. 59. 
·· 1qq 
It is interesting and, perhaps~ significant 9 that the ·incomes policy 
was in a state of almost complete collapse when "for practically the 
first. time since the war, a real squeeze is being laid at. the· base of 
( i4) 
the money supply". Although the Government did not intimate that .it 
had lost confidence in .its incomes policy as an economic weapon to 
control inflation and had decided to replace it (rather than reinforce it) 
with a stricter control of the money supply 1 the rapid decline of the 
incomes policy and. the subsequent emergence ·of the new policy provides 
a ready ground for· speculation as to what the Cabinet were really 
. thinking. 
We have .described in the previous Chapter the rapid rise of wages 
in relation to productivity and prices in 1969 and .the first half of 1970. 
We have also noted the somewhat unexpected improvement in the visible 
trade balance in the closing months of 1969. To what extent the ·lag 
in the increase in prices and the improvement. in the export performance 
were a result of the stricter control of the money supply during 1969 is 
impossible to .determine at this stage. The "new model monetary policy" 
11 05) 
- this term is used by· The Economist"- has not been in operation for a 
sufficient. length of time to provid~ any accurate or meaningful assess-
ment of its effect. However, it is .important. to remember that the new 
policy was not a complement to the ·incomes policy which as already 
stressed, was in ruins by the. middle of 1969 ~ if not before, although the 
Government 1 s delaying powers of up to twelve ·months on price and 
wage increases did not legally expire until the end of the year. 
The fears of some members of. the Treasury and . the Bank of 
England that the gilt-edged market would collapse if the support hitherto 
given/ •••• 
(14) (15) "THE ECONOMIST"~ 2nd August 1969 pp 13-14. 
(16) 
given it was reduced proved to be unjustified. Indeed 9 "The Economist" 
remarked that the Friedman view "that a· stop to support buying oil' gilt= 
edged could soon lead to a firming up of the gilt=edged market :v<(as re-
garded as crazilly academic. But of c·ourse" continued· the journal~ 
11 this ·is what has actually happened". 
It is necessary to point out that a reduction in . the money supply 
may be offset, at least in part, by an .increase· in .. the ·velocity of circula= 
tion. An examination of the relationship in :the United Kingdom between 
gross national product and -the money supply for the period 1963 to 1968 
shows that a relatively small change in velocity of ci·rculation can reflect 
a substantial monetary equivalent. The· figures below are ·interesU.ng 
(17) 
because, as Artis~_9.Ild N obay ·.-point out,. "the monetary equivalent of 
velocity variations :is often substantial in relation to the money supply -
(17~ 
sometimes larger and frequently of the opposite sign • • • • • The figures 
could hardly be described as reassuring, since they suggest. that a given 
change· in. the money supply might be offset or· effectively increased by as 
much as a quarter or a thir,d, ·by changes in velocity". However~ 
changes in velocity. do not necessarily conflict with the views of the 
·"Chicago· School". The quantity theorists admit that the velocity of 
circulation will chai:ige but they contend -that these changes may be pre-
dictable. If accurate prediction of the changes in velocity is .possible 9 
monetary policy, through control of the money supply 9 may enjqy a 
greater degree of success. in the future. 
Variations/ ••• 
{16) uThe Economist": 2nd August 1969 - pp. 13=14 
____ (17J__!_!_~a_tJ.oJ1aLins_titute _Economic Revie.W..!.'.._Qp cit._p_p-----'--4-8=49. · 
( 17~) This ·fact emerges clearly from the detailed quarterly tables which 
are •not included 'With . the annual figures · overleaf. 
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In May 1970, · however, the National Instit;ute Economic Revieyv 
came to ·the conclusion that "there. is not much evidence for the United 
Kingdom whether a .tight control of money supply (associated ceteris 
paribus, with rising interest rates) leads to a deceleration in the rate of 
price· inflation rather than in real output growth~ but so far as it goes , 
.it ·seems that the impact is fir$t felt on real output and employment and 
only later on. prices". Significantly, by the middle of 1970 .the level of 
unemployment was the highest since the end of the Second World War. 
This level of unemployment ma,.y have been the result of other economic 
factors such as changes in union behaviour,.rather 'than monetary policy. 
Perhaps it is not unfair to . say that the e.xtent of the· influence of 
changes .in money supply upon the rate of inflation is still very uncertain. 
Although there is a growing support for the Chicago quantity theorists 
both in the United Kingdom, and especially in the United States,. the 
greatest weakness of .their theori es appears, so far, to be their inability 
to demonstrate with clarity .and precision how the ·"transmission mechanism" 
actually/ •••• 




Indeed sciUi~ky has rightly pointed out that "in 
today 1 s complex economy ll the causal chain through which a change in 
the supply of money· influences the. price ·level is. long and. tenuous". The 
expansion of the money supply in the United Kingdom during the peiriod 
of the incomes policy probably made the implementation of the . policy 
relatively more difficult. It is impossible to say with any assurance, 
· however, to what extent l.t impeded the policy or· hastened its collapse. 
Before concluding the discussion on monetary policy it is relevant 
to ask if the Friedman School, would in practice ll deal with inflation 
in a fundamentally different manner from the supporters of incomes 
policies. The question is 1 perhaps ll not as surprising as might at 
( 2 0) 
first appear. It has been . raised by Weintraub. in an article referred 
to by the 11N ational Institute Economic Revfew". 
( 21) 
The· "Review", in August 1970, noted that "the question is again 
being raised today • • • • whether after all the rate of increase in. prices 
might not be controlled by an appropriately severe fiscal an.d monetary 
policy (rather /than incomes policy). ·A special version of this kind of 
approach 11 the Review says ll "is enshrined in the idea of operating mone= 
tary policy according to a rule by which the money supply is predeter-
mined to grow at a fixed rate (so that) • • • • • ultimately • • • • • • the 
nominal national income (will) grow also at a fixed rate". They polnt 
out that the problem is that it is not known "how a .restrained rise in 
nominal income will be divided between changes . in prices, on the one 
hand, and real changes. in output on the other". Therefore , it is not 
known how long it would take for price increases to fall to the . desired leveL 
Nor/ ••••• 
(19) T. SCITOVSKY. "Money and the Balance of Payments" p. 66 
( 20) S. WEINTRAUB. "Incomes Policy in the Monetarist's Programme" 
The Bankers n Magazine August 1970 pp. 71~76 
( 21 ) N o • 5 3 • p • 12. 
llO. 
11 Nor is there any assurance", remarks the Review, "once such stability 
was realised, that it could be maintained once a more acceptable rate of 
real economic advance and untilisation of resources was restored". The 
Review then referred to a recent article by s·. Weintraub. It had been 
suggested by· Weintraub that the Friedman argument favouring a constant 
rate of growth of the money supply, assumes that labour will acquiese 
in allowing unit la.bout cost to remain stable. "The big issue 11 observes 
Weintraub, "thus concerns th~ trend of wages under Friedman 1 s monetary 
rule; the penalty is to be unemployment if labour does not bend to the 
monetary clamp • • • • Yet Friedman himself .is the authority for the view 
that while a change in money supplies bears a good relationship to the 
change in money income, the split between price and output is vague 
and unpredictable". Weintraub argues that "entailed in the Monetarist 
programme is either a voluntary or a legislated Incomes Policy", because 
the programme will only succeed if it gains the co-operation of labour 
11 through a new agreement or through the imposed discipline of new laws'~ 
He suggests on past experience that "any expectation of enthusiastic 
labour acquiescence is out of harmony· with the facts". If Friedma.n 11 s 
view requires labour compliance "we see the convergence in the 
Monetarist and wage theories of inflation: both premise an~ 
( 22) 
wa_ge trend to control the ..Erice level 11 • If labour is unco-operative what 
is the monetarist 1 s solution to unruly wage movements? asks Weintraub, 
He concludes by obser·ving that "a country can never embark on a 
policy in the conviction of complete success. As with the military, it 
must have some programme in reserve, for tactical or strategic support. 
Is it / •••• 
( 22) WEIN.TRAUB has written the underlined words in italics for 
emphasis. 
lll. 
Is it an Incomes Policy, in the case of the Monetarists 11 ? Thus, the 
manner in which the . "Chicago School" seeks to control inflation may not 
be so different, in practice, from the supporters of incomes policies. 




An attempt to assess .the value of an incomes policy to a country 1 s 
economy must be made in terms of what it is designed to achieve. The 
·initiators of the policy itself and the administrators concerned with .its day 
to day implementation must evaluate the results in the . light of the objec-
tives. · This . statement is, no doubt, obvious but it is, not infrequently , 
· lost sight of. An .incomes policy may be roundly condemned for 
failing to halt inflation or to re~distribute incomes within the country, 
or for not encouraging investment and saving~ or for its inability to 
. improve :the balance of payments and ensure· full employment with a 
high . rate of economic growth. The validity of any criticism rests, 
therefore, on the success or failure of the policy to achieve the aims 
for which it was established and on whether it was the most appropriate 
' economic instrument for carrying out the job. Admittedly the evaluation 
is made more difficult when the relative importance attached to various 
objectives is equivocal and also where these objectives have themselves 
changed in emphasis over time • 
. In trying to judge the success of the British policy we shall look 
" 
at .its achievements in the light . of its intention to assist in reducing the 
rate of inflation without excessive unemployment. This was .certainly 
its principal aim. If inflation had. not been so acute a problem it is 
most unlikely that the policy would ever have been. embarked upon. At 
most,· the incomes policy would have been very different to ·the one es.-· 
tablished had inflation not been its central objective. However~ it must 
be recognised that the British incomes policy : did ·have other ·object-.· 
. . ·~ 
tives besides maintainLT1.g a high level of employment without incurring 
. ., . 
'·~· 
inflation at ,the same time. There were social as well as economic 
aspects/ •..•• 
aspects,. such as .the· maintenance· of a reasonable standard of ·living. 
Indeed .the White· Paper in November ·1966 stated that ''improvement in 
the standard ·of living of the worst-off members of the community is a 
·primary social objective". The White Paper added that. "as in practice 
the needs of individual workers. are largely determined by the extent 
of their family commi.tments, the Governmentwm continue .to give a high 
priority to measures specifically designed to meet family needs"~ 
It will be recalled that the "Declaration of Intent" signed in 
December 1964 accepted the need to keep increases in income in line 
with the increase ·in real output. In addition, both sides of industry 
accepted the Government 1 s proposals . set out in the White Paper in 
(1) 
1965 .that the National Economic Development Council should. "keep under 
review. the general movement of prices and of money incomes of all 
kinds II• Furthermore, they accepted that the National Board for 
Prices and Incomes should be set up .. "to. examine particular cases 
. in order to advise whether or not the ·behaviour of prices or of wages~ 
salaries or other incomes (was) , in the· national interest as .defined by 
the Government after consultation with Management and Unions". 
We have already. indicated that the attempt.to .irnpose a voluntary 
incomes policy was a failure in so -.far as it did not achieve tne restraint 
necessary for preventing inflation. The retail price index 1 the capital 
goods index and the index for total final prices are set out below. The 
base year is 1958 and the increase in the indices .from .1956 is not with-
out considerable ·interest in so far as the index for total final prices rose 
(2) 
from 113 .1 in 1964 to .122. 3 in. 1966. 
Retail/ •••• 
(1) Cmnd 2639. April, 1965. Op cit. 
(2) "NATIONAL INSTITUTE ECONOMIC REVIEWu. No. 46 
November 1968 p. 71. 
.115. 
Retail Prices Total Final Prices. 
1958 - 100 
.1966 I 123 .4 119.4 
II 125 .8 ' 121. 4 
III 126.2 123. 7 
IV .·127. 2 124.3 
127.9 123 .9 
II 129 .o 124.5 
III .128.3 .125.8 
IV 12 6. 5 
1968 I '131. 7 127. 5 
II 134.8 · 130. 7 
III 135. 5 132. 7 
·IV 137-.2 132.8 
From the third quarter of 1966 to .the end of. 1967 retail prices rose 
from 126. 2 to 129. 9. This amounted to approximately 3 per cent over 
~he eighteen months. During the whole of 1967 they rose ·by only 
2 per cent. In order ·to .try. to find some indication as to whether ·it 
was "the ·"freeze", rather than the "squeeze" imposed by severe fiscal 
and monetary policies 1 which caused the check ,in the rise in prices~ 
.it is not very· helpful to look at the·. indices for the·. level of unemployment~ 
' 
unfilled v\acancies and ·"excess. demand". The following tables reflect 
the demand for ·labour from. 1957 as. depicted . by these •three indices. 
DEMAND/ ••• 
DEMAND FOR LABOUR. 


































































































Although at first glance it might appear that the "freeze 11 rather than . the 
"squeeze" in 1966 and 1967 was the major cause of the decrease in the 
demand for ·labour as there was an immediate change in the demand for 
labour ·in the third quarter of 1966 ~ this in. fact proves little or nothing 
as the whole deflationary 11package 11 in that year must be seen as a 
comprehensive/ ••. 
117. 
comprehensive economic assault on the, inflationary spiral. It is not 
possible to establish any accurate apportionment of the change, in the de-
mand for ,labour to any 0ne instrument of policy, though this was the 
'first peace-time occasion in which an incom-es"freeze" was- instituted. 
The Board for Prices and Incomes in its Second Gener~i .Report,·. 
in August 1967, concluded that "it cannot be said with any exactitude what 
would have been 'the· effect of th~ "squeeze" without the ,"freeze" .•• o o 
It is reasonable to assume, however,. that. the '"freeze" played a major 
role ·in slowing .down the momentum of inflation 1 and that without· it the 
disinflationar.y effects of an even tr.lore severe "squeeze" would have 
·taken longer to show ,themselves" o This is probably about as .far as 
-, one can go in assessing the relative significance of the different economic 
policy measures. and, indeed, it may be questioned whether the effects 
of a statutory ·"standstill" on incomes can -ever be accurately calculated 
until there are a number of case studies which may provide guidance 
and . suggest trends. 
The deflationary measure in 1966 and 1967 did not result in the 
hoped fOY. improvements· in the balance of payments on the trading account. 
However, there was an absolute decline in the gross domestic product 
over one quarter ·- April to Ji.me, · 1966 -- and the figures showed .that 
. there was no .growth whatever ·from the fourth quarter of 1965 .to t;h.e 
·fourth quarter of 1966, while ·for the following ei~hteen mo~ths until. the 
middle of• 1968 gross national product rose from 129. 8 to 135. 0' an in-
crease of about 4 per cent or at an annual rate of about 2. 7 per ·cent. 
Perhaps, more ·importantly, the industrial production index for the· first 
quarter in 1966 was 134 and· in the final quarter declined to 13L In 1967 
this. index was 132 for ·the first quarter and .136 .for the ·fourth quarter. 
The/ ••.• 
118. 
The index for "distribution and other -services" remained at 125 for ·the 
whole of 1966 and rose from 126 in the -first three months of 1967 to ,130 
.. by the last quarter of that year. 
What do ;these statistics suggest? Bearing. in .mind the· lags in= 
herent in the effect of policy measures, - the -11 standstill 11 -and :"severe· re_-
straint 11 , together with . greater control over the creation of credit, re-
sulted in a decrease in the ·rate of inflation, a stagnation in aggregate 
production, a higher level of unemployment and from the -.figures below~ 
no -significant improvement in .the country 1 s trading position. Does one 
.therefore conclude that they were the wrong economic-_ measures,· if. the 
countr.y 1 s performance ·ininternational trade did not improve or may it be 
justifiably claimed that the -balance of international trade would have been 
much worse if they had not been imposed? For the eight quarters· i.n 
1966 and 1967 -·the adjusted balance of visible trade was as ;follows: -
£ million. 
1966 I - 69 
II -'98 
III -- 57 
IV +129 




IV - 332 
It is hardly surprising that devaluation seemed to be the only alternative 
by November ·1967. Other measures including -the -incomes -policy had 
proved to be insufficient. to remedy the situation. Although prices were 




the international m.arket • The loss of confidence in sterling and the 
. deterioration in the United Kingdom 1 s export performance were too 
great. for :the incomes policy to put matters right by directing· its attack 
on .the rising· price ·level. 
It may· be asked at. this juncture what. happened. to productivity. 
Did. the . economy become relatively more· productive as a result of 
managing ·the country on a much ,tighter re\n? ·Even if devaluation 
was .the only solution to an over~valued pound,· it might be expected 
that there would still have been some favourable results -.flowing from 
the severe policies adopted. 
There was a decrease in overall demand .for consumer and capital;·: 
goods; accordingly, there was a greater margin of spare capacity 
in the economy. At the same time, .the decline in profits provided. a 
strong ·incentive ·to management to .decrease costs wherever· possible. 
This would result in a substantial "shake-out" in. industry which should 
help to increase, . in the, longer..,term l) output per person employed. In 
the fohowing table output· per man'.""hour worked .in manufacturing industry 
does show that output started to decline in the second period - in .1966 s· 
. but .this cannot be attributed to .the Hfreeze" which was ·instituted only in 
the third quarter of that year. It is therefore difficult to establish to 
what extent the .. ufreeze 11 did affect output per person· both during :the 
·period of its operation, and in view of time-lags, after ·its termination. 
The index for manufacturing output per m.an=hour worked is· compared 
with .the indices .for· hourly earnings and for average w·eekly hours since 
1957. In .the ten quarter from January 1966 .to July 1968 hourly earnings 
rose from 159.3 to 179.l; whereas weekly hours worked rose not at all. 
More/ ••.... 
' 120. • ' 
More significantly~ productivity declined sHghtly and. then rof3e rapidly in 
the ·last quarter of 1967 suggesting that the effects of the ''freeze" and 
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The discussion/ •••• 
The discussion of the effects of monetary policy in Chapter VI 
revealed• that we possess no accurate guide to determine how long 
changes in monetary policy in the United Kingdom take to cause changes 
:in the economic situationo We ·therefore do not know ·how much of the 
change in. the economic position was due to the incomes poUcy itselL 
The relatively sharp change soon after ;t..he ·1966 "freeze" is~· as we have 
pointed out-~ no . sure guide to its success as it was not .the only instrument 
( 3) 
used. E. VoMorgan in considering British monetary policy stressed the 
'.importance ·that 11 stabilising measures should be quick acting, and here 
monetary policy does not score very high marks. Fiscal changes such 
as .the '"regulator" changes in indirect taxes 1 a variable social insurance 
contribution or changes :in hire=purcha.se controls all exert a much more 
·.immediate ·impact". He adds .that . "the real power of monetary policy 
. is. in influencing economic conditions over rather longer periods". This 
suggests that .. the •fairly sudden change in 1966 in employment.levels v · out= 
put and productivity were mainly due to· measures other than changes in 
Bank rate or ·in controls over ·bank ·lending. However 1 ·it. is .difficult 
to· be more precise on this issue. 
It is worth tracing :the ·views of. the Prices and Incomes Boa.rd 
during the: first four years of its existence from 1965. It issued four 
General Reports. at annual. intervals. We have~ of course~ · referred to 
some of these Reports already. 
In its First Report it emphasised that its recommendations had no 
binding effect and as such "the Board operated within the framework of 
a' voluntary policyu. 11 • We have discussed this voluntary aspect at some 
length earlier. In .its Second Report. the Board remarked that. it . "was 
no .longer/ ••• 
(3) E.V •• MORGAN: ·"Monetary Policy for Stable Growth". 
op cit. pp. 30-31 
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no longer operating -to rules which were the result of tripartite agreement; 
it could reach its ·judgment only in the light of the exceptions to the stand-
(4) 
still. laid down by. the Governmentu. The Government had the pow~r to 
enforce the Board us findings but in fact it did not have occasion to ,do so. 
When the Government did -intervene on a few occasions during the 
period from July 1966 to August 1967 to prevent increases· in prices and 
wages being put into .effect -the specific-. issues had not been referred to 
·the Board. The Government was acting in terms of Part IV of the 
Act passed: in August,. 1966. 
The Board claimed that. the joint "squeeze" and, "freeze" could be 
( 5) 
11 expressed. in short~run economic terms. and .long-run institutional terms" • 
. We have already dealt with .the Board 1 s view on .the effect the -measures 
·had on industrial production, output per head and earnings. It remains 
.for us to consider the Board us view of the question of price ·stability. 
The Board pointed out. that over the twelve month period the retail price 
( 6) 
index rose by:l.4 per cent in each .period. Overall this. index showed 
a rise only of about 0. 8 per cent more -..than the rise in average earn-
ings. As a large section of-the public had no .increase· in wages,· it is 
clear 'that for them there ·had been a . fall in their standard of. living 
during the · short period. 
'What was,· no .doubt, even more important was that over -.the period 
export prices rose by less that one per cent. Although to som-e extent 
-this was due to price reductions. in imported raw materials, .the combined 
. stringent economic measures obviously helped. The Board concluded'-
that/ •••• 
(4) "Second General Report" op cit. pl. July 1966 · - August 1967 
( 5) "Second General Report" op cit. pp 4-5 
( 6) This statistic is supported ~y the table set out above on page 115, 
which is taken from the Quarterly Journali1 '.'National Institute Econo-
mic Review" whose statistics are obtained from various official 




that "this comparative · stabiHty in export prices ~ combined with. similar 
stability in the prices. in home manufactures generally ll ·is probably the 
( 7) 
main economic gain .derived from the period of 1 squeeze u and Ufreeze u " 
This was~ perhaps j an ironic . comment in view of the devaluation of 
sterling less than. six months later in November 9 1967 o 
The :Board also addressed itself to the contention by some econo-
mists - notably F o W. Paish ll = whose views we shall examine shortly ll 
that a .. 2 . to 2! per cent level of unemployment giving a roughly 5 to 6 per 
cent level of surplus capacity should result in a negligible change in 
. prices. The Board observed that the specific references on pay and 
prices to it over the period did not support that contention ll although .it 
admitted· that these refe:t'ences were clearly limited in number and pre-
sumably, by implication, ·insufficient to disprove the ·thesis that a reduction 
of demand, sufficient. to raise ·the 'level of unemployment.to ,2! per cent 
or so, would result, in price stability. in the United Kingdom~ Paish .. and 
others have suggested that .the Government es mandat'ory mcomes policy 
was unnecessary and inappropriate o Paish. has ll moreover, argued his 
case both before and after its imposition. 
In the Board us Third General Report issued. a year later ·in July 
1968, the incomes policy was .seen in. the light of the effect of the devalu= 
ation and probably .the harshest Budget since· the end of World War II, 
in March, 1968. The harsh Budget was not unexpected. The increase in 
earnings from April, ·1967 to April,· 1968 was more ·than 8 per cent and 
prices rose by about 4! per cent leaving as the Board pointed ouL 11 an 
increase in real purchasing power of 3! per c .. ent in a period which 
started / ••••• 
( 6) cont. ~ Gazette, ·.Economic Trends (HMSO) Monthly Digest of Statis-
tics and the Board of Trade Journal (HMSO) 0 
( 7) "Second General Reportn. op cit. p. 5. 
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(8) 
started with an appreciable ·balance of payments .deficit". However, des~ . 
pite the ·rise· in earnings, · uriemployment, seasonally adjusted, rose· from 
J·.9 pe·r cent. to 2.3 per cent. during. 1967 and was still at 2.3 per cent 
in April. 1968 whereas the ·retail price index from ·ApriL 1967 · to·: April 
. 1968, rose · l::>Y · 3. 7 per cent. The B card rem.arked on the surprising 
nature of these ·changes in , view of their different relationship as compared 
with previous :levels ·of unemployment and increases in wage rates. 
This appears to ·indic,:;_te as 9 · indeed 9 ·the Board suggests "a· loosenµig 
of.the relationship. between. variations in earnin@ and variatiora both. in the 
demand for labour and in prices". From a study made by the Board 
over :the previous. twenty years this relationship appeared tl~ser. ·in the 
·first decade :than. in the second and .the ·experience' in 1967 and ·1968 
appeared· to :highlight .this trend. The ·Board offered possible . explana-
tions. Industry mCiY have simply regarded· the wage ·increases as being 
·"deferred" during the earlier .·period. although :the Government had. sought 
. to counter 'any such. supposition. Moreover, -the militancy of the· unions 
may have reflected a . marked increas:e. These explanantions appear 
·similar to those offered py Professor Paish. The· Board remarked that 
. 
11it .is 'just possible, indeed, ·that .. the more: frequently a : 'freeze 1 is im-
( 9) 
posed the greater ·is, the subsequent militancy of claims". -A .model con= 
structed by Lipsey and Parkin. would appear to Jend. support . .to .this 
suggestion. The · model will be described . shortly. Another ·possible 
explanation , suggested by .the Board was :the combination of tw·o -things, 
namely, . the' increase· in. the rate of change in output· per ·head. an.d the 
impact of rising output directly on such pay as .is related to ·output and 
. indirectly on .all workplac~, ·enterprise or ·company wage settlements. 
In :.its/ ••..•• 
( 8} , "Third General Report" : p. 5 
(9) 11 Third General Repor>t"~ op cit. p. 12. 
':-
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In its Fourth General Report in July, 1969, the Board returned 
. to the question of money. earnings rising at a greater rate than during 
the previous periods since the War when unemployment was at a com= 
parable level. The relatively high level of unemployment continued to 
exercise a less moderating effect on the rate of growth of money .earnings 
than in .the pasto Between April 1968 and April. 1969 "unemployment 
(seasonally adjusted) remained at between 2. 2 and 2. 6 · per cent as 
(10) 
against an average of 1. 7 per cent. in the decade from 1958 to· 1967. 11 
The Board also pointed out to underline the new trend that . "the· index 
of weekly wage rates. rose by 5 per cent and of average weekly ear= 
nings by 8.8 per cent as compared with averages of 3.7 and 5.5 
respectively in the previous decade. Moreover, · the average increase 
·in productivity during 1968 and 1969 :1 as measured by output per ·head:1 
was significantly higher .than .in the previous decade - J.7 .. per cent as 
compared with 2. 7 per cent. 
Professor Paish is among those economists who have remained 
very critical of the Government us incomes policy. His views are worth 
consideration since his paper, "Policy for Incomes", publislted in 1964, 
is not materially different in .. the views. it expresses, from his paper pub= 
( 11) 
lished i.n. 1969, the interval having included the compulsory incomes ]>Olicy 
instituted in 1966 and its subsequent relaxation and. final "collapse·"• 
P aish states .that "the return to voluntary methods (of wage and price 
determinatio~ .in the second half of 1967 showed. that the· increases had 
been merely postponed". The policy, if viewed. in a long-term light, 
must therefore surely be ·regarded as largely a failure. P aish compares 
this period of two years .from mid.-..1966 to mid~l968 with .two other periods 
. in 1957""'59 and .1961-63 when .there were also disinflationary .fiscal and 
monetary/ •...• 
(10) ."Fourth General Report" July. 1968 to July 1969 (Cmnd 4130)- p.4. 
( 11) F .W. PAISH: "The Rise and Fall of Incomes Policy". Hobart Paper 
No. 4 7. June, 1969. 
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monetary policies pursued~· including the ·unsuccessful, "pay pause·" intro.= 
duced by Mr. Selwyn Lloyd on 1961. Paish concludes that the J'produc= 
tive potential" and output were roughly similar in all three periods and 
the ·"incomes policy in the third period did not result in any significant 
reduction in the ·rate of increase in .. incomes as· the comparable rate of 
wage increase· in the two earlier disinflationary periods was also .between 
4. 6 per cent and 4. 9 per cent per annum r 0espectively .. 11 
(12) 
Professor .Paish asserts that "on .the face of it 9 these results 
suggest that the much more vigorous enforcement of an incomes policy 
in 1-966-1968 than in either 1957.;...59 or 1961=63 has on balance had no 
.effect at all". He admits,, however~ that . "such assessment would, 
however ,probably be unjust"~ for two reasons in particular. The first. is 
that. in the two earlier periods there was not the urgent need to shift 
resources from home consumption to manufacturing for export so .that 
domestic consumption did not have to , be so severely restricted and 
.there was ·.therefore not as great an incentive· to 0 catch up" later when 
restraint was relaxed. In 1966.:.67 there was an "almost complete 
check to 0the rise in consumption 11 which~ observes Paish, was achieved 
partly by a rapid rise' in prices of consumption goods and partly (con-
(13) 
trary. to the general impression) . by an. increase· in personal saving". 
Pai.sh also . suggests that another reason for the. "faster rise in incomes 
.than was in the past consistent with similar levels of unemployment may. have 
been the· introduction of redundancy payments. and more generous unem-
ployment benefits which reduced the urgency of finding work and so re= 
duced the supply of labour on the labour market at any given level of 
. ( 14) 
unemployment". Another/ ••• 
(12)F.W. PAISH: op .cit. p 52. 
(13) F.W. PAISH: op cit. p. 52. It wUl be recalled that the ·"Second 
General Report" of the Prices and Incomes Board noted that from 
July ·1966 .to .July 1967 ~ although price rises were relatively restrained, 
they,in fact,rose more than wages. The 11 rapid rise in prices of con"'." 
sumption goods 11 should presumably be interpreted in · the/ ••• 
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Another explanation . for the changed relationship is suggested by the 
Government. itself as well as other economists. The change in structural 
unemployment may have made itself felt in so far as those who became 
unemployed were unable to supply the type of skills required by those 
industries demanding labour, so that wages would tend to rise relatively 
more despite the actual increase in the level of unemployment as compared 
with previous periods. 
It is important to point out that Paish has not argued that, there is 
any necessary permanence inherent in the relationship between the rate 
of increase in wages and .the ·level· of unemployment~ nor that. the change 
·in the relationship in . the period from 1966 to 1968 was a "freak" result. 
Although he has provided evidence to suggest .. that whenever the· margin 
of unused capacity has fallen below about 6 per cent price inflation has 
resulted and .trade deficits have appeared:i he does not contend that .there 
is . nothing that can be done ·to ·.reduce this margin without causing inflation. 
He states ;that one of the most important factors which determine the 
necessary margin of unused capacity 11 is certainly the rate of growth. of 
capacity itself. The· higher ,the rate of growth of capacity~ the higher the 
rate of in.come growth .that is compatable with Jong-term price stability~ 
and since the rate of income growth . is assumed to vary inversely with 
the margin of unused capacity. the smaller is the margin of unused re= 
sources nee~ed to prevent. inflation. So far from creating unemployment" 
he adds, ua high rate of technical progress makes a. low level of unem= 
(15) 
ployment compatable with stable prices 11 • Paish also agrees .that ."the 
mobility and adaptability both of emplc>yers and employees ••••• (and) .••• 
the strength and policies of the trade unions" will influence the size of the 
necessary/ •••• 
(13) Cont. ~the light of their relationship to the rise in wages over the 
same period. 
(14) F .W. PAISH ~ op cit. p. 53 
I 
(15) F.W. PAISH: "Studies in an Inflationary Economy" p. 32. 
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necessary margin. Accordingly,· if the economic conditions that have 
prevailed in the ·United Kingdom since •the War can. be changed the ·level 
of unemployment and the margin of unused capacity may be reduced With.-
out causing ·inflation. Paish .has pointed out that ua country with a 2 per 
I 
cent per annum rate of growth and a 2 per cent per annum rise ·in·. in-
comes will remain. fully competitive with a country with a 5 per cent per 
annum rate ·of growth and a 5 per cent per annum rise in incomes .••••• 
Th.e margins of unused resources and unemployed labour required to 
.prevent .. incomes from rising by more than 5 per cent per .year are 
considerably smaller than those needed to .prevent them rising by more 
·.than 2 per cent a year :1 and--the social and political difficulties of main-
taining them consequently less. An increase -in the rate of growth of 
capacity11 1 he adds 1 ."will.therefore not only.increase.the rate of growth 
in· the standard of living, but will also facilitate the maintenance of stable 
prices and an adequate balance of payments". 
It follows that the observed historical relationship between inflation 
and .the level of unemployment. in the post=war years is not a situation 
that must be accepted as unalterable. ·Changes in .the economy could 
produce a faster rate of growth without a higher rate of inflation. It is 
the practical difficulties of promoting these changes· in the United :Kingdom 
·that have made the relationship identified by Pai.sh appear to be almost 
impossible of improvement. :Indeed, the changes in the past four years 
·have suggested .that .the situation. is· indeed, deteriorating,· because a 
particular level of unemployment. is now associated with a relatively higher 
rate of inflation than before. The recent investigation described below is 
relevant to the discussion o:f. this change· in relationship, in view of the 




An empirical study by Lipsey and -Parkin , ·in 1970 9 of the British 
incomes policy~ concludes that "incomes policy tends to reduce· the rate 
of wage inflation at levels of unemployment below 1. 8 .per cent~ but to 
increase the rate cf inflation above what it would otherwise· have been 
when· unemployment is above 'l. 8 per cent". Their· model Ls especially 
· interesting as .it suggests that 11 a policy that combines an. incomes re-
straint ·wlth the depression of aggregate demand sufficient to remove -all 
. 
inflation will require a much higher ·level of unemployment than will a 
policy :that relies solely on depressing aggregate demand without wage 
restraint • • • • • On the other hand 9 a policy that accepts a moderate..,,to= 
large ·rate of inflation and. seeks. to reduce unemployment to ,the· 1owest 
possible ·level may be more .successful with an. incomes policy. :than with~ 
out it". 
(17) 
The model includes four periods when an. incomes policy of some 
kind was in operation as well as periods when there was no. incomes 
policy and where the .·"conditions were as. free from policy-on influences 
as we could make them 11 • Two reduced=form Phillips curves were 
described from the data selected. The steeper of the· two curves 9 in 
the diagram below~ represents the policy= off situation whereas the flatter 
curve shows the policy~on effect. The curves. intersect at a level of 
unemployment of 1. 8 per cent and a rate of change of wages of 41t, per' 
cent. 
Lipsey and Parkin assert. that 11the moral of the story· is that to 
break the existing relation . between excess demand and wage rises and 
to replace . it by a constant (plus a much weakened association with 
excess/ •... 
(16) R·.G. LIPSEY and J .R. PARKIN Hincomes .Policy~ A Re-appr= 
aisel 11 • Economica May 1970. 
.( 17) ( i) 3rd Quarter ·1947 to .3rd quarter '1950 0 
(ii) 1st II 1956 to 4th II 1956. 
(iii) 3rd . II 1961 · to 3rd II 1964. 
(iv) 4th II 1964 to · 1970 .• 
130. 
excess demand) is not an unmixed blessing". They contend that such 
a policy . "has most to recommend it if the economy is to be run at a very 
high level of demand and some inflationary price rises accepted. If an 
attempt is to be made to reduce demand sufficiently to keep increases 
down to the level of increases in productivity (so that an approximately 
stable price level is achieved), then a reasonably successful incomes 
policy_ (with a-wage-norm) would seem to make ·the achievement of the 
goa:l ver.y much more difficult than if no such policy were operated 11 • 
• 







The model l"eve.als that .the factor of union aggressiveness is insignificant 
when .. there is no. incomes policy but that it is very noticeable in the 
11 policy~on 11 situation. Such a conclusion may be soundly based in view 
of the· increased militancy of .the unions, especially during the past thre_e 
years. in the United Kingdom. "Thus incomes policy11 , suggest Lipsey 
and Parkin,, . "seems to create a relation between wage rises and union 
aggressiveness where none existed before". This .factor of union aggre~ 
· ssiveness finds support from . the earlier study by A.G. Hines, whom it 
will be recalled, contended that aggressiveness.was a significant cause 
of the rate of increase in wages. 
Harry G. Johnson/ •••••• 
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Harry G. Johnson has considered the work of Lipsey and Parkin 
which he says argues "that the purpose ·of. incomes policy is to change 
the slope of ·the Phillips curve (specifically to flatten .. it) rather .than to 
(18) 
change .the constant. term that determines its location". He observes 
that their "empirical work • • • . • • shows that incomes P?licy, interpreted 
. this ~way, has in fact been successful, but that. because the policy-makers 
have reduced the level of employment simultaneously with .the introduction 
~ ' . ' 
of incomes policy, they have in fact achieved .the pessimum result of 
(19) 
increasing both the level of :unemployment and .the rate of inflation 11 • 
Turning to the longer-term implications of the British incomes 
policy, can we discern any. significance in the changed relationship 
between productivity, unemployment and earnings? ... At . this stage no 
long-term trend can, of course,. be established with any assurance, 
although in the second half of 1969 and the first half of 1970 there was a 
continuation of the rapid rise in wages despite a level of unemployment 
not experienced in Great Britain in peacetime since ilie Second 
World War. Prices, while lagging behind the rise in wages., were 
by .the middle of 1970, showing marked increases as would be expected 
if labour costs rose • On the ·face of it. the situation would. suggest 
. largely a "cost-push" inflation in this period, caused mainly by the in~ 
creased. militancy of the unions and the unwillingness of the Labour Govern-
ment to apply any effective controls on tJ:ieir monopoly power. It is 
too soon to conclude that the present cP,ange will be permanent or to 
predict the direction of the long-term . trend. 
The Board/ •••• 
(18) (19) HARRY G. JOHNSON: :11 Recent Developments in Monetary 
Theory - A Commentary" "Money in Britain 1959-196911 
Edited by David R. Groome and Harry G. Johnson. p. 113. 
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The Board for J;=>rices and Incomes suggested earlier when con-
sidering the somewhat inexplicable increase in productivity, that this in-
crease, despite the excess capacity and the· level of unemplqyment, may 
have been due in part to the new and greater emphasis placed on the 
importance of productivity agreements and industrial efficiency which these 
agreements could create. The Board itself has issued two Reports 
on Productivity Agreements, in June '.1967 and August 1969, setting out 
( 20) . 
guidelines for such agreements. Indeed the Board claims 'that _"it is ••• 
clear that the evidence upholds the belief we expressed in Report 
No. 36 that 1 a prices and incomes policy can provide the most favourable 
( 21) 
encouragement for successful productivity agreements 1 " 
The result of .the tre'nd towards increasing productivity has been 
that labour costs per unit of output have increased at a slower rate 
·from 1967 to 1969 than in previous years. The following table, 
published by the Board in its Fourth General Report is of interest in 
this regard. The figures are taken from the Government Central 
Statistical Office, Department of Employment and Productivity. 
Annual percentage increases. 
in 
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Nevertheless, as the Board points out 1 this encouraging trend from 
whatever cause, whether due to .the incomes policy or not,· is. less 
pleasing when. compared with other Western European countries. The 
percentage change.. over previous years of wage and salary costs per 
unit/ •.... 
(20) "Productivity Agreements": Report No. 36. Cmnd 3311 
"Productivity Agreements":· Report No.123 .Cmnd 4136 
(21 ) Cmnd 4136. op cit. p 31. 
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unit of output. in manufacturing in certain European countries as compared 
(22) 
with the United Kingdom is as. follows:-
CountrI 1964 !.2§2 1966 12.§.'.Z. .. 1968 
France 3~6 2.6 -0.7 3.9 
Western Germany 1. 6 3.9 4.1 -1.4 -2.7 
Italy 11 • 3 - 3 .2 -2.7 5.7 
Netherlands 6.4 7.0 6.0 2.0 -:1. 0 
Sweden 2. 6' 2.9 3.4 3 .1 
United Kingdom J .4 5.6 4.8 2.4 1. 5 
It ·is worth .noting that without any voluntary, let alone · mandatory, 
incomes policy,. the experience of West Germany must be not a· little 
chastening to British industry and to the British Government. 
)::( 
Even if we wereA concede that the. "freeze" and the incomes policy 
pursued after the "freeze" was terminated, may have had rapid and 
significant beneficial effects in the short-term before its disintegration 
through ·lack of Government resolution or other reasons, ·the longer-term 
results may be more important, although .they are much more difficult to 
identify with certainty. For· in the longer-term some of the economic 
:issues are of a rather different kind. Here the problem of ,changing 
attitudes in industry is of great significance. Ingrained and firmly es-
tablished attitudes by unions to long-standing differentials for different 
jobs are not quickly susceptible to change. The problem of wage 
"comparability'" touched on earlier is also not easy. to change. Disputes 
over the demarcation of jobs sustained for many years need very care-
ful handling ·if they are to be solved. The problems raised by the in-
stitutional framework in the United Kingdom may also provide· many oh-
stacles to .efficiency and economic growth, and may impede a more 
economically sound wage and income structure. The lo:r:iger-:term 
issues therefore raise considerations of changing the whole pattern of 
industry/ •••• 
( 22) Source: "The European Economy in 1968 11 U .N .E .C .E. 
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industry and the social and political climate in which industrial production 
is carried on. An incomes policy if designed purely . to combat inflation 
may possibly achieve this by short-term measures such as stringent con-
trols over prices and wages but it may in the longer-term assist in 
directing or at least guiding the behaviour and attitudes of both sides of 
industry. It may do. so· but there· is no certainty that it will,· because 
if the .trust and confidence essential to -change long-standing habits cannot 
be fostered because of.· the hostility and suspicion existing within· the 
society, there is· little likelihood that any incomes policy will be success-
ful except in the short-term. Even then· it may. be that other .economic 
measures would have achieved as much with less ill-will. 
It has frequently been claimed, probably with a good deal of 
justification, that the highly decentralised form of collective bargaining 
in the United Kingdom has militated strongly against a successful incomes 
policy. The traditional system has been evolved as sectional collective 
·bargaining. This form of bargaining has been accompanied by no 
central co-ordination with the result that the agreements made have 
been arrived at independently of what may have ·been agreed between 
unions and employers elsewhere in the economy. The Trades Union 
Congress has no .effective control over its members. It does not, 
for example, control strike funds. This sort of central union control can 
undoubtedly be an effective weapon. On the other side of industry, the 
central employers 1 organisation, now known as the Confederation of 
British Industries (the result of the merger of three former organisations) 
is in a rather similar position in regard to its members. It has no l 
control over their decisions. 
It must also be remembered that collective bargains in the. United 
Kingdom are voluntary in that they are not legally binding contracts. 
This means that they cannot be enforced in a court of law. Thus 
"unofficial 11 / ••• 
, 
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"unofficial" strikes .for any grievance, whether sound or not, are pre-
valent, particularly where there is militancy among Union officials on the 
shop floor. They cannot be effectively controlled by the union .. leaders. 
An added complication in Great Britain is that there is a great 
deal of inter-union rivalry~ and competition for members. This, in it-
self, may provoke excessive pay claims and may create more work 
stoppages through strikes as unions attempt to retain and exp.and member-
ship on .the basis of obtaining relatively better. pay or other working con-
ditions from employers~ This makes acceptance of an incomes policy 
which. institutes some central direction and ~ontrol much more difficult. 
The traditional barriers to aceeptance ·built into the institutional structure 
are . therefore much stronger in the United Kingdom than. in some other 
European countries. The debate as to what should be done to improve 
industrial relations has ranged far and wide from supporters of highly 
centralised negotiations to those who would prefer to rely almost ex= 
elusively on work-place ·bargaining. Possibly what is most needed if 
an incomes policy is to be workable is some structure along ·the lines 
(23) 
suggested by A. Flanders 9 that is~ 11 a fully developed three=tier system 
of industrial relations • . . . a top tier of central or truly national negotia-
tions above industry level and another bottom tier for supplementary and 
compatable workplace negotiations 11 • But the problems of getting such 
a system permanently off the ground will be immense. 
It would not be · inapposite here to . consider 9 very briefly? the 
Scandanavian. machinery for wage negotiation. Economists,· in despairing . 
-of the British system,· have sometimes held up the nordic countries as 
examples of how a wage determination process should operate. 
It must/ •.. 
( 23 )ALLAN FLANDERS : "Industrial Relations .: What. is wrong with 
the system? An essay on its Theory and Future" (1965) p. 49 
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· · It must be said at once that in Sweden, Norway, . Denmark and 
Finland there is· no . compulsory incomes policy as there has been· in the 
Netherlands. Furthermore, the machinery in each country. is different 
though .there are significant similarities. In addition, there have been and 
still are severe stresses and strains· in the wage bargaining system. 
Restraint has not always been evident in negotiations. The systems in 
these countries ar.e far from ideal and inflation has been .just as pre-
valent and worrying as it has been in the United Kingdom. Price con-
trols are not unknown but only Denmark has experienced a "freeze" on 
incomes. 
It is necessary to tu1derstand. that the central negotiations between 
the employers· organisations and the ·representatives of organised labour 
. "results essentially in a 1frcrne 1 agreement setting certain ·limits to sub-
sequent. bargaining within the individual branchesu, observes the United 
(24) 
Nations 1 Report "Incomes in Postwar Europe". It adds that ·"central-
bargaining sets the strategy and pattern for industry bargaining, or for 
bargaining at .the ·local or enterprise· level. It is not a substitute for 
sectional bargaining". There ·is no .government determined ceiling to 
wage increases. 
Nevertheless the central. 'frame 1 does help to provide co-ordination 
.that is economically valuable. It offers a way to achieve an overall 
appreciation of how wage changes are likely to affect the economy as a 
whole. Forecasts of price ·increases and wage costs per unit of out-
put can be made more readily. It obviously helps in the management of 
the economy to have a more accurate guide to changes· in wages, and 
their / ••••• 
( 24) op cit. Chapter 4~ p. 5. 
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their, likely effect on· the economy, so that.· the use of other econ9mic 
·instruments may be applied when necessary. In so far as the central 
bargaining of wages effects incomes policy, the United Nations Report 
lists . the main characteristics as being :"the inevitable involvement of 
government in· the decisions and an inevitable ·concern on .. the part of the 
(25) 
negotiators with general considerations of economic policy. '.L . The 
significance of these characteristics , is that negotiators are, in practice, 
obliged to· concern themselves witJ:. the economy as a whole. They 
cannot escape into. independant sectional bargaining and disregard 
national considerations. Thus, .despite the fact .that individual unions 
are naturally pre-eminently concerned with their own members 1 welfare 
and pay, the central ··"frame 11 · prevents them ·straying too .far from national 
economic issues. They cannot simply ignore factors which. affect the 
country generally, as can a shop steward at plant level, when there is 
no central control. 
Although the Governments in the Nordic countries do not intervene, 
as in Holland, in wage determination, their views are not disregarded 
by the central bargair13rs on both sides of industry. The Government, 
particularly in Norway, does make its influence felt but .this is not the 
same as a mandatory incomes policy of direct intervention ·by the State 
IJ.., 
by the imposition 01' ceiling ori wages. Where the State has instituted 
pervasive price controls, they have 'been; essentially, temporary mea-
sures and not, except in Norway., a relatively permanent part of the 
·economic system. 
Finally, the central organisations on both sides of industry have a 
much .greater moral and ,leg~l control over .their members. It is prob-
ably an accurate assessment to conclude that "although .the final agree.-
ment reached in central negotiations is subject to approval and application 
by/ •.. 
( 25) Op cit. Chapter 4. p. 7. 
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by .their constituent members, yet the central organisations themselves 
must be able to exercise considerable authority. It is ·for them to 
(26) 
attempt to reconcile the competing claims of their constituents". This 
reconciliation has not always proved successful or acceptable to :various 
interests. But such a reconciliation must always involve a compromise 
which leaves some discontent. The political and social climate ·in· the 
Scandanavian countries has been one factor making a compromise 
economically effective. 
The attempt by the British Government in 1969 to introduce legisla-
tion to .delay strikes in breach of negotiated agreements was, as we· have 
seen, a failure· because .the attitude of .the unions was sufficiently hostile 
to :induce the Government. to retreat. Should the attempt be made again? 
Is it worth the trouble and the· friction it engenders? Would such. legis-
· lation make a material difference to Britain 1 s economic performance by 
reduct.Ilg strikes which increase average costs through lower· output. 
These are some of-the· long-term aspects .of an ·incomes policy,· but these 
aspects .directly and indirectly affect .the rate of inflation in an economy. 
They are· therefore rightly part of any policy designed to control in-
flation. But .. it. is exceedingly. difficult to change attitudes .through legiB-
· lation, so perhaps an· incomes policy incorporating some compulsion to 
.ensure its compliance, is not at present a suitable economic instrument 
for the United Kingdom, except as a short=term "crisis" measure. The 
(27) 
National Board for Prices and Incomes has contended that . .11 .the pur-
·pose of the (incomes) policy is long-term as well as short-term in two 
senses: firstll it is designed, by helping to contain costs and prices, 
to overcome the short-term constraint imposed by balance of payments 
considerations/ •.....• 
( 26) "Incomes in Postwar Europe": Op cit. Chapter 4, p. 6. 
(27) "Third General Report": op cit. p. 4. The Board was replying to 
·the contention of the Donovan Commission 1 s Report on Trade Union~ 
and Employers Associations, which stated that , "incomes policy . / 
· 1S •• • 
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considerations and. so restore the objectives of steady growth and' high 
employment; secondly it is .designed to act as an essential complement 
over time to .the other weapons of economic policy". No . doubt . this 
may be· the objective but here there is no mention of compulsion and 
indeed the Board itself can only operate in· terms of .the powers given 
it from time to .time by the Government. In fairness to ,the Board, 
however, it. has more than once emphasised the essentially complementary 
nature of an· incomes policy. But. the central problem remain unanswered,. 
What powers of intervention will the Government need to make an incomes 
policy .effective in· the United Kingdom and will the end result not be better 
achieved by some ·other means? If the Board for Prices and Incomes 
disappears .. into ;obscurity as did its predecessor the National Incomes 
Commission, what measureswill be required to .replace whatever influence 
·it may have had? Possibly there may be a case for retaining the Board 
or setting up. some organisation or body whose objective would be to 
attempt to ·influence, over the longer...,term, the attitudes within· industry and 
the behaviour of both organised labour and employers and so .encourage 
a better utilisation. of the resources of the· nation. But if this is really all 
.that any United Kingdom incomes policy is to be, in so .far as ,it is 
concerned with inflation, such a policy would be purely voluntary. Its 
value will depend on the degree of influence that it can effectively impose 
on industry and upon the Government in adopting other economic measures 
such as fiscal and monetary policies to achieve the same ends.. The 
history of similar bodies in·. the United Kingdom is most discouraging. 
It is/ •...... 
( 27) cont. is concerned with .the short--run. improvement in ;the country 1 s 
economic position and has been· revised at fairly frequent 
intervals 11 • 
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It is of interest to refer to two views expressed at different 
(28) 
periods by C .W. Guillebaud. In 1951 he ended his "lecture" with-the 
following words which are not very dissimilar to those of F .W. Paish 
in more recent years - "So long as inflation continues", he. asserted, 
"a central policy for wage stabilisation is impossible; as soon as inflation 
ceases, it will be unnecessary". In 1967, Guillebaud conceded that 
his statement, "needs a good deal of qualification". He considers :that 
:the first main clause .is "only valid in the sense that any incomes policy 
directed to keeping the growth of money incomes in· line with the growth 
of aggregate productivity must break down if -the degree of inflation is 
sufficiently great". He contends that the degree was present in 1960-61 
and in 1964-65. It. is, nevertheless, not clear whether he means that 
.the inflation will be anticipated and wages forced up in advance of price 
increases with the result that wage increases will more than compensate 
for ·the· increase in .the price level. Possibly he is. implying that in-
flation will result from - 11 cost~push 11 factors in sectors of the economy 
where . there has been no improvemenL in productivity. Guillebaud 
qualifies his s.econd main clause with the view that it requires an·u.:c\jU5~f\.ab-
ly great degree of unemplqyment and excess capacity to keep wages and 
salaries at the desired liro:it. He now considers - contrary to .the 
Paishian view - -that such a level would be politically unacceptable but 
does not offer any evidence as to what the level would most likely be. 
Those countries such as Holland which have had a more centra-
lised system of collective bargaining for many years and have experienced 
direct Government intervention or countries such as .the Scandanavian 
nations which have no ,direct intervention ·- except for certain price controls 
- but/ ••...• 
(28) C .. W. GUILLEBAUD. op cit. p. 74. 
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- but possess a more appropriate institutional framework~ do· not over the 
·long-term appear to have coped any better with secular inflation· than 
West Germany and Italy which have no such incomes policy and whose 
climate of opinion and institutional framework -is in many respects .differ-
ent. We shall examine in· the next chapter the experience of Holland, 
a smaller and relatively more closely=knit nation than Great 
Britain to, see what. lessons she can .teach such countries as the 
United Kingdom whose growth rate has for many years been so disappoin-
,ting. But .it must· be stressed again that a policy which is suitable for 
one country ma,y be both inappropriate an.d unacceptable in another. 
The relatively successful managem,ent of the Dutch incomes policy in the 
immediate post-war .years was almost certainly due ·to .factors which were 
not present when .the United Kingdom attempted to introduce ·hers. 
If the British experience can be summed up at all, perhaps all that 
fl we may claim ~-<that .. it had some short~term beneficial effects which 
cannot be measured with any precision. In the long-term the answer 
is even more uncertain'. If the· incomes policy as a whole and the 
influence of the Board for Prices and Incomes in particular, have 
·• 
·succeeded in changing sttitudes, dismantling restrictive practices and 
allaying ·long-standing fears of redundancy and unemployment and effectively 
promote :the more efficient utilisation of all resources .in the country~ a 
great deal will have been achieved. But th.e words of the Board in 
1969 sounded a sombre note which subsequent events :have not contra-
dieted. "From the long-term point of. view", observed the Board, 11 ••••• 
expectations with respect to the growth of. incomes had increased, and were 
·increasing independantly of any p0licies ••••••• Whatever :the cause, they 
may make . the successful implementation of .the (incomes) policy, in terms 
of/ ...... . 
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of modifying the rate of growth in money earnings. in relation to .the rate 
of growth in productiv~ty .that much more difficult, though "that much mor~ 
(29) 
necessary". If the Government had been seen to have taken .these 
comments more seriously then, the ensuing wage and price spiral 
which gathered .force later in· 1969 and in the following year, might to 
some extent. have ·been avoided 1 if not by another "freeze", then· by 
alternative measures. 
- · - - - oO.o ·.- - · - · -
( 29) "Fourth General Report": p. 4. 
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CHAPTER '\1.III: 
The experience of the Netherlands in ,the imposition of a .compre-
hensive prices and incomes p0licy immediately after the Second World 
War serves as a valuable illustration of what such a policy can achieve 
both in the short-term and in· the long-term in a particular · institutional 
. environment and under a climate of co-operation .from all sides. A 
national policy such as Holland 1 s, as we have . indicateq before, cannot 
necessarily be transplanted successfully in other countries, in any of the 
particular variations that .it has assumed since its inception. Nor may 
some portions of it be the best, or, even, appropriate substitutes ·for 
other economic instruments such as fiscal and monetary policies which 
might, have served the country better in some circumstances.. Indeed, 
Professor J. ·Pen has remarked. that "in many respects Dutch wage 
(1) 
policy is an improbable affair.". 
At the end of ,the War, ~,the very severe damage which had been 
inflicted on the Netherlan.ds made drastic action by the State ·essential to 
achieve a rapid economic recovery. The Dutch had, · indeed, ·to re ... build 
a very substantial part of their capital stock. The Government, unfortu-
nately, did not merely have ·to . supervise a .change over from war·-time 
to peac·e-time production. Inflation was a very real threat, particularly as 
exports comprised a very. large portion of total output. The Dutch 
authorities considered. that only an extensive direct intervention into .the 
price and wage determination .process would be sufficiently effective· in 
.these circumstances to ensure ·recovery. The pre-war system of 
collective bargaining was 'not considered suitable in the prevailing condi-
tions. 
In 1945/ ... 
( 1) J. PEN: 11 The Strange Adventures of Dutch Wage Policy-" 
British Journal of Industrial Relations. 1963. p. 318. 
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In 1945 "the Foundation of Labour was formed and consisted of 
representatives from trade 'unions and from ·employers' organisations. 
(2) 
"The interests of the Foundation 11 noted B .C •· Roberts '· . "embrace wages, 
social insurance, health and safety, productivity, . technical training and 
employment. It. does not include under its ,jurisdiction .. the· broad. issues 
of economic policy, though it cannot ignore factors .that will inevitably 
affect the levels of employment, wages and prices". 
The F.ol:ll1dation did not have .legal powers and so it was, in 
effeqt, no more-.than a voluntary organisation. It was -under the super-
-vision of the Foundation nevertheless .that "the major pay negotiations 
. take· place ·between the trade union federations and central enployers 1 
organisations ••••• (and) . those central negotiations lead. to a .frame 
agreement or ·guidelines .to .•be followed in ·subsequent. branch. and.local 
(3) 
bargaining. 11 
The direct intervention in the wage.:fixing :process .was through the 
creation of a Board of State Mediators, which although .composed ·of 
independentexperts wasre:pponsible to the Minister of Social Affairs .• 
Although the Foundation of Labour was a voluntary body,· ~e Board 
/ 
· had .the statutory. duty imposed on .it to consult the ;Fcrnndc;rion before 
Of matters normally .withLihe · sphere of making a decision .. in· respect 
· •t lf Accord;.,.,gly, -the Board of State interest of the FoundatiOn 1 se • ... ... 
Mediators had the power after consultation with the Foundation .to .prevent 
wage agreements from being implemented if they appeared to be in contra-
vention of the existing criteria for wage increases prevailing from time . to 
(4) 
time. Pen has/~ ••• 
llN ational Wages Policy in War and Peace". (tz) ·B.C. ROBERTS: 
pp 118-119. 
EUROPE'''. 1967. U .N. Publication 
urNCOMES .IN POST-WAR (3) 
Chapter 4, P· 2. 
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(4) II 
Pen. has stated .that: it. is .too crude to say that wages were simply fixed 
by the Government; the interplay between .the two agencies (the Board 
and the Foundation) was much rn ore subtle. 11 
It is, nevertheless, important. to view the Foundation as well as the 
Board as part of· the whole national planning mechanism in. the Nether-
·lands and· not as operating separately or ·independently of the economic 
planning structUre and econometric models developed and applied by the 
Government. 
In 1950 a further body was established, This was :the Social and 
Economic Council.- This organisation was composed of representatives 
of the unions and employers and, in additio~, contained persons nominated 
by .the State with a view to ensuring .that .the general interests of the 
public were not neglected. The Council was to some extent under ·the 
guidance of .the Central Planning Bureau, and in practice it has proved 
to be of value in assisting both sides of industry m coming to an agreement 
which satisfies the economic criteria .laid .down to .deal with specific econo-
mic situations. The Council, however., does not. take any direct part 
. in· the· negotiations between unions and m.anagement. Its activities to 
. some .extent overlap with other bodies but in. the earlier .years of. its ·existence 
there· was no undue friction because of this. 
Before examining the development and effects of the Dutch incomes 
policy it is necessary. to say something of .the institutional and social 
conditions within which it· had .to operate. in :the more successful period 
immediately after the War. The background against which the policy was 
administered was almost certainly one of the principal reasons for· its 
success. 
It/ ... 
(4) J. PEN: "Income Policy in the Netherlands 1959-1963". 
Scottish Journal of Political Economy. November 1964. p. 183. 
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It has been suggested that Holland provided.a :"laboratory, test:1 
launched. in as ideal political and social conditions as are likely to· be 
(5) 
found anywhere". This statement implies that if a comprehensive incomes 
policy is likely to ·be effective in securing control over the r'ate of ili.flation, 
no better case:...study could be found than .the experience of the Netherlands 
because of the politfoal and social Clim.ate 'in which it was instituted." 
Hennessy rema:rks that. "during the war employers and un.ion leaders, 
patriotically anxious to sabotage the enemy occupation 1 had become 
accustomed to work together. ·in secret conferences which created goodwill 
to continue to .co•·operate in the tasks of pea.de". We have already seen 
that. in· the United Kingdom the long-standing suspicion and .deep .distrust 
between employers and work-people and between. large sections of the 
Labour Party and .the Conservatives made the·. institution of an incomes 
policy such a daunting undertaking. This, together with the inability of 
the Trades Union Congress in 'Britain. to acquire effective authority over 
·its constituent members made the implementation of a voluntary incomes 
policy virtually impossible and a compulsory incomes policy exceedingly 
difficult to achieve except during .the "freeze" in 1966. and 1967. Hennessy 
adds that. "the devastation which, Holland had suffered (during 0·the War) 
, had made everyone-believe that a common and national effort was needed 
for ·recovery and .that extensive regulation of the economy was indispen-
'sible. The election of a Socialist Government was hailed as usheri.ng:in 
a. new .era of planning and. social ,Justice 11 • 
As the· incomes policy formed a p'art of the whole· national planning 
·model in· the Netherlands economy. it was. an opvious means for achieving 
not merely control over the ·rate of inflation,· but also .to ensure ,that 
social / •.•.. 
{ 5) JOSSELYN HENNESSY. "Incomes Policies in Europe 11 • 
Part II, 1964, p. 48. 
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social justice was seen to be a fundamental element of the incomes policy. 
In· so ,far as the various organisations and the. State were directly and 
·indirectly associated with :the determination of wages and prices .this. 
was viewed by many as the best method of attaining social justice. This 
attitude was very strongly held as it was widely felt that social justice 
-- even ,if such a concept cannot be defined with precision = was not 
always achieved when wage negotiation was left entirely to the relative 
power of each· side of industry as determined by market forces, the 
size of strike funds, the labour supply in particular industries and other 
-purely '"economic" forces at any moment in time. 
The· legislation. introduced after the War to .provide for wage• control 
and the necessity for official approval of collective agreements was ·.the 
·
11 Besluit Arbeidsverhoudingen-" of October ·1945. This Extraordinary 
Decree did not include all groups of employees. The system of wage 
regulation· introduced· l;>y '·the -Decree did not extend to. ~the . civil service, 
·.teachers, doµiestic. servants nor. the salaries -of executives and staff 
employees. . Groups which were not covered by this legislation were not 
necessarily- free of central control as their wages could be fixed· b.Y -the 
central agency, namely the ·Board of State Mediators.. This applied .in 
particular where there were · no collective agreements -in existence. 
The Dutch planning mechanism and .the.·. criteria for· wage increases 
have· been ·based· largely on .. exceedingly complicated econometric models J 
which. are almost incomprehensible to the general public. Nevertheless s 
as -the public did .trust, the Government, at. least in· the eariy years of 
.its implementation and had confidence ·in .the independent_ experts and 
more over, recognised the need . for considerable direct. intervention by 
the State, there ,was much less .·likelihood of friction and. instransigence. 
Until/ •... 
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Until. the 1960s strikes were an unusual occurrenc'e. Some unions had for: 
long advocated that jobs should be paid according to certain social. criteria 
rather ·:than.· purely according to market demand or decided ·by monop.olistic 
power • This appealing concept lay behind the very extensive job -evalua-
. tion investigations carried out. in Holland. in order to determine an accept-
able rate· for the job,, irrespective of whether. a particular industry could 
r-
pay more- because of .its greater productivity oJ profitability. As 
(6) 
R .~. Ball , has remarked, job evaluation with 'the underlying ·principal 
of equal pay for ·equal work and implying in. effect that. the value of work 
is intrinsic to .the work ,done gives effect. to -the concept that pay .·"should 
not be governed by the level of demand .derived .from the value· of ·the 
·product in the· open market. Social justice rather. than .market forces . 
determine the rate for the .job". 
In the years immediately following ·the end of. the War and in· the 
early years of .the· next decade wage . increases . were· related to .the in-
·crease in· the cost of, living, so that in .the period real incomes did not 
(7) (8) 
show a . rise • The United Nations . survey "Incomes. in ,Postwar .Europe 11 
claimed that. "for nearly ten .years after liberation, the central pay 
settlement took the form of uniform and.modest percentage increases for 
all branches and. occupations, jtistified. only by increases in· the cost of 
. living/ ••••••• 
( 6') R:•J. BALL - "Inflation and the Theory of Money" p. 297. 
( 7) n has been argued by some economists that in certain countri.es in-
flation has been accentuated b,y tying wage agreements or .. wage in-
, creases to ~the cost of living index. This is because the ipdex may, 
for example, Show a rise due ·to a temporary increase in imported 
commodity. prices. · If this increase ,then becomes added to. wage rates 
it. will tend to .perpetuate .the increase in prices because of higher wage 
costs. This is, probably, only true where· increases in wages are ad-
justed monthly or at very frequent. intervals. Italy has been cited as 
an.example. In Holland the cost of living·index was not specifically 
included. in wage agreements. 
(8)0p cit. Chapter 4. p. 3. 
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. living (themselves due mainly to .import prices and other ·independant 
forces) 11 • This survey considers that by 1954 Holland was about the 
only Western European country . 11 in which there had been no.· increase 
·in real hourly wage ,earnings since 1948.11 • Such a conclusion may be 
a somewhat bleak assessment. Other economists have suggested that 
in .the ·late· 1940s the •relaxation of physical controls and. the disappearance 
of consumer goods shortages had given a wider choice and so an .. in-
crease in real· income. However ·this real increase was probably re -
duced,.in .the first few years of the following decade as a result of the 
greatly increased price of. imports caused by the Korean .. War so ,that 
prices rose above ·the· increases in wages, there by reducing real . income. 
The Dutch authorities in calculating pay scales for the establishment 
of the comp le~{ income determination system decided to retain, by and 
large, pre-existing pay differentials. Having set wage rates,for un-
skilled workers, a differential of 10 .per cent was. established between 
these wor~ers and semi-skilled employees and a. further 10 .per cent 
between semi-skilled and skilled. There was a series of adjustments 
during ·the period from -1945 . to 194 7. As a result :1 although skilled 
workers still received 20% above. unskilled workers, semi-skilled 
received. al:;> out 7% to · 8% more ·than. unskilled. The differentials remained 
relatively constant during the ensuing ·twelve years. The methods used 
for job evaluation were carried out exhaustively· and both maximum and 
minimum wage rates were fixed. Infringements. of these prescribed 
rates made the offenders subject to prosecution. Wage differentials are :1 
as we know, <?ften of relatively long-standing existence and even yvhere 
. technological changes and market and social forces tend to. alter them, 
they, can often be perpetuated by the attitudes held by union members. 
The/ ••...• 
150. 
The Dutch incomes policy tended to perpetuate the existing differentials 
although whether ·the -"social justice" element in the fixing of wages and 
prices. and the retention of differentials was economically soun.d is a 
matter of controversy. It seems clear :that unless the rates appeared 
. to the majority of the population to be equitable their. implementation 
would probably have· been impossible. in peacetime conditions, even. in the 
relatively helpful social climate of the Netherlands immediately after .the 
.war. 
The Dutch .economy showed a. ver.y substantial recovery. by 1955. 
The problems and disagreements. which, however,· had not been 
sufficiently strong to intrude damagingly into ,the economy, now began 
to emerge with considerable strength. Perhaps. the most. important was 
·the growth of the feeling thatthe direct. intervention by the State into 
.the fixing of wages was no. longer essential in view of. the ·relatively 
healthy state of the economy. This view was sbared both by employers 
and by some, though certainly not all, unions. The Socialist unions 
still favoured Government control. How ever, there arose during this 
period a general discontent with and. opposition to the prin~iple ·of equal 
pay for equal work. Employees in the more productive industries felt 
that they should receive some additional benefit in view of the increased 
productivity for which ·they regarded .themselves as having been,· in part, 
responsible. Accordingly, the question of economic criteria for wage 
rises began to make itself felt much more strongly and .the concept of 
-
"solidarity" was naturally. less appealing to .employees in growth-oriented 
and productivity-minded enterprises. 
Initially the Government tried to ·resist. this .demand for greater 
weight to be attached to .the forces of the open market in deciding upon 
wage increases. As the economy expanded and:the demand.for labour 
increased, there was the strohg incentive for employers. to pay .'"black" 
wages/ •...• 
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wages and, indeed, wage drift was very. difficult to control. The Govern-
ment realised that it was no .longer feasible to :retain the strict criteria 
over wages that it· had maintained . UJ? until then. The period of growing 
unrest, .dissatisfaction and resentment among both employers and labour 
made it seem possible .that .the whole pay structure was in danger of 
collapsing. In particular, some workers demanded greater differential 
increases. and although this. was opposed by the Socialist unions one, 
economist has . since remarked that .their efforts .to .enforce · 11 solidarity" 
(9) 
were "as effective as Canute 1 s. to the ·rising :tide". Thus, as ;the 
economic position made for a build up of excess. demand .the policy of 
"wage co-ordination", started to disintegrate 'Under the economic and 
political pressures against which it tried vainly. to fight. 
The . Dutch Government had, however, been moving very sloW'lY 
towards the recognition of wage· increases in terms of productivity. gains 
·in particular industries ·from 1956. In that. year ·pressure· for wage 
increases had mounted as there had been two years of rapid economic 
expansion. The Government,, like many Governments in a similar pre-
dicament, was fearful of the onset of inflation as unemployment had. declined 
from 3. 5% in 1952 to an average of 1. 3% in 1955. It was, moreover, to 
de~line further to 0. 9% in 1956. The· unions argued thaL their share 'of 
wages. in the national income had declined. The Social and Economic 
Council, which, it will be recalled, was set up in 1950,· issued a report 
after it. had instituted an enquiry. It conceded that wage rates had:. lagged 
but that earnings had not. The Government at length consented >to an 
across-:the-board increase of 3% in basic wage rates. They also agreed 
that an additional increase of up to 6% could be made· by individual. indus-
tries. This additional maximum of 6% was subject to>the condition that 
not/ •.•• 
(9) JOSSLEYN HENNESSY: op cit. p. 49. 
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not more than 3% of it should be passed on in increased prices. 
Furthermore, . the· initial overall basic increase .of 3% was not to be -passed 
on .. in prices,. profits· having to bear the burden of the increased cost. 
The real significance of the €?% allowance for indiv:idual industries was, 
of course, Jts :relationship to profits and in particular . to productivity. 
Thus there was a tacit admission by the Governm_ent~. that .. the concept of 
job evaluation which was not influenced by market forces was to be 
modified in' so far as increased productivity permitted. larger increases·· in 
(10) 
some industries . than in others. As B. C. Roberts . has observed :Uthe 
abstract conception .. of social justice which ·had been at .the heart of the 
attempt to .co-ordinate wages scientifically had evidently not provided 
workers or employers with the satisfaction anticipated". Although .the 
6% was-.. intended to .be .the maximum at. the .time; it is clear that most 
.. industries agreed to ,the full percentage, ·irrespective of relative producti-
vity, mainly. because -the demand for labour was very high. The only 
major .exception was. in agriculture. Unions,· in fact 1 ·tended· to press 
for the maximum increase as a matter of course. ,' This approach was 
similar to .that adopted by the unions in Great Britain, in 1968, who had 
·regarded.the 3~% maximum laid-down.by the-British Government as a 
minimum. In 1957 and 1958 there was a recession in .the Netherlands 
which alleviated .the labou~ shortage. In 1959 as .the economy expanded 
-the Government started to look more closely at the problem of wage 
·rates and differentials. 
In. 1959 a new. Government was returned. to .power composed -of the 
·clerical and; liberal parties and without socialist ·members. With ,the de-
partur-e 0f the Socialists from the Government the paPties in power laid 
down new criteria for increases in pay which were directly related .to 
productivity/ •.. 
(10) B .C. ROBERTS: op cit p. 117. 
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. , 
productivity increases. There was now .explicit, and 'not merely implicit, 
recognition by. the State of the need to. allow market forces. a more 
effective, but by no means an exclusive, say. in the determination of wage 
rates. Unfortunately, the Government vs criteria for determining produc-
tivity increases was very far ·from clear a There remained therefore a 
lot of dissatisfaction and not a ·little uncertainty and confusion in .the ·various 
sectors of the economy as well as between employers and organised 
labour. This lack· of clarity was~, to. a limited extent, ·rectified by the 
Government in· 1960, with. a revised series of instructions~ but.-there was 
still great difficulty. in deciding not· only on an adequate and acceptable 
measure of industrial productivity but also . on an acceptable base date on 
which future productivity would be calculated. 
In 1963 .the new system was eventually implemented,· not, however, . 
without a good deal of animositY; being engendered. because of the frustra-
tion felt within industry at .the extent of Government intervention still 
( 11) 
prevailing. Although som-e ·industries and firms were apprehensive· of 
; 
what greater econom.ic freedom might ,mean. in· .the way of addedt uni0n 
pressure for sustaining higher pay claims, som.e of the largest firms, 
appear. -to -have welcomed .the .lessening of State. intervention and, much 
.preferred to· negotiate with .greater freedom with . organised· labour at 
·industry and even plant, level. 
The most significant change· in .the new system ·introduced· in 1963 was 
.that the Foundation .. of Labour and not .the Board . of Mediators should 
-thenceforth approve branch agreements. . This meantthat. "the: internal 
co-ordination, and , the Gover.nm ent 1 s authority to approve or disapprove 
agreements would normally be exercised jointly by the central union and 
. emJ::>loyers/ •••. 
( 11) J .• PEN remarked that by. 1962 "faith in the Government had dis-
appeared ••••• employers and workers wished to be fre~. of Govern-
ment. intervention". "The Strange A~ventures of Dutch Wage Policy" 
Op cit. p. 326. 
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employers organisations-_in the Foundation of Labour instead-- of by -the 
(12) 
official board ••••• which had previously performed this function. 11 
Despite the change, in authority, reserve -powers were· retained 
by the Board so that agreements which were thought not to be in .the 
\.• 
public :interest could be prevented from being implemented. The State 
could also, authorise a_temporary .·"freeze" on wages should it regard 
the economic ·situation._ sUf:ficiently serious to ;justify. this direct- intervention. 
This· type of -11freeze" was. also adopted in other countries such as 
Denmark and France, in. 1963 and 1964. (not to mention. the United King-
dom ,in 1966 and· 1967) put in these two .Continental countries there was and 
. is no formal. "incomes policy" of either a voluntary or compulsory n·ature. 
The acceptance by, the Foundation of Labour of the· responsibility 
for approving agreements was,ri'ot without its disadvantages. From then 
on union leaders could not escape criticism by union members, by 
absolving themselves from responsibility for unpopular wage decisions. 
Until the transfer ·of authority, -the Board of Mediators could always be 
blamed if union members did not receive what .they thought was t]1eir due. 
The Board had accepted this responsibility and. so the Foundation of 
Labour could always pass the blame, if it so wished, to the Board. 
It could do. so no Jonger. The Foundation had now to :face the strong 
-
criticism and pressures that built up within· industry and _it- had--itself 
to ,find acceptable solutions to these problems. The Foundation could 
-not, in practice; act with the detachment and independance -notable· in 
the decisions of the Board. Life for the Foundation. became· much -more 
difficult and -the ·tensions within it more evident. 
It was/ •... 
( 12) "Incomes in Postwar Europe". op cit. Chapter 4 p. 4. 
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It was unfortunate for the Dutch economy that. the new system of 
wage determination·. should have taken place· prior to an increasingly 
serious . shortage of labour. . The result was ·that ·the anticipated in-
·creases proved to be far ·less than. those that occurred. The pressure 
'1 
of demand made .it impossible for the Government or the Foundation to 
prevent increases well above· those· they had thought acceptable o 
What has· oeen described as a· "wage explosion" took ·place in 1964 and 
1965. Employers were again prepared ·.to .pay. "black" wages as ·they 
had on· previous occasions when there· had been . a serio1'l.s . labour 
shortage. Accordingly both wage rates and earnings rose substantially 
and price. stability could not be maintained. In 1966, the Government, 
. extremely concerned about.-the . escalation· of prices and wages, ·for a 
sh:ort while tobk, over ·from the Foundation the power. to. approve or 
disapprove agreements by :transferring these ·powers· to the· Board. 
The Social and Economic Council which was at. this juncture 
called upon .to :report on .the need for revision of the wage determination 
process thought ·that -the State should. still retain authority for approving 
collectively. bargained agreements. Nevertheless P it was clear that 
,there was a substantial minority within .the Council.that was of the opi-
· nion .that despite the ultimate authority. of t;p.e Governm-ent for .the :deter-
mination of wage policy~ direct intervention should be resorted to only in 
extreme situations· in · .. times of major economic crisis~ 
We have already quoted the views of B .c .. Roberts ·in respect of 
the experience of the Netherlands·. but. it is again worth referring to him 
( 12 *) 
as he ,expressed cogently and succinctly in 1957 views which would 
appear to have been· largely justified by events in the subsequent ten 
years. He had wisely observed· that . 11the essential lesson to' be ·learned 
·from/ •..• 
(123€) B.C. ROBERTS. op cit p. 131. 
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from ... the experience of. the Nether lands is .not that inflation cannot be 
prevented by wage, controls ••••• (it can) •••••. but in. a democratic 
society. it. is. impossible to. isolate the instruments of wage determµiation 
from _the pressures generated by the interplay of economic forces. In 
. these circumstances·" 1· claims Roberts 1 . "stability can. only be achieved 
·by .the ·resolute and persistent control of the factors which. lead so 
easily to an over~rapid expansion of effective demand •••• If. the 
check· (to 0 inflation), is .to: be converted into a stable .trend .permanent 
reliance 'Cannot be placed on wage controls 1 ._it must. be placed on fiscal 
and monetary policies·. that will maintain a level of effective demand that 
does not c0nstantly 1induce, wages. to .rise above the JeveL tl:iat would permit 
price stability'". 
(13) 
The 0 .E .c .D •. considered .the .·"wage explosion" in a survey of 
the Nether lands in 1966. It pointed out that various explanations· had 
been suggested for .. the •rapid ·rise in wages in.1963 and 1964 •. These 
were~ ."integration w.ithin,the European Economic Community 
.where (at. least in France and. Germany). real wages were· higher; 
the possible under-valuation of the florin (and) the conditions . of over= 
full employment". The survey suggested that. the evidence favouring 
the· integration within .the E. E .C. and the possible under-valuation of 
.. the florin was not persuasive. It asserts .that· '~the• large differen·ces 
in real wages as between coWltries ( and even as between regions of 
. the same country) do not lead to automatic 1 catching-up' processes. 
They are important only if they result in large-scale movements of 
labour ·towards ;the country where ·real earnings are higher • • • • The 
creation of.the E .E .C. 1 • however 1 has .altered the Jegal but not .the 
' . 
effective conditions 6f labour movements". Indeed 1 .there }).as ·been a 
"net/ .•• 
(13) O.E.C.D. "Economic Surveys. Netherlands" July.1966--pp.8=16. 
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"net immigration of about 10, 000 from 1960 ,onwards 11 as compared to a 
net emigration of between 10, 000 and 20, 000 previously. Accordingly, 
·the increase in the supply of labour would be expected to ·result. in. a 
moderation in the ·rate of wage increase. The Survey agrees that the 
wage explosion of 1963 and 1964 "took place in. conditions .of over=full 
employment" but added .that "over-full employment was not a. novel 
phenomenon" in· the Netherlands and· had existed .. in the· period from 
. 1960 . to 1963 • Why, then, did the wage explosion lag by about four 
. years? The Survey does not deny ·that. there was a. connection ."between 
over-full employment and wage development" but suggests that. "the 
.timing and .the dimensions of the· 1963-64 increases probably depended on 
factors which .lie beyond .the scope of economic analysis properly 
speakingu. All ·the same .. these :factors are most important because 
they may point to .fundamental reasons why an incomes policy may work 
reasonably successfully in a country during particular periods and why 
.jt may be so difficult to institute such policies :in other cmmtries. 
Apart from the factor that employers wanted to ."eliminate or limit" 
'black wages 1 by paying higher wage rates,. employers "may also have 
:tired . of detailed discussion and . intervention involved in previous policies. 
It may also: be·", continues .. the Survey, . "that in the employers 1 organi-
sations, the dominant role is played. by the ·largest firms, Wio ;could more 
' 
easily bear ·large increases. The change in attitude of . the unions , 
from relative moderation and acceptance of the centrally established 
'norms' or .'guidelines' up to ·1962 to massive demands in .1963 and 1964, 
may have ·reflected tensions between rank and file and tin ion leadership, 
which .eventually forced.· the leaders to .change their attitudes". In short 3 
the I . ..... . 
·"'· 
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the social climate may have changed so much as to make the incomes 
policy much more difficult to pursue. The new system instituted in · 1963 
was itse!f primarily a result of the change in ·the attitudes and behaviour 
(14) 
of industry. The 0 .E .C .D. Survey. in 1967 noted that the wage ex-
plosion resulted in average· pay increases per worker of 15 per cent in 
1964 and another 11 per cent. in 1965. "The Government had accepted 
.the freer wage policy to ease the growing tensions on the labour· market". 
We have already mentioned that in 1966, the Government reverted 
to its former policy whereby the Board of Mediators hadfull authority 
.'"to approve, delay, suspend and freeze wage agreements"~ because a 
moderation in the rate of wage increase was not evident. Control of 
wages continued in 1967. However, at the end -of 1967 a .formal agree~ 
ment was reached whereby the system of prior approval of wage agree-
ments would be abolished as .from the beginning of the following year. 
The Minister of Labour retained. the power -.flto .. invalidate :freely negotiated 
collective agreements. if .they were threatening .,the equilibrium of the 
(15) 
economy". A new body of five independant .experts was appointed to 
advise the Minister. The system of prior approval of collective agree-
ments by the Foundation of Labour "came practically to an end· in Decem-
ber ·1967!'. It will be recalled that. the system instituted in 1963 replaced 
the Board of Mediators with Foundation of Labour as the body respon-
(16) 
sible. -for . approving agreehients. The O .• E-.C .D .. Survey said that "it 
. is also .hoped -that the regained freedom in wage negotiation will avoid the 
bickering and bad feelings that beset -the central wage discussion inside 
·the Foundation of Labour 11 • 
The freer system of wage negotiation which operated during 1968 and 
.1969/ •.... 
(14) O.E.C.D. "Economic Surveys. The Netherlands" April 1967 p. 39 
(15) O.E.C .• D • ."Economic Surveys. The Netherlands" May 1968 pp31&33 
(16) 0 .E .C .D. May 1968 op cit. p. 33. 
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1969, however, was seen as a transitional period pending agreement 
between· the Government and both sides of industry on future wage 
policy. - A bill was introduced in Parliament in September 1968 providing 
for Government intervention, but it was met with "heavy parliamentary 
( 17) 
and public opposition". The Government had sought ·the powerll if it 
considered that wage contracts were contrary to ,the national interest to:-
. 
11 
'( i) invalidate wage agreements 
(ii) to .decree a .general wage freeze, and 
(iii) as a last resort to introduce for a maximum period 
of one year the earlier system of prior government 
approval of wage agreements". {18) 
There was provision for- prior consultation with various bodies before 
certain powers were -.e>C.ercised and in .the case of (iii) parliamentary 
ratification of action taken by the Minister of Social Affairs was required 
within three months. 
\ 
In view of the apposition to,the Bill part (iii) was-dropped,and part 
( i) was amended to. include circumstances when it coU1.ld not. be invoked. 
The amended Bill was, finally approved by Parliament in February 1970. 
Nevertheless the 0 ~ E. C • D • stated out that . "in protest the two largest 
unions have withdrawn from all further· negotiations at national · level 
with employers associations and: the Government, in so ,far as the latter 
.( 19) 
might derive from such discussions any norms for further wage trends". 
These l:lllions were· not prepared to. accept the amended Bill which still 
gave the Government -the power to interfere with the terms and conditions 
of individual agreements. 
The / •..•. 
(17) {18) 0 .E .C .D. "Economic Surveys. The Netherlands" April 1970 
pp 28-31 
(19) Op cit. April, 197Q. 
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The question may now .be asked whether ·the Gov~rnment'1 s ;incomes 
policy was a success. This. is as difficult a question to . answer as was 
.that of evaluating the British experience because,· as we have repeatedly 
stressed,· the, success· of any mandatory incomes policy will depend• to 
the -extent ori .which -it- is complemented oy fiscal and monetary policies 
and on ,the relative importance attached to;the various objectives •. _Holland, 
which exports approximately half of ,its fiational product has always been 
acutely conscious of .. the urgency of the need to .take action when there 
appears to ;be a threat to he·-r competitiveness in internati0nal .. trade. 
The incomes policy. may well have been a more appropriate economic 
measure to .help control inflatfom _in. the longer-term_ than Jt .. has· been in 
',_ 
the United. .Kingdom. Holland-' s political climate, jts- •institutions and 
especially the fact .that it. is a relatively small country. certainly helped. 
So -too did .the fact that it was a much more closely~knit community • 
. Would greater -reliance on monetary policy have been preferable? No 
unequivocal answer is available •. The ·economic :effects of monetary 
- ..... . i_• I ~ 
policy are today often far from clear and much·· less was known about 
. them twenty...;five years ago,. The crucial problem of leads and• lags and 
.timing bedevils .the most:Sophisticated "monetary managers" in highly. in-
dustrialised countries. We do not know what level of unemp>loyment in 
the Nether lands, in comparison with -other ·countries, would be -needed 
-for maintaining price stability. Therefore, the direct- intervention may 
have been .the most suitable means of controlling wage and price 'Changes. 
~~ (20) 
The 0 .E ·:8 .C. Report in 1961 takes a somewhat more favourable 
I < 
view of the Dutch policy than economists who -find this type of .direct 
State intervention economically harmful or irrelevant. The 0 .E .E .C. 
Report/ •.• 
-(20) UThe Problem of Rising Prices". Op. cit. 
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Report remarks that if the political climate is congenial, co-operation 
between. labour and employers has been shown-_ to be poss bile to prevent 
inflation, subject. to .the proviso -that. "conditions of extreme excess dem_and 
are not allowed_ to emerge". Moreover, the Report was right to point 
out that -there was at -that time - and .the same would appear to apply 
- today, nearly ten years -later ·- the much more -difficult calculation of how 
_deviations from average increases permitted :11 were to be divided within -the 
" 
sphere of co-operation". In other words, -how were 0.the ·increases 
to be shared out? This dhfficulty is highlighted in so far as :the Govern-
ment or the Foundation of Labour has to consider prevailing m_arket con-
ditions, political pressures, concepts of social justice, short-term _and 
long-term effects on .the supply of .different. types of labour, .. the -supply of 
capital, the encouragement of innovation and enterprise and -many other 
J..~ - -
-factors. before deciding . whether to permit.the· implementation of a parti-
cular agreemen_t. In short, can a really pervasive mandatory. incomes 
-,, ....., - _r·· 
' -
' ' 
policy ever ·be -successfully administered except. in critical economic con-
, i' 
ditions when people may. be willing to .forget .their particular interests for 
the common good? As yet .there is -little assurance -that it can. The 
- .... ~. ,. _-_ - ,_, - -J 
- extensive human resources, although admittedly difficult to quantify,, which 
are needed to .institute and" apply a .comprehensive ·incomes policy may be 
. ·.;_ .... 
'far more usefully employed in more~ productive activities. 
It- is -necessary- to -consider ·the Dutch approach to profits and prices -
-, ' 
as these are essential elements· in an incomes policy and -their ·inclusion in 
- . 
the Dutch incomes policy contributed to its success. in the immediate post· -
.. 
war period. 
It had been -realised by the political leaders in . the Nether lands that 
despite the relatively high degree of goodwill existing between organised 
labour and employers, an incomes policy was not a feasible political 
proposition/ ••• 
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proposition unless profits and prices were brought within its ambit, 
·· irrespective of their economic significance. It w.as important, if the 
goodwill of labour were ·to be retained, that an· incomes. policy include 
non-wage incomes. Economists realised the problems inherent in trying 
.to ,control pr0fits by other than :fiscal methods. Some of these pr0blems 
we have considered elsewhere, such as the effect on entrepreneurial 
. incentive and on costs .if profits were .to; be pegged_. We have pointed 
out already. that where profits are pegged the competition essential in a 
basically free enterprise economy would be eroded and it. is q'Uite possible 
to envisage circumstances where :inefficienLfirms would. be able to z:-emain 
\ 
in business. In. conditicms of excess demal,ld and pegged profit margins 
there -is naturally much.· less incentive for elther an efficient. or an inefficient 
firm to reduce ·.its costs. In the case of an economy such as that of 
Holland which .has to . face intern~tional: co:mpetitfori. in . orderv_to · __ .survive, 
.this. in ·itself would undoubtedly provide not only the need for industrial 
efficieri:cy. but also :the incentive to :remain competitive in order ·to :remain 
in business at all. 
Profits in the Netherlands w_ere, of course, subject. to tax,· but, 
other than by fiscal means, .the only really effective control of profits was 
through price controls. In practice, the control of prices· has been 
operated,· in .the main --"oy negotiation and voluntary agreem.ent between 
the Government and produc-ers, although , •••• ,{.the) Government (has) 
( 21) 
the Statutory power to :fix ma,.ximum prices u: negotiations should fail". 
In the Netherlands these powers are comprehensive! As :the -Dutch 
spend approximately half their national income on. imports, ·it is ·very 
. difficult for the State to .prevent price . increases where .they are caused 
by/ •... 
(21) ·."Incomes in Postwar Europe".· Chapter 4. p. 10. 
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by the ·rise· in price of imported raw materials or capital goods • 
.. Especially during :the Korean war period when prices of primary 
commodities rose· steeply it was impossible in many, instances to prevent 
domestic prices rising as a resµlt. There was, nevertheless, co-opera-
tion between., the Government and producers· in fixing prices. Producers 
were required to :inform the Minister of Economic Affairs Qf all price 
increases of both goods and services. This notification was to be 
accompanied by the reasom for the increase. In .the case of some basic 
commodities, such. a milk, bread and margarine, a price increase· had 
. to :be notified to .the Department. in advance. This, list became much 
smaller than .in .. the critical period following the War and. is part of the 
attempt by industry. to free-::itSelf from direct state· intervention in price 
fixing as well as in wage determination. There is still considerable 
control over rural and. urban rents;· but much of this stems .from pre-
war ·legislation. 
It. is important. to :rememher that the Government has. reserve powers· 
and has on occasions used them when excess demand generally or ·the 
pressure of wage costs arising ·from wage· increases,· in particular, have 
made themselves felt in the level of prices. Iri 1963 and 1964 .these 
·reserve powers were used with effect to stop price, increases. In 1966 
. the Government, again .. concerned about .the ·balance of i:>ayinents, autho-
rised. a blanket price .Ufreeze" unless .the :i;>rice increases could be shown 
not to stem from rises in wage costs, but were caused through the 
higher prices . of imported goods. 
At the end of 1966 the: .producers, wholesalers and retailers agreed 
to continµe to co-operate with the Government in: the following year with 




price increases Jf. it regarded .them as being unjustifie4! , ,In 1968 and 
during the ~early months of 1969 the Government pursued a more active 
price policy as prices were showing significant increases. This policy 
did not achieve the desired results so a price "freeze·" was instituted in 
April. Relative price stability ensued and there ·was a relaxation·. of 
the ·"freeze" in September. Howevep, these emergency ·"freezes" 
'• ( 22) 
are not themselves cures for an.f-:iiriflationary spiral. The 0 .E .c .D. 
remarked that.• "it weuld indeed be desirable that ( empIOyers and employees) 
draw up some· stab:ilisation 1 plan 1 • • • • • • • and that this should not be re-
l 
garded as an emergency step te be taken only after an inflationary spiral 
has begun. 11 •. 
How has Holland fared . in comparison with otlier. countries as regards 
\ ~ 
consumer prices? Using an:index with a 1958 base the figures below re-
fleet. the change ·in .consunier prices from -1951 to' 1966.·,in West Germany, 
·Sweden, ;.the United Kingdom .and the United States as well as H0lland. 














. United State.s. \ 
:89 
113 
West Germany without an .. incomes policy, has .done• better. than Holland. 
'\\,; 
So has .. the United State~. · :.s.weaen:-on ·the other ·hand has donID somewhat 
'. 
worse with a relatively centralised system of collective bargaining and a 
considerable measure of control by central industrial organisations over 
their members.. The· price• increase : in . the United Kingdom .. has. been 
greater since, 1958 than; o.efore that' year' despite ·the attempts at a 
voluntary incomes policy b.Y .the Conservative administration .• 
The/ ••. 
(22) Op cit. April, 1970 p. 41~ 
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The table p.elow 'sets out in mere detail the rise in darestic output priGe s 
in nine Western· European Countries from 1953 to 1964 together with the 
percentage of this rise attributed to ;incomes from employment. The ftgur.es 
should be viewed. in the· light of .the weight of the component; income from 
employment in total domestic output~ -
. / 
Country Domestic % Contribution to The weights 
Output Pr·ice Rise. of the a::mponent 
Price Rise. Income from of income ·from 
·--Employment of which emplqyment in 
total domestic 
erµployers u 
output. in 1953 
contribution 
and 1964 
. to·· social 














Iqs8-64 28.3 74.2 l'3. 8 1964: 53 0 2 7.51 
Norway 19. 9 59 .1 2.5 47.0 0.8 
19. 0 56.3 13. 2 50.0 2.7 
Sweden 18 .1 62.9 
-
59.0 -
25.4 77.9 - 62.8 ·-
Denmark ·14. 5 52.9 0.3 46.l o .• 3 




United 21.1 69.3 7.3 58.0 3.5 
Kingdom 16. 9 59. 5. 6.5 59.9 4.5 
West 12. 0 67.0 13. 0 44.8 4.4 
German;y 22.4 59.9 4.0 49.3 501 
; 
I 
France 28.4 53.5 8.5 44.2 8.4 
38.0 59.6 16. 0 48.3 10. 0 
12.3 54.3 = 39.4 -
Italy 29.8 71.3 - 47.3 ·-
17. 8 47.9 12 .1 46.8 5.3 
1Austria 26.6 55.4 10 .6 48.8 7. l 
I 
What conclusions may be drawn from ·these statistics? Firstly, although 
Holland had the most comprehesive incomes policy of any m.ixed industrial 
economy, domestic output prices in .the first period from· 1953 to 1958 
rose more rapidly. than Jn Sweden, Norway; Denmark, West Germany, 
Austria and Italy and .even ·.the United Kingdom. In the second period 
from 1958.to ,1964 prices-rose more steeply than-.in Norway,. Sweden, 
the United Kingdom and West. Germany,. but· less so ;than . .in France, Italy 
and Denmark. 
From. these ,figures is it fair to. say that the Dutch wage policy 
achieved m·ore :than· the relatively greater reliance placed on· fiscal and 
monetary policies· by other countries'? The facts .do not· seem to . be 
conclusive or -even particularly persuasive when .viewed .. from the longer-
term aspect. in evaluating the success ·of the' inc om es policy. . The 
.figures, however, rhust be viewed with some caution , as the authority 
quot~~ ).them admits :that .. the measures. for computing them are· not -the 
same in. each .country. However they are· not- likely to· be sufficiently 
. inaccurate to ;justify, qisregarding <them. 
What. of. labour productivity? Here again, the. table on .,the ·following 
page, taken· from the same . source 'is· by no m·eans .conclusive and· it. is 
. necessary to stress too.,that. the computation· 0f the productivity of labour 
and capital is subject. to a good deal of controvers_f • 
( 23): "Incomes :in Postwar .Europe". op cit. Chapter 2. 
l,_,lJ.Cl .. U~t::i:> 1 • .u VU.vi.JUL Cl.HU. UJ.J.1L l.;Ui:>Li:> J.UJ." VCl.J."1UUi:> l.,;Ui:>L-1...;UlUUU.Ut::!.1.Li:> ·LIJ. i:>t::!t::l.,;Lt::U VVt::i:>Lt::L"!J.1 -C/UJ."Uµt:::.Cl.J.J. _1.,;UUJ.J.LJ."Lt::i:> •. !"1""J_J t.u.-.l.,.,Ul.1-o 
Domestic output :a Cost per unit of out.out-·- · Income -per uh.it of inout Inouts Productivitv 
Country , . . Indirect ·Gross . Voluth.e Prices Labour Capital _ taxes Labour C "t 1 Labour Capital Labour Capital. (net) .Earnings api a 
return. 
Austria 184.7 144.4 131.2 192.2 . 172.2 235.5 - -- 103.9 - -- 177.8 - -
-·B.eiguim 151.8 122.4 128.1 107.2 -152.I - . 180.5 ,.115.3 -- .106.6 139 142.4 109.2 
:France ·-17Q-•.. 8 166.4 164.3 165.7 176.7 272.1 188.7 -103.2 150 .165~6 -113.9 
! 
-W-estern Germany 209.6 134.4 139;0 131.2 122.9 220_.9 ; 157.9 126.1 -194 166.3 108.1 
I-taly J83. 8 142 .. 1 .149. 8 128 .• 2 . 156. 6 264 •. 0 .159. 0 IOL 1 139 · 181. 8 132. 2 
Netherlands 168. 4 150. 0 171 .. 1 12-0 .4 .124. 5 - 243. 9 ;121. 4 118 .1 167 142. 6 100. 8 
~orway 155.7 .138.9 133.5 147.1 :157.6 203.9 140.3 103.6 · 157 150.J 99.2 
' 
·Sweden 159.o 143.5 141.9 123.1 211.9 _206.7 - - 109.1 -- 145.6 ---
. 
- United Kingdom 139. 5 : 138. 0 144.'7 121.I 141.1 188. 2 : 114. 5 · · 107. 4 14 7 129. 9 94. 9 






In concluding the· discussion of the development of . .the incomes policy 
in .the N.etherlands ·it is necessary to .stress :that wage and price stability 
must be seen·in the, context of Dutch economic policy as a whole. 
i , ! 24) 
· ·murray Edelman and·:'R~W. Flemming go as -far as . claiming :that '~it 
cannot be overemphasised, .that wage and price. stability as such have· not 
. been a. major objective of .Dutch .economic policy. As a matter of fact,.·" 
.they assert, ·''leading .economists. in the ~etherlp.nds argue ·that. their 
system ha.s ·little to. do with wage inflation or cost--push ·theory. The 
wage policy evolved not from theorising,. buLfrom .. the desparate postwar 
·economic . situation and . the shee_r ·necessity. for ·co-operation cm· .the part 
of .the ·mterest groups •••••• · Thus. wage· policy was conceived and 
developed within .the ··framework~ .of multiple objectives, including not only 
wage-price· stability, but also and much mor.e important, rapid economic 
growth,. full iemployfuent,. balance of payments quilibrium.,, equitable 
' 
distribution of incomes' 'industrial pea~e: in a. framework -of industrial 
democracy, and .. ecG>nomic planning :to ,ensure· an .orderly, co-ordinated 
devel0pm·ent of all factors contributing to ;national economic policy". 
Edelman and· Flemrhing ·.observe, · however, .. tll.at .: "it. Js .extremely difficult 
, to .measure the ·degree: to which ,these .various . objectives :have been 
achieveGl" • 
The developm-ent oL.the incomes policy of -the Netherlands from 1970 
"is difficult toi .predic.t. . Th,e stresses and. strains affecting :the· policy are 
·significant and may become more .. intense. Much_ greater ·freedom .in -wage 
negotiaticm is. now. accepted by the Governmen.t. It. is possible that'.the 
•incom-es policy will move further :towards . .the· policies 0f .the Scandinavian 
.countries and, in particular, Sw~den,. buLit. is :likely .. lll:at the ·Dutch 
. Governm-ent will want to .retain .its· reserve powers· for a CQnsiderable 
•tim-e ·to )com-e. . The Dutch .policy had,· 
of course/ •..• 
(24) MURRAY EDEL:MAN and R.W. F~EMING: ·11 The Politics -of 




It w0uld ·be satisfying 'to conclude a survey of income policies with 
some· persuasive arguments that they were worth the t~ou~le 'they involved 
.. instituting anC.l,_ apply-ing: them. Unfortunately,. no. such, evaluation .seems .to 
be .justified,. except in so;far as.:the policies are -designed,. pureiy as rela~ 
· .tively ~hort-run measures. for managing an economy in ,times of crisis and 
emergency. However, . it is surely right to ql.\eistion whether a short...,term 
}1fre~ze" or similar ·restraint. cm prices and incom·es may. pr.operly. be called 
an.· ''incomes. policy". If a.; 11freeze 11 is.included.within .. the concept of 8.1:1 
·.incomes . p0licy, .. there rnay be sound . economic reas<::>ns for Jts. impos~tion, 
· .. if it is. essential to, secure· an; immediate an.d effective control over· prices 
and incomes. Despite .the disadv.antages of extensive government interven.-
tion, a.: 11freeze·" ·is quid.k-ac.ting.· . During ;the period oLits imposition it may 
, be ,possible to: set in motion other economic me_asures w:hich., _r although. act-
. ing .far more. slowly,, serve-· in ,,the .longer-term ·to .change the·. structural and 
institutional conditions which. encourage. and perpetuate inflation. The 
"freeze", accordingly, may assist in ·providing. an appropriate ~ . .temporary 
:i;-espite, during w;hich ·,other factors may be .allowed to .influence .~the economy, 
1 
· by changing. social attitudes·, alleviating. shortages,. and promoting a more 
efficient. use of the res'ources of the country. 
Where. an · inflation -.is diagnosed as primarily of a :11 cost..:.push 11 
nature, sustained 'Qy '"administered" prices. in ~ey ·industries and .the 
m.onopoly. power ·of organised. lab0ur, an :inc9mes .policy may.· be· of 
greater assistance . in .the' short.-run' ' in 'controlling the rate . of inflation' 
than other policies, such as . a .. tighter ·control of the meney supply or 
severe· fiscal measures. ·An: .incomes policy may· be able .to avoid :the 
' 
level ·of unemployment and .the margin of spaI'e capacity. that .the appli~ 
cation .. of alternative• policies may require. Miss Anne · Rorqanis · nas ob-
• 
served that: "in practice • • • the inducemenLto ·adopt an :incomes policy 
is stronger ·in some economies .. than in others. The ·inducement is 
. (1) MISS ANNE ROMANIS: "Cost Inflation, Incomes Policy in Industrial 
Countries". International Monetary Fund •. Staff Papers March· 1967 p 204. 
171 •. 
greatest", she considers, nwhere relative price stability is needed• to 
.facilitate expansion of employment ••••• or to improve a critical 
balance of pa,.yments•i. 
However·,· if the direct. intervention pY ·the State ·in. the determination 
of prices and incomes encourages attitudes .that make· institutional and 
other changes even harder ·to achieve, there· is· little or nothing to :justify 
. it. The mefubers of a community must, as a whole, freely co-operate, 
· if the policy is t0 have any success. We cannot. but agree with Professor 
(2) 
J .. Pen, who remarks that an "incomes policy must be .,accepted whole-
heartedly by all parties concerned. If not,:you can't have it". Holland 
enjoyed this co.-operati0n for a relatively long spell in peacetime. This 
was probably due to a combination of factors which would be· inapplicable 
in most other industrialised countries. Therefore, the Dutch .experience 
may be an unreliable guide ·to nations contemplating similar policies. In 
the United Kingdom the necessary spirit of co-operation was not present. 
The· lack of resolution shown by the Labour Government in 1968, was 
itself an acknowledgement of . the ·trade unions 1 suspicion and hostility 
to .the incomes p0lic.y. . Indeed, it remains uncertain whether the 
policy in Great Britain will have any enduring beneficial results. Perhaps, 
Jt may have even done more harm than good .if it has made valuable changes 
within. industry r.pore difficult. to . carry through. Although exhortation may 
prove normally to be an . in,e~ective m-eth.od of controlling·· inflation, it may, 
( 3) 
on the other hand,· be relatively harmless. Samuel Brittan has asserted 
that "while few advanced Western countries operate statutory price and 
wage controls, hardly any have ·felt able to dispense with exhortations, 
statements/ •... 
(2) J .PEN: "Harmony and Conflict in Modern Society" p. 72 
(3) SAMUEL BRITTAN: ."Steering the Economy" p. 324. It would 
perhaps,· have been more accurate to have qualified .the words 
"statutory •• .controls 11 with the word "extensive" or 11 pervasive11 • Minimum 
wage legislation for example,· is not unusual. Nor is rent control. 
1?2.. 
statements of 'norms 1 and occasiona~ arm-twisting. Incomes policies"~ 
· he continues, . "are thus a never ending series of tactical engagements 
with no .·victory or conclusion ever . in sight". Moreover~ he adds· that 
·
11 no one can say how much faster prices would have •risen - or how 
much higher unemployment would have been required to contain .. inflation 
at a given rate -:- if governments had. not. bothered about. the question 
at all". 
We cannot confidently suggest a more precise conclusion to .the 
study of. incorlles policies. We do not know the formµla which will 
make an. incofues policy both. economically efficient and politically 
acceptable in•. industrialised Western countries. 
- - · - - oO o , - · · - - -
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